State v. Scott

11 Citing cases

  1. State v. Harding

    740 A.2d 1270 (R.I. 1999)   Cited 3 times

    We disagree. Gordon Smith, a detective sergeant with the Cranston Police Department, testified that the license plate reported by the eyewitness was registered to a Hyundai owned by David Harding. Thus, this fact was in evidence. Moreover, in State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 330 A.2d 66 (1974), we held that "[t]here is no precise formula to delineate the proper bounds of the prosecutor's argument to the jury." Id. at 137, 330 A.2d at 70 (citing State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 274 A.2d 742 (1971)).

  2. State v. Manfredi

    372 A.2d 975 (R.I. 1977)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that reversible error was committed when the Court could not determine that the instruction given by the trial justice was sufficient to remove the taint of the statement and such doubt was to be resolved in favor of the defendant

    Even assuming, arguendo, that the challenged remark, standing alone, either confused and misled the jurors or aroused their passions and prejudices against defendant, the trial justice's cautionary instruction was clearly sufficient to disabuse their minds of any prejudicial effect. In State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 330 A.2d 66 (1974), a unanimous court apparently felt as I do, for it held a substantially similar instruction sufficient to cure any prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's statement that two of the defendant's alleged accomplices had been charged with misprision of a felony. Id. at 140, 330 A.2d at 71.

  3. State v. Parente

    460 A.2d 430 (R.I. 1983)   Cited 20 times
    Recognizing that "evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea is amenable to misuse"

    The prosecutor is generally allowed considerable latitude in his closing argument as long as he stays within the evidence and the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 137, 330 A.2d 66, 70 (1974); 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-5.8 at 3.88-3.91 and commentary (2d ed. 1980). However, prejudice clearly inheres if the challenged comments "are totally extraneous to the issues in the case and arouse the passions of the jury" against defendant.

  4. State v. Clements

    83 A.3d 553 (R.I. 2014)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that, even if there had been a violation of Rule 404(b), it would have been “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”

    “A prosecutor is given considerable latitude in closing argument, as long as the statements pertain only to the evidence presented and represent reasonable inferences from the record.” State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881, 885 (R.I.2002) (citing State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 137, 330 A.2d 66, 70 (1974)). “[W]hile there is no formula in law which precisely delineates the proper bounds of a prosecutor's argument, * * * prejudice obviously inheres if the remarks are totally extraneous to the issues in the case and tend to inflame and arouse the passions of the jury.”

  5. State v. Boillard

    789 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2002)   Cited 36 times
    In State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2002), we held that, in certain limited circumstances, objecting after the prosecutor had completed his closing argument might preserve the objection.

    A prosecutor is given considerable latitude in closing argument, as long as the statements pertain only to the evidence presented and represent reasonable inferences from the record. State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 137, 330 A.2d 66, 70 (1974). We have held that "while there is no formula in law which precisely delineates the proper bounds of a prosecutor's argument, * * * prejudice obviously inheres if the remarks are totally extraneous to the issues in the case and tend to inflame and arouse the passions of the jury."

  6. State v. Jette

    569 A.2d 438 (R.I. 1990)   Cited 10 times
    Affirming the denial of a motion for a new trial when the defendant was found guilty of penile penetration but not guilty of penetration with a foreign object and digital penetration and noting that the case involved three separate counts of sexual assault and that acquittal of one count did not amount "to a finding that the elements of another offense could not be prove[n]"

    The prosecutor's remarks "had an adequate factual basis in the evidence and were within the legitimate inferences that the jury could have drawn." Padula, 551 A.2d at 691; see State v. Conway, 463 A.2d 1319, 1324 (R.I. 1983); State v. Parente, 460 A.2d 430, 439 (R.I. 1983); State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 137, 330 A.2d 66, 70 (1974). In this case the trial justice reserved his decision on defendant's request for a mistrial.

  7. State v. Padula

    551 A.2d 687 (R.I. 1988)   Cited 14 times
    In State v. Padula, 551 A.2d 687, 691 (R.I. 1988), this court stated that "[w]hen a defendant claims that alleged prejudicial remarks from the basis for a mistrial, the trial justice must assess the prejudicial impact of such statements."

    After examining the statements made by the prosecutor, we feel they had an adequate factual basis in the evidence and were within the legitimate inferences that the jury could have drawn. See Conway, 463 A.2d at 1324; State v. Parente, 460 A.2d 430, 439 (R.I. 1983); State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 137, 330 A.2d 66, 70 (1974). We find no merit in defendant's contention and hold that the trial justice was not clearly wrong.

  8. State v. Conway

    463 A.2d 1319 (R.I. 1983)   Cited 18 times
    In Conway we also noted that "[t]he jury's attention should not be directed to various propositions of law unless the record contains evidence which supports and requires it."

    It is well settled that a prosecutor is allowed considerable latitude in arguing the state's case as long as he stays within the evidence and the legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Parente, R.I., 460 A.2d 430, 439 (1983) State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 137, 330 A.2d 66, 70 (1974); State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261 274 A.2d 742 (1971). A prosecutor may even express his opinion or belief regarding a defendant's guilt or the veracity of a witness's testimony as long as it is based on the evidence and does not permit the jury to infer that it stems from reasons or knowledge outside the record.

  9. State v. Gibbons

    418 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1980)   Cited 35 times
    In State v. Gibbons, R.I., 418 A.2d 830 (1980), this court recently explicated the principles of law controlling severance of joint trials.

    In reviewing the denial of a motion to sever, we shall not reverse the trial justice unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he has in fact suffered "prejudice sufficiently substantial to impinge upon his right to a fair trial." Id. at 28, 308 A.2d at 310; accord, State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 135-36, 330 A.2d 66, 69 (1974). This court has also recognized that the right to a fair trial requires a trial justice to grant a motion for severance when persons who are to be tried jointly intend to present antagonistic defenses.

  10. State v. Sharbuno

    120 R.I. 714 (R.I. 1978)   Cited 37 times
    Affirming waiver of double-jeopardy argument when the defendant failed to show good cause for not asserting it before trial

    However, in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, we do not believe that defendant suffered any "real prejudice" in this case. State v. Scott, 114 R.I. 132, 330 A.2d 66 (1974); State v. Mastracchio, 112 R.I. 487, 312 A.2d 190 (1973); State v. Patriarca, 112 R.I. 14, 29, 308 A.2d 300, 311 (1973). While defendant may have suffered some disadvantage in defending the four counts simultaneously, there is not doubt in our minds that the outcome would have been the same had separate trials been held.