Opinion
No. 5-454 / 04-1699
Filed July 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Stephen C. Clarke, Judge.
Rosell Saulsberry appeals the judgment and sentence following his conviction for third-degree burglary. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and James Katcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Rosell Saulsberry appeals the judgment and sentence following his conviction for third-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code section 713.1 and 713.6A(1) (2003). Saulsberry claims his conviction was based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony so that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Because we find the testimony of Saulsberry's accomplice was sufficiently corroborated, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could have reasonably found the following facts.
In April of 2004 Saulsberry became acquainted with Eugene Stapella. At the time they met, Stapella was living in a hotel in Cedar Falls, Iowa. Saulsberry did not have any place to stay, but did have a car. Saulsberry's car was a white Honda Accord. Stapella allowed Saulsberry to stay with him in his hotel room in exchange for the use of Saulsberry's car.
Saulsberry and Stapella focused their energies on the obtaining and use of crack cocaine. During the day they would collect scrap metal in order to obtain money to purchase the drug. The two of them used crack several times a day.
In addition to collecting metal, Stapella's and Saulsberry's other source of income was breaking into establishments and stealing cash. The men would drive to various places in the early morning hours and Stapella would use a crowbar to break into these establishments. Stapella and Saulsberry would then split the money they obtained from their illicit activities in order to buy more crack.
In the early morning hours of May 16, Stapella drove Saulsberry to a hospital parking lot near Narey's 19th Hole, a tavern. Both Stapella and Saulsberry understood that the purpose of their visit to Narey's was to steal money in order to obtain more drugs. Stapella took a crowbar from Saulsberry's car, walked the short distance to Narey's, and broke in. However, in so doing Stapella unknowingly triggered a burglar alarm.
The police responded to the alarm and arrested Stapella on the scene. Although Stapella stated he walked to the tavern, the police were familiar with the considerable distance between Stapella's residence and Narey's and were also aware of Stapella's access to and recent use of a white Honda Accord. The police began searching the area for the Accord. The police found Saulsberry in the nearby parking lot, crouching in the passenger front seat of his Accord. After some questioning, he was placed under arrest.
The State charged Saulsberry with three counts of burglary in the third degree. On August 24, 2004, Saulsberry was tried to a jury. Stapella testified against Saulsberry. Saulsberry was acquitted of two counts but convicted of one count based on the events occurring at Narey's 19th Hole. Saulsberry appeals.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Saulsberry contends the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because Stapella's testimony was not corroborated and no other evidence ties him to the burglary occurring at Narey's 19th Hole. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001). A jury's verdict is binding if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is evidence that could convince a rational fact finder that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
It has long been the law of Iowa that one cannot be convicted on the testimony of accomplices alone. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.21(3); State v. Douglas, 675 N.W.2d 567, 568 (Iowa 2004). Thus, when the prosecution relies on this type of proof, "corroborating evidence independently linking the defendant to the offense is required." Douglas, 675 N.W.2d at 569.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.21(3) provides that corroborating evidence must "tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." In State v. Ware, 338 N.W.2d 707, 710 (Iowa 1983), our supreme court stated,
Corroborative evidence need not be strong and need not be entirely inconsistent with innocence . . . The requirement of corroborative evidence is met "if it can fairly be said the accomplice is corroborated in some material fact tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime." [Citations omitted].
Even if each piece of evidence is not alone sufficient to corroborate an accomplice, the evidence as a whole may be sufficient corroboration. See State v. Willman, 244 N.W.2d 314, 315 (Iowa 1976).
Stapella testified that his and Saulsberry's motive for burglarizing Narey's 19th Hole was to obtain money to buy crack. Stapella also testified Saulsberry lived with him in a hotel room and that he and Saulsberry used crack several times a day. This testimony as to Saulsberry's motive was corroborated by Officer Jeremy Pohl's testimony that evidence of drug use was found at Stapella's hotel room as well as by Saulsberry's own testimony confirming that he was using crack in April and May of 2004 and that he was living with Stapella during this time. See State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 348, 349-50 (Iowa 1979) (concluding the defendant's testimony in conjunction with other evidence was sufficiently corroborative of accomplice testimony).
Stapella further testified that he drove Saulsberry in Saulsberry's white Honda Accord to a hospital parking lot near Narey's 19th Hole, that he grabbed a crowbar from Saulsberry's car, and that he proceeded to break into Narey's. This testimony was more than sufficiently corroborated. First, Officer Brice Lippert testified that he had stopped a white Honda Accord driven by Stapella on two recent occasions, both times with Saulsberry as a passenger. Second, Officer Rob Camarata testified that he found a white Honda Accord in the hospital parking lot near the crime scene with Saulsberry in the passenger seat. Third, Officer Camarata testified that Saulsberry admitted that Stapella had driven the car to that location and then left on foot. Cf. Douglas, 675 N.W.2d at 572 (noting that a defendant's out of court admissions may corroborate the testimony of an accomplice). Fourth, Saulsberry testified that he owned a white Honda Accord, this was the car used to obtain drugs, and that Saulsberry was with Stapella when he drove this Accord to the hospital parking lot. Finally, Saulsberry confirmed in his testimony that he did keep a crowbar in his car. See State v. Bizzett, 212 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 1973) ("[T]he defendant himself may furnish the required corroboration of accomplice testimony.") (Citations omitted).
We conclude the State, through the testimony of various police officers, through Saulsberry's statements, and through Saulsberry's own testimony, provided evidence that supported material parts of Stapella's testimony. This same evidence tended to connect Saulsberry to the commission of the burglary occurring at Narey's 19th Hole. We accordingly conclude the district court correctly determined Stapella's testimony was sufficiently corroborated and correctly denied Saulsberry's motion for judgment of acquittal. We affirm Saulsberry's conviction and sentence.