Opinion
No. 108,215.
2013-09-13
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Steven Todd SHELINBARGER, Appellant.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Evelyn Z. Wilson, Judge. Kevin Shepherd, of Topeka, for appellant. Jodi Litfin, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; Evelyn Z. Wilson, Judge.
Kevin Shepherd, of Topeka, for appellant. Jodi Litfin, assistant district attorney, Chadwick J. Taylor, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., PIERRON, J., and BUKATY, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Steven Todd Shelinbarger appeals his conviction for obstructing legal process or duty. He argues the arresting police officer had no authority to enter his house to arrest him and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of the events following the officer's entry. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him.
We first find the arresting officer could lawfully enter Shelinbarger's house to arrest him because the officer possessed probable cause to make the arrest before Shelinbarger ran into his house and the officer's hot pursuit of Shelinbarger provided the exigent circumstances that justified the officer's entry during the pursuit. We further find the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Facts
During the early evening hours, Topeka Police Officer Charles Wilson responded to a domestic violence call on 24th Terrace. The complaining party was calling from 5824 SW 24th Terrace but alleged the violence had occurred a few houses away at 5812 SW 24th Terrace. Dispatch also advised Wilson that the suspect had approached the 5824 residence and had rung the doorbell multiple times, so Wilson went to that residence. Seeing no one outside the residence, he then proceeded to the 5812 residence.
As Wilson stopped in front of 5812 SW 24th Terrace, a person later identified as Shelinbarger came out of the house and approached him. Shelinbarger immediately extended his right hand, which was holding a black cell phone and some keys. Shelinbarger stated the property belonged to “Robin” and told Wilson to take them to her. Wilson refused to take the property. Shelinbarger put his hand into a tear in the left side of his pants, and Wilson ordered Shelinbarger to keep his hands out where he could see them. Shelinbarger chuckled but complied. Shelinbarger again attempted to give the phone and keys to Wilson. Wilson again told him he would not take the property. Shelinbarger again started to put his left hand into the tear in his pants. Wilson repeated his command to keep his hands in sight. Shelinbarger did not receive this request as well as he had previously received the command.
Wilson asked Shelinbarger what had happened, and Shelinbarger replied, “Well, you know,” and turned forward slightly to show Wilson the tear in his pants. Shelinbarger offered Wilson the phone and keys for a third time. When Wilson refused, Shelinbarger asked to place the phone and keys on the bumper of a vehicle in the driveway. Wilson allowed him to do so. Shelinbarger placed the items on the bumper and then he ran towards the garage. Wilson shouted, “Stop, police,” and ran after Shelinbarger. As Shelinbarger reached the front-door area, Wilson again shouted, “Stop, we need to talk.” Shelinbarger continued to enter the house. Wilson followed and kicked the wooden door open as Shelinbarger attempted to close it. Shelinbarger was forced back a few feet as Wilson forced the door open.
When Shelinbarger “squared off” with Wilson, Wilson grabbed his left arm, telling Shelinbarger that he was being arrested. Wilson attempted to put Shelinbarger's arm into a “chicken wing,” but Shelinbarger resisted. Wilson struggled to subdue Shelinbarger, who pushed Wilson into the wall. Wilson was unable to subdue Shelinbarger and called for additional police assistance. When Wilson reached for his baton, Shelinbarger raced out the front door but fell off the porch. Wilson and Shelinbarger struggled on the ground until Officer Schleuder arrived, employed his taser, and assisted Wilson in handcuffing Shelinbarger.
Officer Shane McCoy arrived and assisted Wilson and Schleuder in subduing Shelinbarger. McCoy advised Shelinbarger of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694,reh. denied385 U.S. 890 (1966). McCoy then escorted Shelinbarger to his patrol car, where he was examined by emergency medical personnel before McCoy transported him to the Shawnee County Correctional facility. Throughout McCoy's interaction with him, Shelinbarger was cooperative but verbally abusive.
Wilson eventually talked to Robin Ramsey. After learning the keys and phone belonged to her, Wilson took her statement about the alleged domestic violence.
The State originally charged Shelinbarger with battery against a law enforcement officer and obstructing legal process or duty with respect to Shelinbarger's interactions with Wilson and with simple battery and criminal restraint with respect to Shelinbarger's interactions with Ramsey. The State later amended the complaint to drop the charges related to Ramsey.
Shelinbarger filed a motion to suppress all statements and evidence obtained following what he called the unlawful seizure of himself inside his house. Shelinbarger also waived his right to a jury trial. Following a hearing on the suppression motion, the district court denied it, finding that Wilson's entry into the residence was justified and even if it was not, any illegal entry would not require exclusion of the battery or obstruction events. Thereafter, Shelinbarger changed his mind and formally requested a jury trial.
After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the jury acquitted Shelinbarger of battery against a law enforcement officer but convicted him of obstructing legal process or duty. The court ordered Shelinbarger to serve 30 days in jail and credited him with 13 days of jail time awaiting trial and sentencing.
The Motion to Suppress
Shelinbarger first challenges the district court's suppression ruling raising two interrelated issues: (1) Was Officer Wilson justified in entering the residence after Shelinbarger, and (2) if not, does the exclusionary rule prohibit admission of evidence of Shelinbarger's interaction with Wilson following the illegal entry?
When a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress is challenged on appeal, an appellate court on review extends deference to the district court's findings of fact so long as those findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion regarding suppression, however, is a question of law which gives the appellate court plenary review. State v. Walker, 292 Kan. 1, 5, 251 P.3d 618 (2011). Where, as here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was undisputed, an appellate court possesses unlimited review of the suppression ruling. State v. Fitzgerald, 286 Kan. 1124, 1126, 192 P.3d 171 (2008).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides essentially identical protection. See State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 498, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), cert. denied131 S. Ct 2114 (2011). Both provisions generally require a state actor to obtain a warrant from a neutral magistrate before violating an individual's privacy through a search. Otherwise stated, a warrantless search is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless the search falls within a legally recognized exception to the search warrant requirement. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) (“[W]arrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement.”); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) (“[W]arrantless search[es] ... ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ “ [quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) ] ).
The United States Supreme Court has held that an entry into a house without a warrant where an officer possesses probable cause of criminal activity along with exigent circumstances is justified. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (“ ‘[A]bsent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found within.’ ”). Exigent circumstances recognized by the court include: preventing harm to another person; preventing the destruction of evidence; hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; and preventing the escape of a suspect. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).
Here, Shelinbarger essentially concedes that Wilson was in hot pursuit of him but he argues Wilson lacked the necessary probable cause to justify entry into his house. Hot pursuit as a legal justification for a warrantless search requires that a law enforcement officer first possess probable cause to arrest a person in a public place and then give chase to that person when the person attempts to evade the arrest by fleeing into a house or other place normally requiring a warrant. See State v. Dugan, 47 Kan.App.2d 582, 593–94, 276 P.3d 819 (2012).
Because any exigent circumstances must be coupled with probable cause of criminal activity, Wilson's hot pursuit of Shelinbarger justified entry into the residence only if the surrounding circumstances provided Wilson with probable cause that Shelinbarger had engaged in criminal activity. Probable cause means a reasonable ground for belief in a person's guilt. Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt but merely reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. See State v. Fewell, 286 Kan. 370, 377–78, 184 P.3d 903 (2008).
In this case, Wilson responded to a call from the alleged victim of domestic violence. The record is not entirely clear whether Ramsey identified herself or Shelinbarger to dispatch, but dispatch apparently did not communicate the alleged victim's name to Wilson because he did not learn that “Robin” referred to the alleged domestic violence victim until he talked with Ramsey after Shelinbarger's arrest. However, Wilson was informed the domestic violence reportedly had occurred at 5812 SW 24th Terrace. When Wilson stopped in front of that residence, Shelinbarger exited the house and attempted to hand Shelinbarger some property belonging to Robin. Shelinbarger's actions indicate a knowledge of Wilson's presence at the house. When Wilson asked Shelinbarger what had happened, Shelinbarger did not seem confused by the question nor did he provide an innocent account of his interaction with Ramsey. Instead, he confirmed the violent nature of the interaction by showing Wilson a tear in his pants. At this point, Wilson possessed sufficient evidence to justify an investigatory detention of Shelinbarger. When Shelinbarger suddenly ran into the house, his flight became an indication of a culpable state of mind. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but is certainly suggestive of such.”). These circumstances together were sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that Shelinbarger committed some form of domestic violence against Ramsey.
Furthermore, as discussed, the circumstances at least provided Wilson with reasonable suspicion to detain Shelinbarger for further investigation into the domestic violence allegations. When Shelinbarger ran to the house, Wilson shouted commands for Shelinbarger to stop; Shelinbarger ignored those commands. This act, in itself, provided Wilson with probable cause to arrest for obstructing legal duty. See State v. Beltran, 48 Kan.App.2d 857, 877, 300 P.3d 92 (2013) (“Disregarding a law enforcement officer's order to stop may violate K.S.A. 21–3808(a) [obstructing legal process or duty].”). Shelinbarger's refusal to comply with Wilson's orders to stop impeded or hindered Wilson's legal duty to investigate a domestic violence call and provided probable cause to arrest Wilson for obstruction. Therefore, Wilson's warrantless entry into the house in hot pursuit of Shelinbarger was justified under the Fourth Amendment. We find no error in the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.
Our finding that Wilson had justification to enter Shelinbarger's house obviously renders moot the issue raised by Shelinbarger as to whether the exclusionary rule prohibits the admission into evidence of the events in the house after an illegal entry by Officer Wilson.
Sufficiency of the Evidence—Obstructing a Legal Duty
Shelinbarger next contends the evidence did not support his conviction for obstruction of legal process or duty. When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his or her conviction, we review the record in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational fact-finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was convicted. State v. Frye, 294 Kan. 364, 374–75, 277 P.3d 1091 (2012).
Obstruction of legal duty or process is “obstructing, resisting, or opposing any person authorized by law ... in the discharge of any official duty.” K.S.A. 21–3808(a). The conduct violating this statute is broadly defined. State v. Lee, 242 Kan. 38, 40, 744 P.2d 845 (1987) (“At common law, obstruction included any act which impeded justice.”).
“The statute does not limit the offense to resistance alone. It includes also willfull [ sic ] acts of obstruction or opposition, and to obstruct is to interpose obstacles or impediments, to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent, and this term does not necessarily imply the employment of direct force, or the exercise of direct means. It includes any passive, indirect or circuitous impediments to the service or execution of process.” State v. Merrifield, 180 Kan. 267, 270, 303 P.2d 155 (1956).
Here, at a minimum, Wilson was lawfully conducting an investigation into a domestic violence call. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, Wilson had not terminated his investigation with Shelinbarger when Shelinbarger ran away from him. Shelinbarger then ignored Wilson's commands to stop on two different occasions, requiring Wilson to enter a more dangerous situation by following Shelinbarger into his house, where the possibility existed that Shelinbarger might have had a weapon. Once inside the house, Shelinbarger refused to submit to Wilson's authority but continued to struggle, again increasing the danger for Wilson in conducting his investigation. Under these circumstances, the record sufficiently supports the jury's verdict finding Shelinbarger guilty of obstructing legal process or duty.
Affirmed.