Opinion
A17-1741
02-10-2020
State of Minnesota, ex rel. Robert Young, petitioner, Appellant, v. Paul Schnell, Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Bradley D. Simon, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018). Appeal dismissed; motion denied
Randall, Judge Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-17-3621 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Bradley D. Simon, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Randall, Judge.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
RANDALL, Judge
After this court dismissed Young's habeas corpus appeal on the ground that it had become moot upon his release from prison, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted and stayed Young's petition for further review pending its decision in State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 2019). After issuing its opinion in Ford, which concluded that Ford's habeas corpus petition and appeal were not rendered moot by his release from incarceration, the supreme court vacated this court's opinion and remanded the matter for reconsideration. The record in this matter does not demonstrate that either of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine relied upon by the court in Ford are applicable. Young's appeal is dismissed as moot due to his release from incarceration.
FACTS
The facts underlying appellant Robert Young's petition for a writ of habeas corpus were previously set forth in this court's initial opinion in this matter. State ex rel. Young v. Roy, No. A17-1741, 2018 WL 2407259, at *1-2 (Minn. App. May 29, 2018), stay vacated, rev'd and remanded (Minn. Oct. 15, 2019) (mem.).
This court initially held that Young's appeal was moot due to his release from incarceration during the pendency of his appeal from the district court's order denying his habeas corpus petition. Id. at *4. Young petitioned for further review to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The supreme court granted Young's petition and stayed the matter pending review of this court's decision in State ex rel. Leino v. Roy, 910 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. App. 2018), review granted (Minn. June 27, 2018) and appeal dismissed (Minn. May 10, 2019), which presented a similar mootness question. The supreme court later dismissed the appeal in Leino, but issued an order continuing the stay of Young's case pending its disposition of Ford, which also presented the mootness question. The supreme court issued its opinion in Ford on September 11, 2019, concluding that Ford's habeas corpus petition and appeal were not rendered moot by his release from incarceration. 933 N.W.2d at 402. The supreme court then vacated the stay of Young's appeal, vacated this court's opinion, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Ford. This court reinstated the appeal and requested supplemental briefing from the parties addressing the impact of Ford on the question of whether Young's appeal was rendered moot by his release.
DECISION
As a general principle, "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). But mootness is not monolithic, and is instead a "'flexible discretionary doctrine.'" Id. at 4 (quoting State v. Rud, 359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984)). For instance, a court may choose not to dismiss an otherwise-moot appeal "when there is a reasonable expectation that a complaining party would be subjected to the same action again and the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases or expires." Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). Or a court may choose to address a matter that is moot but "is 'functionally justiciable' and presents an important question of 'statewide significance that should be decided immediately.'" Id. at 6 (quoting Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576).
In the context of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the only available remedy is relief from the challenged restraint. Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2018); see State v. Schnagl, 859 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2015) ("The writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a confined person to obtain relief regarding the custody imposed, or the length of confinement in a given case."). Accordingly, a petitioner's claim ordinarily becomes moot upon his release from restraint because there ceases to be any effective relief that a court is able to provide. The supreme court in Ford stated that habeas corpus relief may be available to challenge future incarceration where the petitioner is able to show that a restraint on his liberty is demonstrably imminent and inevitable. 933 N.W.2d at 402.
In Ford, as relevant here, the Department of Corrections (DOC) revoked Ford's conditional release due to the lack of an approved residence in the community, and continued to extend his incarceration for this reason. Id. at 397. Ford filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, and he ultimately argued that DOC had failed to meet its obligation under State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008), to provide supervision services at available residences located in counties other than Blue Earth County where his offense had been committed. Id. at 398. While Ford's petition was pending in district court, DOC released him from prison to a residential sex-offender treatment program in Hennepin County known as Alpha House. Id. Notwithstanding his release from incarceration, the district court considered the merits of Ford's petition and concluded that DOC had violated Marlowe and its own internal policies by failing to provide supervision for Ford and for failing to consider restructuring his conditions of release. Id. at 400.
On appeal, this court reversed, concluding that Ford's habeas corpus petition was rendered moot by his release to Alpha House. Id. at 400-01. The supreme court granted Ford's petition for further review, reversed this court's decision, and reinstated the district court's order. Id. at 407-08. In so deciding, the supreme court concluded that Ford's case was not moot because "the likelihood of Ford being sent back to prison is not purely hypothetical, and his interest in remaining in the community rather than returning to prison is still in jeopardy, despite his temporary release." Id. at 402 (citations and quotations omitted). In addition, it held that the issues presented in Ford's case were functionally justiciable and of statewide significance meriting immediate disposition. Id. at 403-04.
Now, on remand, Young argues that his appeal should not be considered moot because, like Ford, he faces an ongoing risk of having his release revoked in the future due to no fault of his own, and of having his incarceration extended due to an inability to secure approved housing. Young states that his release was revoked twice due to a loss of housing because the residential facilities were unable to address his epilepsy, and that his incarceration was extended beyond his established release dates due to DOC's failure to approve a placement in the community. This, Young asserts, demonstrates that he—more so even than Ford—faces so substantial a risk of "prolonged reincarceration" that his case should not be considered moot.
The record in this matter establishes the facts and circumstances attendant to Young's prior incarcerations and the concerns that exist for his future on release. It is silent as to the nature of the release from custody at the core of this mootness inquiry. In addressing mootness in a reply brief during this matter's initial appearance in this court, Young highlighted the absence of any such information in the record:
The state has not disclosed where Young is living, why or how he was released, or whether his ongoing ability to remain in Ramsey County is contingent on this Court's decision in the case or on any other factors. . . . There is currently no record as to whether the DOC has entered into any sort of agreement with Ramsey County that will require the DOC to revoke Young's release after a certain period of time, allow Ramsey County to require that Young be revoked following the decision in this case, or in any other way make Young's release to Ramsey County contingent or time-limited.This dearth of information regarding Young's release is significant because it was precisely these sorts of details that the Ford court explicitly relied on in determining the likelihood of reimprisonment under similar circumstances:
In this case, we conclude that Ford's habeas petition is not moot, and his request for relief presents a sufficiently ripe question. In reaching this conclusion, we rely on and afford great weight to the findings of the district court. Specifically, the district court found that Hennepin County is likely to refuse to supervise Ford after his time at Alpha House ends, and the [DOC] will not provide courtesy supervision if he remains in that county. Furthermore, the district court found that if Hennepin County refuses to supervise Ford, the [DOC] is likely to revoke his release, as it has done in the past, based on his failure to have an agent-approved residence, and Ford will return to prison, as he has in the past. Finally, the district court found that the [DOC's] unwillingness to enforce its own policies by requiring Hennepin County to accept supervision intentionally sets Ford up for failure. These findings by the district court have ample support in the record, and many of the facts are undisputed.
Thus, substantial evidence leads us to conclude that the likelihood of Ford being sent back to prison is not purely hypothetical, and his interest in remaining in the community rather than returning to prison is still in jeopardy despite his
temporary release. As put by the district court, Ford's housing situation is "contingent, uncertain, and temporary at best," and his return to prison for a lack of suitable housing is not so much a matter of if but when. Because Ford's release is only temporary, and because he faces a nonspeculative threat of returning to prison, we hold that Ford's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not moot and his request for relief on the petition is ripe for decision.933 N.W.2d at 402-03 (citations and quotations omitted).
Here, the record on appeal discloses none of this information. The question of mootness was first raised on appeal by the state in its respondent's brief, noting only that Young had been released and that he was "currently serving his conditional release term in the community." Young, in response, made no attempt to provide any additional information to the court concerning this release but instead pointed only to the state's failure to have furnished such information itself. Unlike in Ford, the record does not disclose whether the residence to which Young was released was temporary or permanent, whether there existed any foreseeable concerns over supervision jurisdiction, or whether there was any likelihood that Young's medical conditions might result in the subsequent loss of that residence.
Whereas the court in Ford was able to rely on specific district court record information to conclude that the risk of reincarceration was not merely speculative or hypothetical, the record here is insufficient to permit an evaluation of whether Young's release was either temporary or contingent, and whether his return to prison was consequently "imminent and almost inevitable." Ford, 933 N.W.2d at 403. Young, who is seeking to avoid application of the mootness doctrine, bears the burden or providing this court with a record sufficient to demonstrate the non-theoretical likelihood of his reincarceration. Instead this court has an inadequate record on which to determine whether there is any "reasonable expectation" that Young will again be subject to a return to prison due to a lack of approved housing based upon his medical condition. Young has failed to establish that his appeal is not moot.
Young's second argument on remand is that the issues raised in his appeal not otherwise resolved by the opinion in Ford present questions of statewide significance that merit resolution. In addition to arguing that DOC failed to comply with Marlowe, Young asserted on appeal (1) that his revocation and extended incarceration violated the Americans with Disabilities Act; (2) that Minnesota Statutes and the administrative rules pertaining to DOC do not permit extensions of incarceration for lack of suitable housing; and (3) that his detention beyond his assigned release date violated substantive due process.
This exception to the mootness doctrine is narrowly applied, and has been reserved for those cases which involve issues exhibiting some manner of particular urgency. See Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6-7 (providing examples of cases in which the exception has been applied). In Ford, for instance, the supreme court elected to decide petitioner's claims because there had already been a "parade of appeals" involving similar claims, and because record testimony established that finding approvable housing for all manner of offenders had been a significant and ongoing barrier to release. 933 N.W.2d at 403 (quotation omitted). Unlike Ford, however, nothing in the record of Young's case demonstrates that his additional issues present urgent concerns of such broad statewide applicability as to justify excepting his appeal from being declared moot.
The record is lacking to demonstrate that there is a reasonable risk that Young will be subject to similar incarcerations under similar circumstances. We conclude none of the claims raised in this appeal present "urgent question[s] of statewide significance." Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6. Young's appeal is moot.
Prior to submitting its supplemental brief after remand to this court, respondent filed a motion to supplement the record with information regarding Young's release from custody, subsequent violations of his release and incarceration, and his current incarceration status. Because Young's appeal is moot on the basis of the existing record, respondent's motion to supplement the record is denied.
Appeal dismissed; motion denied.