Opinion
No. CR98-275377
October 26, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Jaime Santiago, petitioner, was convicted by jury verdict of Assault in the First Degree, a violation of CGS Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) which provides for a maximum 20-year sentence with a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years; Risk of Injury to a Child, a violation of CGS Sec. 53-21 which provides for a maximum period of 10 years incarceration.
The court imposed a net effective sentence of twenty (20) years to serve and ten (10) years of Special Parole. It is this sentence petitioner seeks to have reviewed.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. During the day, while his wife was at work, the defendant stayed at home and cared for his three-month-old infant son and four-year-old daughter. On November 30, 1998, the defendant was the sole attendant and care giver for his two children. At about 1 p.m., the infant fell from the defendant's lap to the floor. When the defendant picked him up, the infant was crying loudly, his arms and body were shaking and his eyes were rolling. When the baby stopped crying, he became unresponsive and the defendant thought that the infant was dead. The defendant then poured water on him and shook him, after which the baby began kicking and coughing.
See State v. Santiago, 74 Conn.App. 736, 737-40 (2003).
Later that afternoon, the defendant's fifteen-year-old daughter returned home from school and, when she saw the baby, told the defendant that the baby looked sick and that there was something wrong with his eyes. Although the defendant knew how to reach the infant's physician, he did not seek advice or assistance for the infant until about 6 p.m., when he drove with the infant and his younger daughter to Cheshire to pick up his wife. When his wife saw the baby, she told the defendant to drive immediately to a hospital.
The defendant and his family arrived at Waterbury Hospital at about 7 p.m., where the baby was found to be struggling to breathe, unresponsive, in distress and in need of intensive care. An examination showed evidence of brain swelling, anoxic brain injury and retinal hemorrhaging. Medical staff, police and a social worker questioned the defendant to obtain a medical history so as to determine what had happened to the baby to cause his injuries. The defendant first stated that he had noticed during the afternoon that the baby was breathing abnormally, but that his breathing had returned to normal. When asked, the defendant stated that the baby had not fallen or suffered any injury. Later that evening the baby was transported by Life Star helicopter to the Connecticut Children's Medical Center (medical center) in Hartford and was admitted to the pediatric intensive care unit.
At the medical center, after the baby arrived at the emergency department, Aaron Zucker, director of the pediatric intensive care unit, directed the infant's care. Zucker placed the infant on a respirator to help him to breathe. There was no external evidence of trauma, but an examination revealed retinal hemorrhages in both eyes and abnormal reaction to various stimuli. Computerized axial tomography (CAT) scans completed at Waterbury Hospital and at the medical center showed severe cerebral edema. Zucker told the defendant that in the absence of something similar to a high speed car accident, he could not explain the cause of the severe brain injuries. Shortly afterward, the defendant told Zucker that when he was on his way to pick up his wife, he had in fact made a sudden stop in the car, but because he had failed to secure the car seat properly, the car seat tipped forward to that the baby hit his head on the back of the driver's seat. Zucker told the defendant, and later told the police, that he had trouble believing that this had caused the baby's severe injuries.
The following day, on December 1, 1998, the defendant gave the police a written statement in which he stated that while on the way to Cheshire with his two children in the backseat at about 6:15 p.m., another car came in front of his vehicle and he was forced to make a sudden stop. The defendant stated he had heard the infant crying and that when he turned around, he saw the baby's head bounce back from the headrest. The police then told the defendant that the physician did not think that this explanation was a plausible one. A few minutes later, the defendant gave an addendum to his statement. The defendant stated that while he was watching television at about 1 p.m. with the baby on his lap, he either dropped the baby or the baby slipped off his lap and hit his head on the floor. The baby cried and his eyes rolled up, and the defendant shook the baby lightly to get his attention.
On December 3, 1998, the police arrested the defendant on a warrant. He then added a second addendum to his statement. He stated that after the infant fell, he had washed the baby's head and that he had shaken the infant up, down and sideways very hard.
Zucker stated, on the basis of the CAT scan completed at the medical center, that the infant's cerebral edema was perhaps the worst he had ever observed. The injuries sustained by the baby were consistent with "shaken baby syndrome," and, in fact, that was Zucker's diagnosis of the cause of the injuries. The baby has a large head in relation to his body and has weak neck muscles. The underlying cause of the syndrome is an acceleration-deceleration injury and a rotational injury so that the brain moves forward at an extremely rapid rate and collides with the skull when the head stops moving. The brain moves back and forth very rapidly inside the skull, tearing the veins. The brain injury in this case was so severe that the baby is in a persistent vegetative state. He must be fed through a gastrointestinal tube, cannot maintain his body temperature and must be kept in a private room with controlled temperature, his breathing can be erratic, he cannot sit on his own and cannot walk or see. The brain injury to the infant was so severe that he never will be able to walk or to see and will require constant daily care as long as he lives."
At the hearing before the Sentence Review Division counsel for the petitioner stressed that petitioner suffered from "deficient mental faculties" at the time of sentencing. Counsel indicated that petitioner was depressed and suffered from an "adjustment disorder." Counsel further argued that these mental health issues were not sufficiently considered by the trial court. Counsel further opines that given the information concerning petitioner's mental health issues a sentence of 10 years on each count, concurrent, is "more than adequate."
The petitioner addressed the Division. Petitioner related that he was the full-time caretaker of his children, worked full-time and "no supervisory agency" was involved. Petitioner related that he is "not a criminal element," is a first time offender and has mental health issues.
Counsel for the state indicated the sentence imposed provides for a 10-year mandatory minimum period of incarceration. Counsel related that the victim was petitioner's "own 3-month-old child." Counsel reminded the Division that as a result of the injuries inflicted on the child by petitioner the child is in a permanent vegetative state.
Pursuant to Connecticut Practice Book § 43123 et seq., the Sentence Review Division is limited in the scope of its review. The Division is to determine whether the sentence imposed "should be modified because it is inappropriate or disproportionate in the light of the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of the public interest and the deterrent, rehabilitative, isolative and denunciatory purposes for which the sentence was intended."
The Division is without authority to modify sentences except in accordance with the provisions of Connecticut Practice Book § 43-23 et seq., and Connecticut General Statute § 51-194 et seq.
Taking into consideration the egregious and serious nature of the injuries that were inflicted on this child wherein he presently exists in a vegetative state, the sentence imposed is neither inappropriate nor disproportionate.
In reviewing the record as a whole, the Division finds that the sentencing court's actions were in accordance with the parameters of Connecticut Practice Book § 43-23 et seq.
THE SENTENCE IS AFFIRMED.