Opinion
N23NCR090091261S
10-06-2017
State of Connecticut v. Steven Setzer
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Filed October 10, 2017
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION--MOTION TO DISMISS
MELANIE L. CRADLE, Judge.
On December 20, 2016, the defendant, Steven Setzer, filed the present motion to dismiss all cases pending against him, arguing that the delay in prosecution violates both the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article first, § § 7, 8, and 9, of the Connecticut Constitution, and that, as a result of the delay, prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. In the alternative, the defendant argues that prosecution violates the requirements of the Interstate Agreement of Detainers (IAD) and thus, the cases against him should be dismissed. The state filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss on February 17, 2017. The defendant filed a reply brief on March 10, 2017.
This court scheduled the matter for a hearing and subsequently continued that hearing several times to afford the parties an opportunity to obtain and present additional evidence. Thereafter, the parties indicated that they would submit a stipulation of facts. On July 28, 2017, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts that is set forth below. On August 3, 2017, the parties notified the court that they did not intend to call any witnesses and the court heard oral argument on the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
Findings of Fact
The court makes the following findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
On April 8, 2009, the defendant was arrested and charged by warrant in docket CR09-0091261-S with Strangulation in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-64bb; Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61; Breach of Peace in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181; Unlawful Restraint in the First Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95; and Burglary in the First Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101. The conduct in the warrant was alleged to have occurred on or about January 30, 2009.
The defendant was also arrested on April 8, 2009, by a second warrant and was additionally charged in docket CR09-0091262-S with Forgery in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-140; Attempt to Commit Larceny in the Fourth Degree, in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-49 and 53a-125; and Interfering with an Officer, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a. The conduct in the warrant is alleged to have occurred on or about April 7, 2009. On April 8, 2009, the defendant was arraigned on the two warrants, and the Office of the Public Defender was appointed to represent him in both matters.
On July 14, 2009, the defendant did not appear in court, and as a result was charged with Failure to Appear in the First Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-172, in docket CR09-0091261-S, and Failure to Appear in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-173, in docket CR09-0091262-S. On August 26, 2009, while in re-arrest status on both cases, the defendant was arrested in Virginia and held at the Riverside Regional Jail in Hopewell, Virginia. The defendant was arrested on allegations that he attempted to evade arrest when police officers tried to pull him over for speeding. According to news reports, a forty-five-minute pursuit followed and the defendant, once detained, was found to have been operating a car that had been reported stolen out of Connecticut.
Thereafter, on or about January 21, 2010, the New Haven State's Attorney's office was made aware of the defendant's arrest and pre-trial detention incarceration in Virginia. On or about March 3, 2010, Inspector Reardon, who was responsible for lodging detainers on behalf of the New Haven State's Attorney's Office, sent a letter to the Riverside Regional Jail and requested to be informed of what, if any, sentence the defendant received. He noted, " A decision to lodge a detainer will be made by Connecticut at that time."
On March 16, 2010, another arrest warrant was issued charging the defendant with Larceny in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123; Identity Theft in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-129d; two counts of Fraudulent Use of an Automated Teller Machine, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-127b; and Forgery in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-140, for conduct that is alleged to have occurred in July and August 2009. On June 10, 2010, the fourth arrest warrant was issued for the defendant, charging him with Larceny in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-124, for conduct that is alleged to have occurred on or about August 3, 2009.
On July 14, 2010, the defendant was sentenced in Virginia to seven years in prison for Disregarding the Signal of a Law Enforcement Officer to Stop, Eluding Police, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-817(B), and Attempted Unlawful Wounding, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-51, for conduct that occurred on August 26, 2009.
On February 9, 2011, another arrest warrant was issued in Connecticut charging the defendant for conduct that occurred on April 7, 2009. The warrant alleged that the defendant fled on foot from police after attempting to cash a counterfeit check. The warrant further alleged that the defendant got into an SUV that was being operated by his girlfriend (DA) and that they drove away. While the police pursued the vehicle, the defendant got into the driver's seat and sat on top of DA. Both the defendant and DA are alleged to have been maneuvering the wheel at various times and eventually, disregarded a red light and crashed into another vehicle. The crash caused serious physical injury to at least one occupant in the other vehicle. As a result, the warrant charged the defendant with Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(3); Aiding and Abetting Assault in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-8 and 53a-60; and Failure to Bring Motor Vehicle to Full Stop When Signaled, in violation of General Statutes § 14-223(b).
All of the defendant's outstanding arrest warrants in the Judicial District of New Haven were entered into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized index for criminal justice information. On or about April 7, 2011, Theresa Ward, Virginia's Detainer Coordinator, wrote to Inspector Reardon in reply to his March 3, 2010 letter. Her letter indicated the defendant's charges, the sentence he received, and that the defendant's projected release date was in 2015. She concluded her letter, stating, " [p]lease advise this office if a detainer will be lodged for Steven Setzer."
In fall of 2016, Lieutenant Siclari of the New Haven Police Department (NHPD) reported that she had been unable to locate any documents reflecting that NHPD had requested that a detainer be lodged for the defendant. Likewise, Inspector Reardon reported that he had not located any documentary evidence stating that Connecticut wished to lodge a detainer with the defendant's Virginia institution. On June 24, 2015, Melanie Cale, an employee with the Virginia Department of Corrections, sent a letter to the NHPD stating that a detainer had been lodged for the defendant. Thereafter, on or about July 14, 2015, the defendant sent an IAD, Form 1, " NOTICE OF UNTRIED INDICTMENT, INFORMATION, OR COMPLAINT AND RIGHT TO REQUEST DISPOSITION" (request for disposition) to the NHPD. The request for disposition stated that a detainer had been filed by the NHPD charging Larceny in the Third Degree, Larceny in the Second Degree, Identity Theft in the Third Degree, and Fraudulent Use of an Automated Teller Machine.
As of now, the defendant has not produced evidence confirming that his IAD request for disposition was completed according to the statutory requirements, and, moreover, the defendant has not produced any evidence demonstrating that he sent his request for disposition via certified mail to either the New Haven clerk's office or the New Haven State's Attorney's Office. In November 2016, Joseph Murolo, caseflow coordinator, and John Dzieken, clerk, both reported that they were not familiar with any request for disposition sent by the defendant to the New Haven superior court clerk's office. Similarly, Inspector Reardon reported that he did not have a copy of the defendant's request for disposition.
On July 14, 2015, the same day that they received the defendant's request for disposition, the NHPD, after consulting with Inspector Reardon, responded to the defendant's request for disposition via facsimile stating, " [a]t this time we are pulling our detainer and will not extradite Steven Setzer 8/6/75. Please call with any questions." Then, on or about July 21, 2015, the state of Virginia provided paperwork to the defendant stating that the detainer had been removed. Melanie Cale reported to Lieutenant Siclari that Virginia treats outstanding warrants in NCIC as a " hold." Lieutenant Siclari requested that Cale locate the defendant's file to see if there was any written documentation from the NHPD requesting a detainer be lodged or a hold be placed on the defendant. On November 30, 2015, Cale stated to Lieutenant Siclari via email that " [w]e have searched the archives and all we have is the request to withdraw your detainer." To date, the defendant has failed to provide any documentary evidence, transmitted by Connecticut authorities to the State of Virginia, requesting that a detainer be lodged or that a hold be placed on him.
On December 18, 2015, the defendant was discharged from the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections after having been incarcerated for a period of 2, 306 days. Thereafter, on June 23, 2016, in New Haven, the defendant is alleged to have deposited two stolen checks belonging to an individual named Ryan McFarland for a total of $4, 505.67. One of the checks was made out to " Jazymn Thomas" and the other to " Tyrone Lee." Then, on August 24, 2016, the NHPD responded to a domestic disturbance on Shelton Avenue. At that time, they spoke with D.J., who indicated that she and the defendant had been in a dating relationship since December 2015. She stated that she had been in an argument with the defendant that night, and that the week prior, the defendant had pushed her down the steps of the front porch, which resulted in a sprained ankle. The defendant was not present upon police arrival. Subsequently, an arrest warrant was issued for his conduct.
On September 8, 2016, the NHPD observed the defendant, who they knew to live in the area, operating a vehicle without a front plate. The police had information that the defendant had outstanding arrest warrants, had been involved in domestic disputes where a broadcast was placed for his arrest, had been selling narcotics in the area, and that the vehicle that he was driving operated as a misuse of plates. The police attempted to initiate a motor vehicle stop, but the defendant shook his head " no" and fled at a high rate of speed. The police subsequently learned that the defendant's privilege to drive was under suspension. As a result, an arrest warrant was issued for his conduct.
On October 6, 2016, the NHPD observed the same vehicle that had engaged them in pursuit on September 8, 2016. The female occupant of the vehicle stated that she was waiting in the car for her friend, " Steven, " to come out. The female contacted the defendant by phone to try to lure him outside for the police, and the defendant exited the house and walked towards the vehicle. Upon being ordered to stop by the police, the defendant fled on foot. A short pursuit ensued which resulted in the apprehension of the defendant. Located on the defendant's person at the time of his arrest was a Virginia I.D. card and numerous items belonging to other people, to wit: a CT license and Mohegan Sun card with the name " Daryl Setzer"; a Capitol One Platinum and First Premier Bank MasterCard with the name " Dorrie Cash"; a Visa debit card with the name " Danyell Avery"; and a TD Bank debit card with the name " Jocquelyn Crenshaw."
On October 6, 2016, after being apprehended, the defendant was served with the two Failure to Appear warrants in dockets CR09-0091261-S and CR09-0091262-S. He was also served with the outstanding warrants for his 2009 conduct, which are reflected as docket numbers CR16-0170526-S, CR16-0170527-S, and CR16-0170540-S/MV160102608-S. The warrants were served 293 days after the defendant's release from the Virginia Department of Corrections and 2, 597 days after the defendant was first arrested and held in the state of Virginia.
Also on October 6, 2016, the defendant was further served with warrants for his conduct in August 2016 for domestic disputes under docket CR16-0170528-S. In that docket number, he was charged with Assault in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61, and Breach of Peace in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181. Additionally, he was arrested by warrant for his conduct on September 8, 2016, and charged under dockets CR16-0170539-S and MV16-012607-S with Interfering with an Officer, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167; Operation of a Motor Vehicle with a Suspended License, in violation of General Statutes § 14-215; Engaging Police in Pursuit, in violation of General Statutes § 14-223(b); Reckless Driving, in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, and some infractions.
On January 20, 2017, the defendant was arrested by warrant for his involvement in cashing the stolen checks on June 23, 2016, and was charged under docket CR17-0173399-S with Conspiracy to Commit Larceny in the Third Degree, in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-48 and 53a-124; Conspiracy to Commit Forgery in the Second Degree, in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-48 and 53a-139; and Conspiracy to Commit Fraudulent Use of an Automated Teller Machine, in violation of General Statutes § § 53a-48 and 53a-127b. The defendant was also arrested by warrant for fleeing from the police on October 6, 2016, and charged under docket CR17-0173400-S with Interfering With an Officer, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a.
Based on the stipulation of facts, the documents submitted to the court by the parties and the arguments of counsel, the court further finds that the state of Connecticut did not lodge a detainer with Virginia based on any pending arrest warrants and charges contained therein against the defendant.
Discussion
In his motion and reply brief, the defendant asserts two primary grounds to warrant dismissal of all the criminal cases pending against him. First, the defendant claims that prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in General Statutes § 54-193, and, in addition, that the state unreasonably delayed the prosecution of his cases in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § § 7, 8, and 9, of the Connecticut constitution. Second, the defendant claims that the state violated the IAD by failing to honor his request for disposition of the charges against him as required by General Statutes § 54-186. The state opposes each claim and argues that the warrants for each charge were signed well within the statute of limitations prescribed by § 54-186. Additionally, the state argues that the statute of limitations was tolled when the defendant fled Connecticut to avoid prosecution, and then continued to evade law enforcement after his return. The state further claims that since it never filed a detainer as to any of the charges, the requirements under the IAD were not triggered and thus, were not violated. The court will address each claim.
I. Statute of Limitations and Reasonableness of the Delay
Section 54-193(b) provides that an individual may be prosecuted for a felony offense only if the prosecution commences within five years after the offense was committed. For a misdemeanor, an individual may be prosecuted only if prosecution commences within one year after the offense was committed. See § 54-193(c). There is no claim in this case that the arrest warrants for all of the pending criminal charges were not submitted and signed by a judge within the statute of limitations for each offense.
Rather, the defendant's claim is that because § 54-193(b) does not indefinitely toll the statute of limitations, the state's unreasonable delay in executing the arrest warrants against the defendant violates the applicable statute of limitations. The state claims that the statute of limitations was tolled by the defendant's actions, namely, fleeing the state of Connecticut after appearing in court on two files, allegedly committing additional offenses within the state, and then subsequently being incarcerated and serving a sentence in the state of Virginia. Thus, the dispositive issue in this case is whether the statute of limitations under § 54-193(b) tolled after the warrants issued in July 2009, March 2010, June 2010, and February 2011, at which time the defendant had fled the state and was in re-arrest status, and, if not, whether the state is therefore time barred from prosecuting the defendant five years after the warrants were issued and upon his return to Connecticut.
Our Supreme Court has held that the tolling of the statute of limitations occurs when an arrest warrant is issued within the time limitations of § 54-193(b) and is then executed without unreasonable delay. State v. Crawford, 202 Conn. 443, 450-51, 521 A.2d 1034 (1987). In Crawford, the court did " not adopt a per se approach as to what period of time to execute an arrest warrant is reasonable. A reasonable period of time is a question of fact that will depend on the circumstances of each case. If the facts indicate that an accused consciously eluded the authorities, or for other reasons was difficult to apprehend, these factors will be considered in determining what time is reasonable. If, on the other hand, the accused did not relocate or take evasive action to avoid apprehension, failure to execute an arrest warrant for even a short period of time might be unreasonable and fail to toll the statute of limitations." Id., 451. Therefore, the issuance of an arrest warrant within the statute of limitations will effectively toll the statute of limitations, even if the warrant is not executed within that time frame, provided that the warrant is executed without unreasonable delay. See, e.g., State v. Jennings, 101 Conn.App. 810, 818, 928 A.2d 541 (2007).
" A statute of limitations claim is an affirmative defense for which the burden rests with the defendant to prove the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence . . . Despite this, once a defendant puts forth evidence to suggest that she was not elusive, was available and was readily approachable, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the delay in executing the warrant was not unreasonable." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Woodtke, 130 Conn.App. 734, 740, 25 A.3d 699 (2011), quoting State v. Soldi, 92 Conn.App. 849, 857, 887 A.2d 436, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 913, 895 A.2d 792 (2006). " In determining whether the evidence proffered by the state is adequate to avoid dismissal, such proof must be viewed in the light most favorable to the state." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ward, 306 Conn. 698, 707, 52 A.3d 591 (2012).
In this case, the initial arrest warrants were executed and the defendant was arrested for conduct that allegedly occurred on January 30, 2009, and April 7, 2009. The defendant was arraigned on April 8, 2009, and then subsequently failed to appear on July 14, 2009, and was on re-arrest status. Thereafter, on August 26, 2009, the defendant was arrested in Virginia and held at the Riverside Regional Jail in Hopewell, Virginia. According to news reports of his arrest in Virginia, the defendant attempted to evade arrest when police officers initiated a traffic stop. The state of Connecticut learned of the defendant's Virginia arrest on January 21, 2010. On March 3, 2010, an inspector who was responsible for lodging detainers on behalf of the New Haven State's Attorney's Office, sent a letter to Riverside Regional Jail requesting to be informed of what, if any sentence the defendant received and noted " [a] decision to lodge a detainer will be made by Connecticut at that time." Additional arrest warrants were obtained in Connecticut on March 16, 2010, June 10, 2010, and February 9, 2011, all for conduct that allegedly occurred before the defendant fled Connecticut.
On April 7, 2011, Virginia notified the inspector that the defendant had been sentenced to seven years of incarceration on July 14, 2010, with an anticipated release date of September 24, 2015. The notice asked the inspector to notify Virginia if a detainer would be lodged. As noted in the stipulation of facts, while there was correspondence between Connecticut and Virginia in June and July of 2015, there is no evidence that Connecticut ever lodged a detainer for any of the pending charges against the defendant. While the defendant sent a request for disposition of the charges of Larceny in the Third Degree, Larceny in the Second Degree, Identity Theft in the Third Degree, and Fraudulent Use of an Automated Teller Machine--stemming from the warrant issued on March 16, 2010--there was no evidence that a detainer had been lodged by Connecticut for those charges. The defendant was notified by the state of Virginia that there were no detainers lodged and accordingly, was discharged from custody in Virginia on December 18, 2015.
The evidence presented shows that the defendant became involved in a relationship with a woman in New Haven in December 2015, or shortly after his release in Virginia. Certainly by June 23, 2016, the defendant had returned to Connecticut, where he then deposited the allegedly stolen checks totaling $4, 505.67. There were subsequent calls to police about alleged domestic violence by the defendant on August 24, 2016. On September 8, 2016, the NHPD observed the defendant and attempted to initiate a motor vehicle stop for his outstanding warrants, including the domestic violence incident, at which time the defendant fled from the police at a high rate of speed. The defendant was then observed driving the same vehicle on October 6, 2016, and was finally apprehended after engaging police in a foot chase.
Given the defendant's actions, i.e., fleeing the state of Connecticut with pending criminal charges and then allegedly engaging police in pursuit, leading to him striking another vehicle and causing serious permanent injuries, he has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not elusive and was readily approachable for execution of the remaining warrants. Even if the defendant, assuming arguendo, had met his initial burden, the state of Connecticut's attempts to locate him and apprehend him, both before and after his return to Connecticut, establish that there was no unreasonable delay in execution and therefore, the statute of limitations was appropriately tolled. To find otherwise would reward the defendant for his efforts, including fleeing the state, to avoid prosecution. Short of seeking extradition of all charges, the state of Connecticut made reasonable efforts to apprehend the defendant. " When the prosecutorial authority has done everything possible within the period of limitation to evidence and effectuate an intent to prosecute, the statute of limitations is tolled . . . An accused should not be rewarded, absent evidence of a lack of due diligence on the part of the officer charged with executing the warrant, for managing to avoid apprehension to a point in time beyond the period of limitation." (Citation omitted.) State v. Crawford, supra, 202 Conn. 450.
Contrary to the defendant's claim, the circumstances of his case are not at all similar or more egregious than those cases where the appellate courts have dismissed charges for unreasonable delays. In both State v. Woodtke, supra, and State v. Soldi, supra, the police made no efforts to execute the warrants while the defendants were living openly in Connecticut and were readily approachable. See State v. Woodtke, supra, 130 Conn.App. 744 (" [T]he defendant in the present case at no point attempted to elude service of the warrant by leaving the state. Rather, similar to the defendant in Soldi, the defendant continued to openly reside in her community during the two-year and ten-month delay"); State v. Soldi, supra, 92 Conn.App. 859-60 (finding that defendant made no effort to evade police where she lived openly and continuously in West Haven for five years with her license, motor vehicle registration, and utilities in her name and in connection with her West Haven address). In contrast, in the present case, the defendant engaged in elusive behavior both when he initially fled the state of Connecticut as well as after his return to the state.
Nor does the defendant's conclusory claim of prejudice due to the delay support his due process claims. At oral argument, although defense counsel argued that his client was prejudiced by the delay, he could not articulate specifically how the defendant was prejudiced. As the court noted in State v. Woodtke, supra, 130 Conn.App. 740-41, a showing of prejudice " is only necessary for a due process claim, not a statute of limitations claim. Connecticut courts consistently have considered only two events when ruling on whether a defendant may successfully raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense: (1) the issuance of the warrant by a judicial authority; and (2) the execution or service of the warrant on the accused . . . When it can be shown, however, that a delay has been intentional, and actual significant prejudice to the accused has thereby resulted, due process requires dismissal of the information . . . Where a delay does not prejudice the accused, no balance need be struck between the cause and effect of delay. The statute of limitations, not the due process clause, defines the limits of protection in such cases." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In this case, there is no showing that the delay was intentional or caused significant prejudice to the defendant.
II. Interstate Agreement on Detainers
The defendant claims, alternatively, that the state violated the requirements of the IAD by failing to honor his request for disposition of the charges against him in violation of General Statutes § 54-186. Specifically, he cites to the IAD request for disposition sent on July 14, 2015 to the NHPD requesting disposition of charges of Larceny in the Third Degree, Larceny in the Second Degree, Identity Theft in the Third Degree, and Fraudulent Use of an Automated Teller Machine allegedly contained in a detainer that he claimed had been filed by the NHPD. The state claims that the IAD provisions do not apply to this case because Connecticut never filed a detainer and thus, the only hold on the defendant was placed by Virginia because it treats outstanding warrants in NCIC as a " hold." The parties stipulate that there is no evidence that Connecticut ever lodged a detainer for any of the charges or warrants pending against the defendant and entered into NCIC.
At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that a detainer was never lodged by Connecticut. However, in his reply brief, the defendant argues that the entry of warrants against him constitute the lodging of an IAD and therefore trigger the IAD requirements. He further claims that the state's failure to seek to extradite the defendant on the pending charges violates the IAD and warrants dismissal of all his charges. The defendant cites to a Superior Court case, State v. Tomczak, Superior Court, Judicial District of Tolland, Docket No. CR-96-59766-S (August 21, 1996, Klaczak, J.) (17 Conn. L. Rptr. 478, ), for the proposition that the signing of a warrant and subsequent entry into NCIC is equivalent to lodging a detainer with another state and accordingly, Connecticut is required to seek extradition of any and all extraditable charges, or otherwise, such charges should be dismissed.
The defendant's position is not supported by the applicable law. First, the statutory provisions relating to the lodging of detainers pursuant to the IAD provide that " [t]he temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54-186, art. V(d). Connecticut courts and other jurisdictions have consistently held that the lodging of a detainer is a prerequisite to the application of the requirements of the IAD. See State v. Taylor, 63 Conn.App. 386, 411-12, 776 A.2d 1154, cert. denied, 257 Conn. 907, 777 A.2d 687, cert. denied, Taylor v. Connecticut, 534 U.S. 978, 122 S.Ct. 406, 151 L.Ed.2d 308 (2001). In State v. Taylor, supra, 414, the defendant claimed that additional charges arising after he was brought to Connecticut pursuant to a detainer on other charges must also be disposed in compliance with the IAD requirements. The appellate court rejected that claim and held that " [t]o the contrary, our review of the case law discloses that courts considering the issue, or analogous ones, have held that the IAD requirements apply only to the charges specifically contemplated by the detainer." Id. It is conceivable that a defendant, who has fled the jurisdiction, might, for strategic reasons, choose to exercise his or her right to a speedy trial as to charges arising out of one case or detainer but not another.
In this case, unlike in State v. Tomczak, supra, and State v. Taylor, supra, there was no detainer filed at all as to any of the charges pending against the defendant. While not binding on this court, the defendant's reliance on Tomczak is misplaced because in that case, Connecticut authorities had filed a valid detainer which was then mishandled by authorities in New York, where that defendant was incarcerated. In this case, as conceded by the parties, no detainer was ever lodged by Connecticut. Further, the defendant's request for disposition was sent to the NHPD and not properly submitted, as required under the statute, to the prosecuting authorities and to the court. See General Statutes § 54-186, art. V(d).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the inspector's inquiry and the defendant's submission of the request for disposition of the charges that were contained in the single warrant constitute a valid detainer and therefore require application of the requirements of the IAD, the defendant's request for disposition would apply only to those charges listed as the basis of the alleged detainer, namely, Larceny in the Third Degree, Larceny in the Second Degree, Identity Theft in the Third Degree, and Fraudulent Use of an Automated Teller Machine, and not to all of the other charges pending against him. See State v. Taylor, supra, 63 Conn.App. 414. As such, only the charges contained in the March 16, 2010 warrant under docket number CR16-0170527-S, as listed on the defendant's request for disposition, would be subject to dismissal if the state had in fact violated the requirements of the IAD.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.