Our own research has located only one case arguably considering the issue on similar statutory language, and it does not help the defendant here. See State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 12 n.1, 16, 280 A.2d 85 (1971) (jury question existed as to whether defendant should have known his operation of vehicle "created a risk to the safety of his passenger" under Rhode Island General Laws § 31-27-4, which provided, "Any person who operates a motor vehicle ... recklessly so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered" [emphasis added] ). "No person, except firefighters or garbage collectors, or operators of fire trucks or garbage trucks, ... shall hang onto the outside of, or the rear-end of any vehicle, ... and no operator of a motor vehicle shall knowingly permit any person to hang onto or ride on the outside or rear-end of the vehicle ...."
The trial justice is then required to determine whether under such a test the state has failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Moretti, 113 R.I. 213, 215-16, 319 A.2d 342, 343 (1974); State v. Rose, 112 R.I. 402, 406, 311 A.2d 281, 283 (1973); State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 15-16, 280 A.2d 85, 88 (1971). Only if the trial justice determines that in such a frame of reference the evidence is insufficient to be submitted to the trier of fact may he grant a motion for judgment of acquittal.
The defendant argues that there was no evidence he punched or kicked the victim during the fracas in the Bristol parking lot, that there was no evidence connecting him with the alleged kidnapping, and that there was no evidence he had participated in any activities involving the victim at the Providence clubhouse of E.C.M.F. He contends, therefore, that even viewing the evidence adduced by the state and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the state does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the trial justice erred in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal. State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 280 A.2d 85 (1971); State v. Main, 94 R.I. 338, 180 A.2d 814 (1962). The record is clear that Richard Rose named defendant Scott as one of the persons he saw beating the victim at the Bristol parking lot.
However, where the evidence adduced by the state and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the state, are insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the court must grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 280 A.2d 85 (1971). The defendant, contending that the evidence adduced in these cases is entirely circumstantial, urges that to warrant a jury in finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, it is necessary not only that the evidence be consistent with a conclusion of guilt but must also at the same time be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
It was, therefore, error to deny defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of violating § 11-19-18. State v. Saulnier, 109 R.I. 11, 15-16, 280 A.2d 85, 88 (1971). Exception 1 is sustained and the conviction on the charge of violating § 11-19-18 is reversed.