Opinion
1 CA-CR 12-0119
02-05-2013
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. DAVID SHROPSHIRE, Appellant.
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section Attorneys for Appellee James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender By Jeffrey L. Force, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication -
Rule 111, Rules of the
Arizona Supreme Court)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CR2010-145311-001
The Honorable Kristin C. Hoffman, Judge
Affirmed
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General
By Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel
Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section
Attorneys for Appellee
Phoenix James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender
By Jeffrey L. Force, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Appellant
Phoenix GOULD, Judge ¶1 David Shropshire ("Shropshire") appeals from his conviction and sentence for theft, a class three felony; burglary in the third degree, a class four felony; and possession of burglary tools, a class six felony. Shropshire was sentenced on September 16, 2011 and filed a delayed notice of appeal on February 21, 2012. He had earlier filed an untimely notice of appeal on October 25, 2011, but it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on December 30, 2011. The trial court granted his request to file a delayed notice of appeal on the grounds that the delay was due to no fault of his own. Shropshire's counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), advising this Court that after a search of the entire appellate record, no arguable ground exists for reversal. Shropshire was granted leave to file a supplemental brief in propria persona on or before November 13, 2012, and did not do so. ¶2 Our obligation in this appeal is to review "the entire record for reversible error." State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30, 2 P.3d 89, 96 (App. 1999). We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-4033(A)(1) (West 2012). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Unless otherwise specified, we cite to the current version of the applicable statutes because no revisions material to this decision have occurred.
Facts and Procedural History
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions and resulting sentences. See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293, 778 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1989).
¶3 On August 30, 2010, a Scottsdale police officer observed a Ford Taurus pull out of a business shopping center at 2:00 A.M, long after all the businesses had been closed. He observed the Ford Taurus pull into a Circle K parking lot. Shropshire got out of the driver's side; another man exited the passenger side. ¶4 The officer watched as Shropshire and the passenger went into the store, exited the store, went to the pay phones, and went back to the car multiple times. The officer had to leave, but relayed the information to another officer and asked him to take over. ¶5 Another officer arrived in an unmarked vehicle and observed Shropshire walking back and forth from the vehicle to the pay phone. The officer approached Shropshire, who was standing by the pay phone. In the interim, the Circle K clerk called the police to report two suspicious individuals. ¶6 When the officer approached Shropshire, Shropshire stated that he was having vehicle problems and that he was calling for a taxi. He explained that he had just come from visiting a friend who lived in Mesa and had been on his way to central Phoenix to help another friend who was also having vehicle problems. When the officer asked why he was in Scottsdale, Shropshire had no answer. When asked for identification, Shropshire explained that his identification and keys were both locked in the Ford Taurus. ¶7 However, after Shropshire was arrested, a key was found in his possession. The officer asked Shropshire whether the key went to the Ford Taurus. Shropshire replied that it went to a Ford Mustang. However, when the officer went to the Ford Taurus and inserted the key, it opened. ¶8 The Ford Taurus was impounded and searched. The officer who inventoried the Ford Taurus testified that eight catalytic converters were found in the trunk of the car. A cordless saw and five pipe cutters were also found. The officer also explained that catalytic converters are typically stolen using a cordless, battery-operated saw or a tailpipe cutter. ¶9 Later that day and the next day, three people in the area reported that their catalytic converters were missing. None of the three had given permission to anyone to remove their catalytic converters from their vehicles. DNA samples taken from one of the catalytic converters found in the trunk matched the buccal swab DNA taken from Shropshire. Three of the catalytic converters found in Shropshire's trunk were eventually matched to three victims' trucks by comparing the pieces of mounting bracket that had been cut from the truck. All three of the victims' trucks had been parked within one mile of the Circle K where Shropshire was apprehended. ¶10 Shropshire was arrested on August 30, 2010. He was charged with theft, a class three felony; burglary in the third degree, a class four felony; and possession of burglary tools, a class six felony. ¶11 Shropshire was either present or waived his presence and was represented by counsel throughout all stages of the case. A jury eventually found Shropshire guilty of all three offenses. All three offenses were found by the jury to be aggravated by the expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value; the second and third offenses were also aggravated by the presence of an accomplice. ¶12 During a hearing on Shropshire's prior felony convictions, the Court noted that Shropshire admitted his two prior felony convictions. Shropshire was given an opportunity to speak at sentencing. ¶13 The trial court sentenced Shropshire to a presumptive prison term of 13.25 years for count one, 12 years for count two, and 5.75 years for count three, to be served concurrently, with credit for 382 days served.
Discussion
¶14 We have read and considered the entire record and have found no meritorious grounds for reversal of Shropshire's conviction or for modification of the sentence imposed. Clark, 196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50, 2 P.3d at 100. Shropshire was present at all critical stages of the proceedings and was represented by counsel. All proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and substantial evidence supported the finding of guilt. Accordingly, we affirm.
Conclusion
¶15 Counsel's obligations pertaining to Shropshire's representation in this appeal have ended. Counsel need do nothing more than inform Shropshire of the status of the appeal and his future options, unless counsel's review reveals an issue appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for review. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584-85, 684 P.2d 154, 156-57 (1984). Shropshire shall have thirty days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he so desires, with an in propria persona motion for reconsideration or petition for review.
Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 31.18(b), Defendant or his counsel has fifteen days to file a motion for reconsideration. On the court's own motion, we extend the time to file such a motion to thirty days from the date of this decision.
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ANDREW W. GOULD, Judge
CONCURRING: ________
MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge
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DONN KESSLER, Judge