State v. Sheriff

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Pima County Superior Court

    442 P.2d 113 (Ariz. 1968)   Cited 5 times

    * * *" In State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 396 P.2d 613, we said: "The State of Arizona sought a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in this Court to direct the Sheriff of Pima County and the Supervisor of the Arizona State Hospital, to release and transport Peter Damskey to the Justice of the Peace Court in Pima County for a preliminary examination on the charges of murder and assault with intent to commit murder pending before that Justice of the Peace Court. That writ was granted by this Court on October 6, 1964.

  2. State v. Denton

    101 Ariz. 455 (Ariz. 1966)   Cited 34 times

    In State v. Buchanan, 94 Ariz. 100, 381 P.2d 954 we held that a defendant can be criminally tried and sentenced if he can understand the nature of the proceedings against him and assist in his defense though he has been certified as incompetent and committed for the treatment of a mental illness. See also State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 396 P.2d 613. Defendant's final argument is that the verdicts are contrary to the evidence.

  3. Palmer v. State

    407 P.2d 64 (Ariz. 1965)   Cited 12 times

    There was no error in denial of petitioner's motion. State v. Heisler, supra; State v. Kostura, 98 Ariz. 186, 403 P.2d 283; cf. State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 396 P.2d 613. Petitioner next contends that he was deprived of a fundamental right to be informed of the charges against him. During the eighteen-month period between filing of the complaint and his release from the Arizona state prison, petitioner argues he did not know when the robberies were alleged to have been committed, who the victims were, or where the robberies allegedly took place.

  4. State v. Seay

    232 Ariz. 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 15 times
    Granting presentence credit from the date defendant was transferred to county jail from ADOC

    And it may be used to transfer a person from a state facility to a county jail. See State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 43, 396 P.2d 613, 613–14 (1964). Thus, Seay was in the custody of Cochise County when transferred pursuant to that writ, and he clearly was in custody for the offenses charged in the October 6 indictment. See§ 13–712(B); De Passquallo, 140 Ariz. at 229, 681 P.2d at 381.

  5. State v. Loera

    165 Ariz. 543 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 7 times

    It is generally true that the state may use a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to return the accused to the county where charges have been filed. State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 43, 396 P.2d 613, 614 (1964); cf. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1845, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial on charges pending in one state while he is incarcerated in another; that writ is a proper method of bringing a defendant to trial.

  6. Anonymous v. Superior Court in & for the County of Pima

    10 Ariz. App. 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 11 times
    In Anonymous v. Superior Court In And For Co. of Pima, 10 Ariz. App. 243, 247, 457 P.2d 956, the court said that "the term `suspend,' given its ordinary meaning, means nothing more than a temporary cessation, i.e., a holding in abeyance."

    We conceive that the simultaneous suspension of criminal prosecution was intended to safeguard petitioner's interests since a finding of civil incompetency does not serve to avoid criminal prosecution. State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 396 P.2d 613 (1964); State v. Buchanan, 94 Ariz. 100, 381 P.2d 954 (1963); McWilliams v. Justice Court, Tucson Precinct No. 1, 5 Ariz. App. 200, 424 P.2d 848 (1967). As to petitioner's double jeopardy argument, there is substantial authority that the constitutional ban against double jeopardy prevents prosecution in the adult court for the same offense upon which an adjudication of delinquency was predicated.

  7. McWilliams v. Justice Court, Tucson Precinct No. 1

    424 P.2d 848 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 4 times

    A finding of civil incompetency does not preclude criminal prosecution. State v. Buchanan, 94 Ariz. 100, 102, 381 P.2d 954 (1963); State v. Sheriff of Pima County, 97 Ariz. 42, 43, 396 P.2d 613 (1964). As pointed out in State ex rel. Ronan v. Stevens, 92 Ariz. 227, 375 P.2d 717 (1962), there are different degrees of mental incompetency and a "mentally ill person" as defined in A.R.S. § 36-501(2) may be competent to the extent that "he is [able] to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense."