Accord Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). See, also, State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992); State v. Staten, 238 Neb. 13, 469 N.W.2d 112 (1991). Roberts argues that the clothing was not within the area of his immediate control because the jacket and pants were searched after he was removed from the bedroom.
Petersen relies heavily on this court's decision in State v. Scovill, 9 Neb. App. 118, 608 N.W.2d 623 (2000), wherein we found that possession of drug paraphernalia — a bong discovered by police at the scene of a vehicle accident — did not justify a pat-down search of the driver, which search produced methamphetamine, after officers found him at a truckstop several miles from the accident scene. The State argues that the "surrounding circumstances," in addition to the discovery of the marijuana pipe, brief for appellee at 8, justify the officers' further investigation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-427 (Reissue 1995), claiming that such investigation is clearly authorized in State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992). We conclude that Sassen does sustain the pat down of Petersen and the search of the pickup because even though possession of a marijuana pipe is only an infraction, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-441 (Reissue 1995), for which citations are to be issued in lieu of arrest, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-435 (Reissue 1995), Sassen creates the controlling exception.
Only the bong was lawfully discovered and therefore admissible against Scovill in this case. Finally, we address State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992), which both parties and the trial court cited in support of their positions on Johansen's search. In Sassen, police officers who noticed that a car did not have a front license plate and was being driven with its back window completely covered in snow stopped the car and spoke with the driver.
Generally, a search of the container will be upheld where the events that transpired between the arrest and the search do not render the search unreasonable. United States v Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (CA 9, 1993); United States v Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-888 (CA 9, 1991); United States v Morales, 923 F.2d 621 (CA 8, 1991); United States v Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (CA 7, 1982); State v Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675; 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); State v Sassen, 240 Neb. 773; 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992); Ricks v State, 322 Md. 183; 586 A.2d 740 (1991); Commonwealth v Madera, 402 Mass. 156; 521 N.E.2d 738 (1988); State v Heinen, 114 Idaho App 656; 759 P.2d 947 (1988); State v Boff, 766 P.2d 646 (Colo, 1988); Carrasco v State, 712 S.W.2d 120 (Tex Crim App, 1986). See also 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure (2d ed), § 5.5(a), pp 535-536.
See, e.g., People v. Bland, 884 P.2d 312, 315 (Colo. 1994); State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1992). When federal prisoners are placed in segregation pending the determination of disciplinary charges against them, this is not considered "arrest."
Following the pat-down, Special Agent Allrich asked for Consospo-Perez's identification and whether Consospo-Perez was a citizen and had immigration papers. See TR. 20, 27. Consospo-Perez responded "No" to each inquiry. See TR. 20. Because Consospo-Perez did not have any identification, admitted he was not a citizen, and did not have immigration papers, Special Agent Allrich had probable cause to arrest Consospo-Perez. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Sassen, 484 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Neb. 1992) (driving without a driver's license provided probable cause to arrest defendant); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-484 (driver's license required); 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (classes of deportable aliens). Any subsequent search of Consospo-Perez's person and vehicle were done incident to his lawful arrest.
Pursuant to the lawful arrest, Atkinson had authority to conduct a full search of defendant without a search warrant. See, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992). A search incident to arrest is not limited to searching the arrested person for weapons only; an officer may search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person, even if such evidence is unrelated to the crime for which the arrest was made, in order to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence.
Such matters are for the finder of fact, and the verdict will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 774, 484 N.W.2d 469, 470 (1992). An examination of the evidence in the record, construed in favor of the State in light of the defendant's convictions, discloses that the opportunity and ability of the tellers to identify Jones as the attempted robber are not insufficient as a matter of law.
" State v. Jansen, ante p. 196, 198, 486 N.W.2d 913, 914 (1992), quoting State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 484 N.W.2d 469 (1992). See, also, State v. LaFreniere, 240 Neb. 258, 481 N.W.2d 412 (1992); State v. Dawson, 240 Neb. 89, 480 N.W.2d 700 (1992).
Such matters are for the finder of fact, and the verdict will be affirmed, in the absence of prejudicial error, if properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. State v. Sassen, 240 Neb. 773, 774, 484 N.W.2d 469, 470 (1992). Only where evidence lacks sufficient probative force as a matter of law may an appellate court set aside a guilty verdict as unsupported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.