Opinion
Case ID: 1411003781
05-22-2015
RE: State of Delaware v. Rayshawn Sheppard
RICHARD F. STOKES JUDGE Caroline C. Brittingham, Esquire
Department of Justice
114 East Market Street
Georgetown, DE 19947
Thomas A. Pedersen, Esquire
115 South Bedford Street
Georgetown, DE 19947
Dear Counsel:
On November 7, 2014, Delaware State Trooper Schlimer ("Officer") was travelling eastbound in an unmarked car on Church Road. As he approached a stop sign at an intersection, Trooper observed a dark skinned black man, Rayshawn Sheppard, ("Defendant"), driving northbound, approaching from Officer's right side. Officer observed Defendant consistently holding what Officer perceived to be a white cell phone in his right hand up to his right ear. According to Officer, the phone was particularly discernible based on the light color of the phone contrasting against Defendant's darker skin color. Officer proceeded to follow Defendant. When Defendant turned onto German Road, the officer activated his lights intending to pull Defendant over for utilizing a cellular phone while driving under Title 11, Section 4176(C). Defendant continued to drive on German Road a rate of approximately 30 miles per hour.
Upon observing Defendant jettison suspected contraband out of a passenger side window, Officer activated his siren. Defendant then turned onto Palmer Lane, a private street, and stopped. After that, Officer approached the vehicle and observed the presence of two cellular phones inside of the vehicle, including a white iPhone he believed Defendant was using. Nothing else was found in the car that could have been mistaken for a white cellular phone. At this time, no investigation was held as to how the phone may have been used. Later on, the phone was returned to Defendant while he was being transported. When Officer returned to where the suspected contraband had been disposed, Officer found suspected marijuana.
The incident, including the traffic stop, was recorded by Officer's car camera. The recording does not provide a clear image of the Defendant utilizing a cellular phone while driving. At the intersection where the Officer testified he witnessed Defendant holding a white cellular phone up to his face, Defendant's vehicle was beyond the periphery of the car camera's lens.
Records were presented by defense counsel showing no incoming or outgoing calls were made from the cellular number associated with Defendant around the time of the traffic stop. No supplemental records reflecting data usage from the number associated with Defendant were presented.
Generally, a traffic stop is a seizure of a vehicle and its occupants under the Fourth Amendment. The ability of a law enforcement officer to conduct a stop is constitutionally limited. The State must demonstrate the reasonableness of a traffic stop and further investigations resulting from the stop. The standard to justify a traffic stop is a lesser standard than probable cause; the officer need only form a reasonable articulable suspicion when initiating the stop to justify the stop. Following a stop, any subsequent inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation." The question this Court must address in the present case is whether the stop was justified at its inception by a reasonable articulable suspicion of a traffic violation.
Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1045 (Del. 2001).
Id.
Id.
See e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (permitting "police officers who suspect criminal activity to make limited intrusions on an individual's personal security based on less than probable cause"); see also, Caldwell, 780 A.2d at 1045.
Id.; see also, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880-81 (1975) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29); see also, Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (stating "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warrants a temporary seizure for the purpose of questioning limited to the purpose of the stop").
For the purposes of this decision only the Court will assume the officer was under a mistaken belief and Defendant was not actually using or talking on his cell phone. Accepting this as true, the question is whether the traffic stop was valid even if Officer was under a mistaken factual belief as to Defendant's use of a cellular phone when operating a vehicle. Specifically, the Court must determine whether Officer was able to form an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant was using or talking on a cellular phone while operating a vehicle, notwithstanding whether or not Defendant was in fact using or talking on a cellular phone while operating a vehicle, based on the circumstances confronting Officer.
A police officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts that lead to a seizure during a traffic stop will not always violate the Fourth Amendment. As the United States Supreme Court recently verified:
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); United States v. Garcia-Acuna, 175 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 966 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1006 (11th Cir.1992).
[A] search or seizure may be permissible even though the justification for the action includes a reasonable factual mistake. An officer might, for example, stop a motorist for traveling alone in a high-occupancy vehicle lane, only to discover upon approaching the car that two children are slumped over asleep in the back seat. The driver has not violated the law, but neither has the officer violated the Fourth Amendment.In analyzing the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in an earlier case, the Delaware Supreme Court held: "a police officer's good faith mistake of fact will not taint an arrest that would have been lawful if the basis for his suspicion of criminal conduct had in fact been accurate." Thus, a reasonable factual mistake that forms the basis of a suspicion regarding ensuing unlawful conduct, as a general matter, will not invariably go beyond the constitutional limits of the Fourth Amendment.
Heien v. N. Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (U.S. 2014).
McDonald v. State, 947 A.2d 1073, 1083 (Del. 2008).
In U.S. Chantasouxat the Eleventh Circuit held: "an officer's mistaken assessment of facts need not render his actions unreasonable because what is reasonable will be completely dependent on the specific and usually unique circumstances presented by each case." Also, in an analogous case the Seventh Circuit held: the "propriety of the traffic stop does not depend ... on whether [the defendant is] actually guilty of committing a traffic offense.... The pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for [the officer] to believe that [a traffic offense had been committed]." As such, a reasonable mistake of fact by an officer may still provide an adequate objective basis for a law enforcement officer to form a reasonable articulable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir.1996)).
Id.
When a mistake of fact becomes part of the basis of a law enforcement officer's suspicion of criminal activity, the only additional question to the standard assessment of an investigatory stop the Court must determine is whether the mistake of fact itself was reasonable. In this case, there is a two-step analysis. First, whether Officer's mistake of fact that Defendant was violating traffic laws by using or talking on a cellular phone while operating a vehicle was reasonable. Second, if the mistake is reasonable, the Court must determine whether a reasonable articulable suspicion was formed prior to initiating a stop such that the traffic stop is justified given the circumstances confronting Officer. In making this fact-sensitive determination, "[g]reat deference is given to the judgment of trained law enforcement officers on the scene."
Id.; see also, United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining "if an officer makes a traffic stop based on a mistake of fact, the only question is whether his mistake of fact was reasonable").
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 194 (2001). --------
After reviewing the facts, the Court finds when Officer observed what he believed to be a white cell phone held up to Defendant's face while operating a vehicle at an intersection, it was a reasonable to infer that Defendant was utilizing his phone while operating his vehicle.
Next, provided that Officer's belief is a reasonable mistake of fact, the remaining question is whether a reasonable articulable suspicion was formed at the inception of the stop. Officer witnessed a driver utilizing what he reasonably believed to be a cellular phone while operating a vehicle prior to activating the lights of his unmarked car. As such, before the inception of the traffic stop, it was reasonable to engage in an investigatory stop. Thus, the Court finds Officer formed a reasonable articulable suspicion prior to initiating the traffic stop.
Considering the foregoing, Officer formed a reasonable articulable suspicion that Defendant had committed a traffic offense notwithstanding whether the Defendant was actually talking on or using his cellular phone. Accordingly, the traffic stop was valid and the motion to suppress is DENIED.
Very Truly Yours,
/s/ Richard F . Stokes
Hon. Richard F. Stokes
cc: Prothonotary