Opinion
A22-0660
12-06-2022
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Jessica Marie Seymour, Appellant.
Chippewa County District Court File No. 12-VB-21-393
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
PETER M. REYES, JR. JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Jessica Marie Seymour received a citation for driving without a Minnesota driver's license. After appellant failed to appear at a court trial scheduled on April 08, 2022, the district court convicted appellant of driving without a Minnesota driver's license as a petty misdemeanor. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 23.05(4). Appellant raises six issues on appeal which we will address in turn.
2. First, appellant appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider that an attempt to sex traffic her by a police officer was related to her driving charge, which in turn violated her 13th Amendment rights. "A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019). The 13th Amendment protects individuals from slavery and involuntary servitude. U.S. Const. amend. XIII. But appellant here fails to show how the 13th Amendment is connected to her driving citation. Nor does appellant provide any corroborating evidence to support her argument. Instead, the record shows that the district court clarified with appellant what issues are appropriate to bring in a d riving charge. At the pre trial hearing, the district court stated,
as far as the issues go . . . this case is not about misconduct to the police, except in so far as that raises a legal defense to the charge that you face. Th[is] case is about the charge that you face and that is no Minnesota driver's license.
Based on the limited facts and evidence provided, the district did not abuse its discretion when it rejected appellant's 13th Amendment claim on a driving charge.
3. Second, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to provide her with a new court-appointed attorney. Appellant misinterprets the law. When respondent State of Minnesota charged her with a misdemeanor, appellant had a court-appointed attorney. At the first pretrial hearing, the state moved to certify the case as a petty misdemeanor, and the district court approved the certification. Minn. R. Crim. P. 23.04. It then explained to appellant that, with the lesser offense, she is no longer entitled to a court-appointed attorney. Minn. R. Crim. P. 23.05 (2) . The district court did inform appellant that she could hire an attorney on her own to represent her.
4. Appellant objected to the certification. Although appellant's consent was not required, the district court reversed its decision to give appellant more time to provide caselaw on why she should be entitled to a court-appointed attorney. Minn. R. Crim. P.
23.04. At the second pretrial hearing, appellant changed her mind and agreed to have the district court certify her charge to a petty misdemeanor. Following that, the district court approved the certification. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion because it appropriately applied the law and determined that appellant did not have a right to a court-appointed attorney on a petty-misdemeanor charge.5. Third, appellant claims that she had a right to a jury trial instead of a court trial. We disagree. "No right to a jury trial exists in a misdemeanor charge certified as a petty misdemeanor . . . ." Minn. R. Crim. P. 23.05(1). After the district court certified appellant's charge as a petty misdemeanor, she had no right to a jury trial. Additionally, a petty misdemeanor is not a crime, and the only penalty is a fine. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 4a (2020).
6. Fourth, appellant argues that her Fifth Amendment rights were violated because (1) the police officer failed to provide her with Miranda rights during the traffic stop and (2) the district court required her to testify at trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). As to appellant's first issue, she d id not raise it before the district court and "this court generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court, including constitutional questions of criminal procedure." Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). Because there is no decision by the district court to review, we decline to d o so for the first time on appeal. Next, appellant contend s that the district court violated her right to remain silent by requiring her to testify at trial. But no trial was held in this case. The record shows that appellant failed to appear at the April 08, 2022 trial date, and the district court entered a conviction under Minn. R. Crim. P. 23.05(4), because the offense is on the statewide payables list. Therefore, appellant's second argument fails.
7. Fifth, appellant appears to argue that the district court abused its discretion by denying her second request for a continuance. We are not persuaded. A ruling on a request for a continuance is within the district court's discretion and a conviction will not be reversed for denial of a continuance unless the denial was a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Rainer, 411 N.W.2d 490, 495 (Minn. 1987). And defendant must show prejudice. Id. The limited record shows that the district court first scheduled trial on March 30, 2022. Appellant then filed a motion for a continuance. It appears that the district court granted the continuance because the trial was continued to April 08, 2022. Appellant contacted the district court to continue the matter once again, but this time the district court denied her request. The district court granted a continuance to appellant once but had the discretion to deny her additional request. Appellant has also not shown any prejudice. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's second request for continuance.
8. Sixth, appellant contends that venue was improper because it is the venue where she was allegedly sex trafficked by police officers. We review a challenge on the district court's venue decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. 2014). "A case must be tried in the county where the offense was committed . . . ." Minn. R. Crim. P. 24.01. A request for a change of venue may be granted when: (1) an impartial trial cannot be held in the county; (2) it is convenient for parties and witnesses; (3) it is in the interests of justice; and (4) it is provided for by rule 25.02 governing prejudicial publicity. Minn. R. Crim. P. 24.03. Here, appellant failed to show that a transfer was in the interests of justice or that an impartial trial could not be held. As a result, the district court denied appellant's request to change venue and determined that appellant did not "provide grounds justifying transfer of the case to another county." However, it offered to hold the trial via Zoom, and appellant agreed. Because the district court correctly applied the law, we discern no abuse of discretion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.