Opinion
Docket No. 27615.
Filed: October 30, 2002.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. George D. Carey, District Judge.
Order denying motion to amend felony judgment of conviction to misdemeanor, vacated, and case remanded.
Vernon K. Smith Jr., Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.
Matthew James Schwartz appeals from the order of the district court denying his motion to amend a felony judgment of conviction to a misdemeanor conviction pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604(2).
In March 1993, Schwartz pleaded guilty to driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, I.C. § 18-8004. The district court entered an order withholding judgment and placed Schwartz on probation for a period of five years pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601(3). In 1994, Schwartz violated his probation by failing to complete a mandatory treatment program and absconding from supervision. As a result, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a unified sentence of four and one-half years with a minimum term of one and one-half years. The court retained jurisdiction for 180 days, however, under I.C. § 19-2601(4). At the expiration of the retained jurisdiction period, the district court suspended Schwartz's sentence and once again placed him on probation.
Schwartz successfully completed his probation and was discharged in February 1999. He thereafter filed a motion, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(2), to amend his judgment of conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. The district court concluded that the statute did not authorize amendment of the judgment in Schwartz's circumstance. The court reasoned that Schwartz had not "at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation," as required by I.C. § 19-2604(2), due to his probation violation in 1994 and, therefore, he did not qualify for the requested relief. Schwartz now appeals the district court's order denying his motion.
Because two types of disposition orders received by Schwartz — first an order withholding judgment and later entry of judgment and sentence with the court retaining jurisdiction — are significant to our analysis of his request for relief under § 19-2604, a brief description of these forms of disposition is necessary. An order withholding judgment is authorized by I.C. § 19-2601(3). That subsection specifies that, when a defendant has been adjudicated guilty by entry of a guilty plea or by a trial, the court may withhold judgment and place the defendant on probation. When judgment is withheld, no sentence is imposed and no judgment of conviction is entered, but if the conditions of probation are violated, the district court may revoke the probation and thereafter impose any sentence that originally might have been imposed. I.C. § 19-2603. State v. Branson, 128 Idaho 790, 792-93, 919 P.2d 319, 321-22 (1996); State v. Murillo, 135 Idaho 811, 814, 25 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct.App. 2001). If the probation during the term of withheld judgment is completed without a violation, the court may then set aside the guilty plea or finding of guilt and dismiss the charge as authorized in § 19-2604(1).
The retention of jurisdiction after entry of a judgment of conviction is authorized by I.C. § 19-2601(4). The court is allowed to retain jurisdiction during the first 180 days of the defendant's service of the sentence in the custody of the Board of Corrections. The principal purpose of retained jurisdiction is to provide a period for evaluation of the offender's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 385, 582 P.2d 728, 731 (1978), overruled on other grounds, State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 30 P.3d 293 (2001); Thorgaard v. State, 125 Idaho 901, 904, 876 P.2d 599, 602 (Ct.App. 1994); State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct.App. 1984). At the conclusion of the retained jurisdiction period, the trial court may relinquish its jurisdiction and order that the defendant serve the remainder of the sentence in confinement, may reduce the sentence, or may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation. Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 385, 582 P.2d at 731; Thorgaard, 125 Idaho at 904, 876 P.2d at 602; McDonald v. State, 124 Idaho 103, 105, 856 P.2d 893, 895 (Ct.App. 1992).
Schwartz received both of the foregoing forms of disposition. He was first placed on probation under an order withholding judgment and, after violating that probation, received a judgment of conviction and sentence, with the court retaining jurisdiction and ultimately putting him on probation again.
We now consider Schwartz's claim that he qualifies for modification of his judgment under I.C. § 19-2604. That statute contains two subsections that are pertinent to Schwartz's motion. They provide:
1. If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant. . . . [F]inal dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil rights.
2. If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one hundred and eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, and the defendant placed upon probation . . . upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.
The relief afforded under subsection (1) is complete expungement of the conviction, and the subsection applies when judgment has been withheld and the defendant placed on probation or when judgment has been entered and the sentence has been imposed but suspended. Subsection (2) provides a lesser form of relief, the reduction of a conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor. Subsection (2) applies only in the specific circumstance where jurisdiction has been retained during the first 180 days of a sentence and the defendant has thereafter been placed on probation.
Schwartz sought relief under subsection (2). He argues on appeal that the district court misinterpreted that subsection. Schwartz acknowledges that he violated probation in 1994, but asserts that the relevant probationary period under subsection (2) is the period after the court sentenced him and retained jurisdiction. Schwartz maintains that he is entitled to reduction of his offense to a misdemeanor under subsection (2) because he complied at all times with the terms and conditions of probation after the court retained jurisdiction. Subsection (1), he asserts, applies to probationary periods served while judgment is withheld, and he acknowledges that because he violated probation during that period, he is not entitled to dismissal of the charge against him.
The State argues, and the district court held, that Schwartz is not eligible for relief under subsection (2) because he violated his probation during the period of withheld judgment and therefore has not "at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation." Thus, it is the State's argument that once a defendant has violated probation, making him no longer eligible for relief under subsection (1), he may never meet the requirements for the lesser relief authorized by subsection (2).
This Court exercises free review over this issue of statutory interpretation. State v. Spor, 134 Idaho 315, 320, 1 P.3d 816, 821 (Ct.App. 2000). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App. 2001). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. State v. Scott, 135 Idaho 457, 459, 19 P.3d 771, 773 (Ct.App. 2001).
We conclude that the State's interpretation of I.C. § 19-2604 is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Although under either subsection, relief is available only if the defendant has complied with the terms and conditions of probation, these subsections provide two distinct forms of relief that are mutually exclusive, and each subsection describes the particular period of probation that must be served without violation in order for the defendant to obtain relief. An order for a complete expungement under subsection (1), is permissible upon complete compliance with probation whenever a sentence was suspended or judgment was withheld. The lesser relief of amendment of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor, however, applies only in the circumstance where the sentence was suspended after the retention of jurisdiction. Given these separate circumstances in which the two subsections apply, an individual who has violated probation under a suspended sentence or withheld judgment, and has thus lost the opportunity for complete expungement of his record under subsection (1), still has an opportunity to obtain a reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor under subsection (2) by complying with the terms of any probation that may be subsequently granted after the court has retained jurisdiction.
Thus, in Schwartz's case, it is his second period of probation, after the court retained jurisdiction, that is relevant to application of § 19-2604(2). Because Schwartz has shown that he fully complied with the terms and conditions of that period of probation, he is eligible to be considered for relief under subsection (2). Therefore, the district court erred in holding that it lacked authority to grant the requested relief.
It must be observed, however, that relief under either subsection (1) or subsection (2) of § 19-2604 is not mandatory but "may" be granted by the trial court. The legislature's use of this permissive term signals that the determination whether to grant relief is within the trial court's discretion. See State v. Harbaugh, 123 Idaho 835, 837, 853 P.2d 580, 582 (1993). Here, the fact that Schwartz committed violations during his first period of probation is a factor which, although not automatically disqualifying him for relief under subsection (2), may be taken into consideration by the district court as it exercises its discretion.
We conclude that the district court erred in holding that § 19-2604 did not permit the relief sought by Schwartz. Accordingly, we vacate the order denying Schwartz's motion to amend his judgment of conviction and remand to the district court for reconsideration of the motion in light of this opinion.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge Pro Tem BURDICK CONCUR.