Opinion
No. 84012-6-I
07-31-2023
STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Alfonso V. SENIOR Jr., Appellant.
Richard Wayne Lechich, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant. Samantha Dara Kanner, King Co Prosecutors Office, 516 3rd Ave. Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2390, for Respondent.
Richard Wayne Lechich, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, for Appellant.
Samantha Dara Kanner, King Co Prosecutors Office, 516 3rd Ave. Ste. W554, Seattle, WA, 98104-2390, for Respondent.
OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART
Dwyer, J.
¶1 Alfonso Senior Jr. appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on resentencing following his conviction by jury verdict of second degree murder with a firearm enhancement. On appeal, Senior asserts that the resentencing court erred by imposing the requirement that he register as a felony firearm offender. This is so, he contends, because RCW 9.41.330, which mandates the imposition of the registration requirement, was not in effect when he committed the offense.
¶2 We conclude that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the mandate that the sentencing court impose the registration requirement applies only when the offender was convicted of a felony firearm offense on or after June 9, 2016. See RCW 9.41.330(1), (3). Senior was convicted of the pertinent offense on November 10, 2011, several years prior to the effective date of the statute. Accordingly, we remand to the superior court to strike the firearm registration requirement from the judgment and sentence.
Senior raises additional claims of error that are resolved in the unpublished portion of this opinion.
I
¶3 On November 10, 2011, Alfonso Senior Jr. was found guilty by jury verdict of second degree murder with a firearm enhancement. Senior's offender score, as calculated at sentencing, included out-of-state convictions for possession of a controlled substance. Thus, Senior moved for resentencing following our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wash.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), which invalidated our state's strict liability drug possession statute.
Senior was additionally convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. However, because that conviction was premised on prior convictions for possession of a controlled substance, it was vacated on resentencing following our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wash.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).
¶4 At the resentencing hearing, the State advised the court that it was required by statute to impose the felony firearm registration requirement as part of Senior's judgment and sentence. The resentencing court determined that it was mandated to impose the requirement pursuant to RCW 9.41.330(3). The court thus ordered Senior to register as a felony firearm offender.
¶5 Senior appeals.
II
¶6 Senior contends that the resentencing court erred by imposing in the judgment and sentence the requirement that he register as a felony firearm offender. We agree. The plain language of the statute mandates that the sentencing court impose the registration requirement when an offender is convicted of a felony firearm offense on or after June 9, 2016. The conviction for which the registration requirement was imposed on Senior occurred several years prior to the effective date of the statute. Accordingly, the resentencing court was not authorized to impose the registration requirement.
Senior's counsel did not object when the resentencing court imposed the registration requirement. We exercise our discretion pursuant to RAP 2.5(a) to consider this claim of error on the merits.
¶7 The meaning of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing State v. Breazeale, 144 Wash.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001) ; State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001) ). "Our primary duty in interpreting a statute is to discern and implement legislative intent." Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159 Wash. App. 939, 946, 247 P.3d 18 (2011). "If a statute's meaning is plain on its face, we must ‘give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.’ " Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 174 Wash.2d 619, 627, 278 P.3d 173 (2012) (quoting Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 ). "To determine the plain meaning, we look to the text of the statute, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’ " State v. Donaghe, 172 Wash.2d 253, 262, 256 P.3d 1171 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) ).
¶8 Washington's felony firearm registration statute requires that "[a]ny adult or juvenile residing, whether or not the person has a fixed residence, in this state who has been required by a court to comply with the registration requirements of this section shall personally register with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence." RCW 9.41.333. Our state legislature first enacted the statute in 2013. LAWS OF 2013, ch. 183, § 3. Once codified, it provided:
On or after July 28, 2013, whenever a defendant in this state is convicted of a felony firearm offense or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any felony firearm offense, the court must consider whether to impose a requirement that the person comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9.41.333 and may, in its discretion, impose such a requirement.
Former RCW 9.41.330(1) (2013).
¶9 In 2016, our legislature amended the statute to require the sentencing court to impose the felony firearm registration requirement in certain circumstances. RCW 9.41.330(3). Thus, pursuant to the current version of the statute, the sentencing court must consider whether to impose the registration requirement whenever an offender is convicted of a felony firearm offense but is mandated to impose the requirement when the offense is committed "in conjunction with" a particular listed offense. RCW 9.41.330(1), (3). As currently codified, the statute provides:
(1) On or after June 9, 2016 , except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, whenever a defendant in this state is convicted of a felony firearm offense or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any felony firearm offense, the court must consider whether to impose a requirement that the person comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9.41.333 and may, in its discretion, impose such a requirement.
....
(3) When a person is convicted of a felony firearm offense or found not guilty by reason of insanity of any felony firearm offense that was committed in conjunction with any of the following offenses, the court must impose a requirement that the person comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9.41.333 :
(a) An offense involving sexual motivation;
(b) An offense committed against a child under the age of eighteen; or
(c) A serious violent offense.
RCW 9.41.330 (emphasis added).
¶10 Senior asserts that the sentencing court erred by imposing the firearm registration requirement on resentencing. We agree. By its plain language, the statute requires that the court impose the registration requirement on sentencing, and it permits the court to do so only when an offender is convicted of a firearm offense "[o]n or after June 9, 2016." RCW 9.41.330(1). Contrary to the State's assertion, the prospective language in subsection (1) applies not only to the sentencing court's discretionary imposition of the registration requirement, but also to subsection (3), which mandates imposition of the registration requirement when, as here, the offender is convicted of a felony firearm offense "in conjunction with ... [a] serious violent offense." RCW 9.41.330(3)(c). A plain reading of the statute indicates that the legislature included the language "except as provided in subsection (3) of this section," RCW 9.41.330(1), to distinguish between circumstances in which the sentencing court may impose the registration requirement and circumstances in which it must impose that requirement. The State's assertion that this language exempts subsection (3) from the requirement that the conviction occur "[o]n or after June 9, 2016," RCW 9.41.330(1), is contrary to the statutory language. Reading the statute as a whole, as we must, we conclude that our legislature intended the effective date of the statute to apply to the mandatory imposition of the registration requirement set forth in RCW 9.41.330(3).
Specifically, Senior contends that the court erroneously imposed the registration requirement because he committed the pertinent offense prior to June 9, 2016. As we discuss herein, the relevant date is the date of conviction, not the date on which the conduct underlying that conviction occurred. See RCW 9.41.330(1), (3). Senior is nevertheless correct that the resentencing court was without authority to impose the registration requirement.
¶11 Were we to determine that the statute is ambiguous, and thus to engage in statutory construction, our conclusion would remain unchanged. See State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002) (when a statute is ambiguous, the court will resort to principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent); Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash.2d 390, 399, 191 P.2d 858 (1948) ("In construing statutes which re-enact, with certain changes, or repeal other statutes, or which contain revisions or codification of earlier laws, resort to repealed and superseded statutes may be had, and is of great importance in ascertaining the intention of the legislature."). Pursuant to the 2013 version of the felony firearm registration statute, the sentencing court was granted the discretion to impose the registration requirement when the defendant was convicted of a felony firearm offense on or after the effective date of the statute. See former RCW 9.41.330(1). Our legislature amended the statute in 2016 only to add subsection (3), which provides that, in certain circumstances, the sentencing court must impose the registration requirement. See RCW 9.41.330(3). The legislature again indicated that the statute applies only when the offender is convicted of a felony firearm offense on or after the statute's effective date. RCW 9.41.330(1). The 2016 amendment to the registration statute indicates intent to distinguish between the circumstances in which the requirement may be imposed and those in which it must be imposed by the sentencing court. It does not demonstrate legislative intent that the statute's effective date applies only when imposition of the registration requirement is discretionary.
¶12 We additionally reject the State's assertion that the felony firearm registration requirement is consonant with our state's sex offender registration statute. See RCW 9A.44.130. That statute provides that "[a]ny adult or juvenile residing ... in this state who has been found to have committed or has been convicted of any sex offense or kidnapping offense ... shall register with the county sheriff for the county of the person's residence." RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). Pursuant to its statutory language, the sex offender registration statute automatically applies to any individual who meets the requirements set forth therein. In contrast, a person is required to register as a felony firearm offender only after a sentencing court has imposed the registration requirement. RCW 9.41.333(1) (requiring that any person residing in our state "who has been required by a court to comply with the registration requirements of this section" register with the appropriate county sheriff); see also RCW 9.41.330(1), (3) (providing that the court "must consider whether to impose" or "must impose" the registration requirement, depending on the circumstances of the felony firearm conviction). Thus, unlike the sex offender registration requirement, the felony firearm registration requirement is triggered only after imposition of the requirement by the sentencing court. As discussed herein, by its plain language, the statute authorizes imposition of the requirement only when the requisite conviction occurred "[o]n or after June 9, 2016." RCW 9.41.330(1).
¶13 Pursuant to its plain language, the felony firearm registration requirement must be imposed by the sentencing court and may be imposed only on offenders convicted of a requisite offense "[o]n or after June 9, 2016." RCW 9.41.330(1). The date of Senior's conviction, upon which the resentencing court premised the imposition of the registration requirement, was November 10, 2011. Thus, the court was not authorized to impose the requirement pursuant to the felony firearm registration statute. Accordingly, we remand to the superior court to strike the registration requirement from the judgment and sentence.
¶14 The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions. See RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Feldman, J.
Diaz, J.