Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2018-0289
04-30-2019
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. RICHARD SAUCIER, Appellant.
COUNSEL Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Corazon Law Firm PLLC, Tucson By Sara L. Dent Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(e).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. A20180040001
The Honorable Danelle B. Liwski, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Chief Counsel
By Diane Leigh Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Corazon Law Firm PLLC, Tucson
By Sara L. Dent
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Judge Espinosa concurred.
ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 Appellant Richard Saucier challenges the trial court's ruling denying his petition for an entry of clearance upon his official records pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4051. We affirm.
¶2 In January 2018, Saucier was arrested on suspicion of criminal damage, a domestic violence offense. His wife had contacted law enforcement to report a "verbal domestic violence dispute," during which she and Saucier were "arguing and he broke a lot of dishes." In support of the arrest, officers noted that the couple had been married thirteen years, Saucier "broke the plates which belonged to both of them" and which they both used, and the remains of the broken dishes had been found in various common areas of the home they shared.
¶3 After the incident, Saucier's wife declined restitution and signed an affidavit that the dishes had belonged to Saucier as he had purchased them before their marriage. The state dismissed the complaint against Saucier, citing prosecutorial discretion. In August 2018, Saucier filed a petition to clear his arrest records, arguing that "without a showing that the property belonged to another person the State [could not] make even a prima facie case of criminal damage" and that the state had not shown he acted recklessly. The trial court denied the petition, determining the officers "had probable cause for an arrest." This appeal followed. Actions pursuant to § 13-4051 are "a special proceeding that is in the nature of a civil action," and we have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(B). State v. Mohajerin, 226 Ariz. 103, ¶¶ 7-8 (App. 2010).
¶4 On appeal, Saucier argues the trial court erred in finding probable cause and denying the petition "when there were ambiguous facts contained in the [police] reports." We review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Franco, 153 Ariz. 424, 426 (App. 1987).
¶5 Section 13-4051(A) provides that a "person who is wrongfully arrested . . . for any crime may petition the superior court for entry on all court records, police records and any other records . . . a notation that the person has been cleared." "[I]f the judge believes that justice will be served by such entry, the judge shall issue [an] order requiring the entry . . . ." A.R.S. § 13-5041(B).
¶6 In his petition to the trial court, citing Franco, Saucier argued that "'wrongfully' as used in the statute mean[s] 'illegally' or 'unlawfully'" and "implie[s] that there was no legal or factual basis for the arrest." At a hearing on the petition, Saucier again argued, "Wrongfully means being arrested without probable cause," and argued the officers "didn't have probable cause to prove that the dishes belonged to the victim" or "as to the mental state that is required." Thus, as the state points out, his argument focused solely on the question of whether there was sufficient probable cause for the arrest.
¶7 Likewise, on appeal, although he cites this court's decision in Mohajerin, quoting "its more expansive definition" of "wrongfully" and discussing the "requirement of 'justice,'" his argument still focuses on a lack of probable cause. As detailed above, the facts known to the officers at the time of Saucier's arrest, including that the dishes were being commonly used, in common areas of the house, by a long-married couple, were sufficient to provide probable cause for arrest on criminal damage charges. See State v. Morris, 246 Ariz. 154, ¶ 9 (App. 2019) ("Probable cause is 'information sufficient to justify belief by a reasonable man that an offense is being or has been committed . . . .'") (quoting State v. Aguilar, 228 Ariz. 401, ¶ 14 (App. 2011)); see also A.R.S. § 13-1602(A)(1) ("A person commits criminal damage by . . . [r]ecklessly defacing or damaging property of another person."). Because Saucier did not argue that his petition should be granted despite the existence of probable cause below, and does not adequately develop such an argument on appeal, we do not address the Mohajerin standard further.
¶8 We affirm the trial court's denial of Saucier's petition.