Opinion
No. 107,293.
2013-03-8
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Glen SHIPLEY, Appellant.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Thomas H. Bornholdt, Judge. Christina M. Waugh, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Clayton J. Perkins, legal intern, Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Johnson District Court; Thomas H. Bornholdt, Judge.
Christina M. Waugh, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Clayton J. Perkins, legal intern, Steven J. Obermeier, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., McANANY, J., and KNUDSON, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Glen Shipley pled guilty to felony possession of marijuana. In March 2010, the court granted Shipley a departure sentence of 12 months' probation with an underlying 30–month prison term. The court ordered Shipley into a community corrections residential program. At some point during his probation Shipley spent time at Mirror, Inc., an inpatient drug treatment facility.
In September 2010, Shipley was placed on house arrest with electronic monitoring until late November 2010.
In July 2011, Shipley's probation was revoked after Shipley stipulated to violating the terms of his probation. He claimed he was entitled to jail time credit for the time he served on house arrest in 2010. (He made no claim regarding his time at the Mirror, Inc., inpatient drug treatment facility.) Relying on State v. Williams, 18 Kan.App.2d 424, 427, 431, 856 P.2d 158 (1993), the district court ruled that Shipley was not entitled to jail time credit under K.S.A. 21–4614a for time spent on house arrest. Shipley then filed his notice of appeal regarding “all adverse rulings.”
A few days after filing his notice of appeal, Shipley filed in the district court an addendum to his jail time credit claim, adding the time he was in the Mirror, Inc., program. We have no indication the district court ever considered this new claim.
Now, on appeal, Shipley argues that the district court erred in not awarding jail time credit for time he spent at Mirror, Inc. Whether we have jurisdiction over this issue is as question of law over which our review is unlimited. See State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 1147, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009), cert. denied130 S.Ct. 3410 (2010).
We have jurisdiction only over the rulings identified in the notice of appeal. State v. Huff, 278 Kan. 214, 217, 92 P.3d 604 (2004). Shipley's notice of appeal, which covered “the revocation of probation and all adverse rulings,” was filed before he raised the issue about Mirror, Inc. Further, there is no indication the court made an adverse ruling on this issue. Thus, we have no jurisdiction to consider this issue. This portion of Shipley's appeal is dismissed.
Next, Shipley contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for jail time credit for the time he spent on house arrest. The right to jail time credit is statutory. State v. Theis, 262 Kan. 4, 7, 936 P.3d 710 (1997). Our review over a matter of statutory interpretation is unlimited. State v. Dale, 293 Kan. 660, 662, 267 P.3d 743 (2011).
K.S.A. 21–4614a allows credit for time a defendant “has spent in a residential facility while on probation, assignment to a conservation camp or assignment to community correctional residential services program.” K.S.A. 21–4614a does not mention house arrest.
Shipley likens his house arrest to being in a halfway house. See State v. Brown, 38 Kan.App.2d 490, 493–94, 167 P.3d 367 (2007). But the Brown court specifically contrasted a halfway house with house arrest, recognizing that this court had previously ruled that house arrest did not fit the definition of a residential facility. 38 Kan.App.2d at 494. In State v. Cordill, 24 Kan.App.2d 780, 781, 955 P.2d 633 (1997), the court held that house arrest does not meet the requirements for a residential facility or a community correctional residential services program under K.S.A. 21–4614a. We adhere to the holding in Cordill.
Finally, Shipley argues that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. But under K.S.A.2012 Supp. 22–3608(c) Shipley had 14 days from the court's ruling within which to file a notice of appeal on this issue. He failed to do so. Thus, we have no jurisdiction to consider this claim and we dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.