" The rationale of the Mulcare case was followed in State v. Seabrands, 191 Wn. 472, 71 P.2d 393 (1937), wherein this court sustained a twenty-year sentence for attempted rape. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded, with direction to dismiss respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The statute is a part of the act relating to prison terms and paroles. [1] In State v. Mulcare, 189 Wn. 625, 66 P.2d 360; State v. Seabrands, 191 Wn. 472, 71 P.2d 393; and State v. McVeigh, 35 Wn.2d 493, 214 P.2d 165, we decided that the act of 1935 applied to felony cases where no maximum was provided, rather than the sections of the act of 1909 fixing terms of confinement. The judgment and sentence was correct, and the application for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

[6] Appellant's final claim of error is that the trial court erred in sentencing him for a maximum term of twenty years. While we are reversing the judgment for the reason hereinbefore stated, we realize that this question may arise upon the retrial of this case and, therefore, deem it proper to point out that, under the provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 10249-2 [P.P.C. § 782-5], as construed in our decision in State v. Seabrands, 191 Wn. 472, 71 P.2d 393, the maximum sentence of twenty years is proper in the event of a conviction of the crime of attempted arson in the first degree. This statute was amended in 1947, but not in any respect material here. Because of the improper cross-examination of appellant, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the superior court with instructions to grant him a new trial.

An objection based on an instruction of the court will not be considered unless the instruction is set out in full in the brief. Rule XVI, § 5, of the supreme court, 193 Wn. 25-a; Lund v. Seattle, 163 Wn. 254, 1 P.2d 301; Carpenter v. Gooley, 176 Wn. 67, 28 P.2d 264; State v. Seabrands, 191 Wn. 472, 71 P.2d 393; State ex rel. Knabb v. Frater, 198 Wn. 675, 89 P.2d 1046; Smith v. Eldridge Motors, Inc., 199 Wn. 10, 90 P.2d 257, 93 P.2d 1120; Simmons v. Kalin, 10 Wn.2d 409, 116 P.2d 840. [9] Moreover, the foregoing assignments of error with reference to the court's instructions, and two additional ones, are stated, but not argued, in appellant's brief.

We think that, on this testimony, the question of identity became one for the jury. State v. Seabrands, 191 Wn. 472, 71 P.2d 393. We have carefully examined this record, and believe the appellant, in all respects, had a fair trial, and that there was ample testimony to support the verdict.

". . . Where an objection is based on an instruction of the court, the instruction shall be set forth in the brief in full." Since the instructions complained of are not set forth in the brief, as required by the rule of court, supra, they cannot be considered. Scott v. Pacific Power Light Co., 178 Wn. 647, 35 P.2d 749; Keseleff v. Sunset Highway Motor Freight Co., 187 Wn. 642, 60 P.2d 720; State v. Jones, 188 Wn. 275, 62 P.2d 44; State v. Hussey, 188 Wn. 454, 62 P.2d 1350; State v. Seabrands, 191 Wn. 472, 71 P.2d 393. [2] Error is also assigned on the refusal of the trial court to retax costs by limiting mileage to one round trip by each witness to and from the place of trial, and by allowing witness fees for defendants' witnesses during the first three days of the trial, when it was known by defendants' counsel that these witnesses would not be called during that period.