Opinion
CR-2017-3236
09-25-2020
STATE OF MAINE v. CHRISTOPHER SHEPARD Defendant
ORDER ON THE STATE OF MAINE'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
JED J. FRENCH JUDGE, UNIFIED CRIMINAL COURT
Before the Court is the State of Maine's Motion to Continue and the Defendant Christopher Shepard's Motion to Dismiss the indictment with prejudice pursuant to M.R Crim. P. 48 and 34-A M.R.S. § 9603. Defendant argues that the State has unnecessarily delayed bringing the defendant to trial.
Background
On June 9, 2017, the defendant was indicted on three counts of Gross Sexual Assault, Class A, and one count of Sexual Misconduct with a Child, Class C. An arrest warrant for the defendant was issued on June 28, 2017. Thereafter, the defendant plead guilty in federal court to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a](5](B] and was sentenced to 180 months of imprisonment. The defendant was incarcerated in New York. On June 14, 2018, the State issued a detainer on the defendant under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. 18 U.S.C. App. § 2. On February 12, 2020, the defendant answered the detainer and filed a transfer request to be brought to Maine to answer to the charges.
On March 13, 2020, the Maine Judicial Branch announced that due to COVID-19, the criminal docket was postponed until May 1, 2020, and that no criminal or civil jury trials would be held until after May 1, 2020. Emergency Order and Notice from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court Courthouse Safety and Coronavirus (COVID-19), March 13, 2020, amended March 18, 2020. On March 31, 2020 and on April 29, 2020, the Governor issued an executive stay at home order through May 31, 2020. Executive Order 28 FY 19/20. Executive orders also implemented restrictions and limitations on out-of-state travel. See, e.g. Executive Orders 28, 34 FY 19/20. The Judicial Branch introduced phased plans to re-open through the Judicial Branch's Phased Management Plan issued on May 27, 2020, but indicated the courts would not try criminal matters by jury until September 7, 2020, at the earliest Covid-19 Phased Management Plan (May 27, 2020) (The Phased Management Plan was revised July 2, 2020, July 31, 2020, and August 28, 2020 farther extending the date on which the courts may begin holding criminal jury trials.)
The defendant was transferred into Maine on or about July 16, 2020, and the court scheduled a dispositional conference on August 11, 2020. At the dispositional conference, the court Q. McKeon) asked the parties to submit briefs on the matter. The state filed a motion for extension of time on August 11, 2020.
Discussion
Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on Detainers, once the defendant's answer to the detainer is received by the state, the state has 180 days to commence trial. 34-A M.R.S.A. §§ 9603 (2020). The court may grant "any necessary or reasonable continuance" of the 180-day limit. Id. Additionally, the 180-day period "shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial." 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9606 (2020). In interpreting this statute, a defendant is unable to stand trial during "all those periods of delay occasioned by the defendant" State v. Rose, 604 A.2d 24, 25 (Me.1992) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 1988)). In the case at bar, the state contends it had until August 12, 2020, to commence trial, and trial was not commenced before August 12, 2020, and has not yet commenced.
The defendant argues that because the delay is not occasioned by the defendant, the charges against the defendant should be dismissed with prejudice, as the state has failed to commence trial within 180 days. Defendant cites cases from other jurisdictions that show the court or prosecutor's delay in bringing a case to trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. See State v. Brown, 157 N.H. 555, 557-58 (2008); Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923, 927-28 (1976). Here, however, the delay was occasioned by the global COVID-19 pandemic, which is beyond the control of all parties, and the court. On March 13, 2020, the criminal docket was postponed and criminal jury trials have since been delayed until November 7, 2020, at the earliest Phased Management Plan (August 28, 2020).
The defendant's argument that "the State and court simpl[y] failed to understand the importance" of prioritizing the defendant's case under the Interstate Compact on Detainers does highlight that the state did not file for a continuance until after the dispositional conference on August 11, 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic is not a free pass for the state to disregard statutory time limits on filing cases. However, where the State was unable to bring the defendant to trial because the courts had delayed all criminal jury trials by emergency orders, the delay is reasonable and necessary. Because the delay is not occasioned by the defendant, the 180-day period is not tolled pursuant to 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9606. Rather, the circumstances of a global pandemic justify a continuance for good cause under 34-A M.R.S.A. § 9603, rather than the "harsh remedy" of a dismissal of charges. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118, 120 S.Ct. 659, 666 (2000).
The Court finds the request for a continuance is necessary and for good cause. For the foregoing reasons, the State's motion for extension of time is GRANTED and the defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.