The district judge, therefore, had no obligation to accept it. See State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833, 835 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 439 So.2d 1076 (La. 1983). Requested Jury Charge No. 8
Further, this court has noted that almost identical language was necessary to "amplify and explain" a requested special charge on retreat. See State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 439 So.2d 1076 (La. 1983). Finally, as pointed out in the Sanders opinion, this language was virtually identical to the charges quoted with approval by the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v. Tolbert, 390 So.2d 510 (La. 1980).
For example, the statement in the second paragraph, that specific intent "cannot be presumed where there are no external signs," could lead a jury to believe that specific intent cannot properly be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. Cf. State v. Boyer, 406 So.2d 143 (La. 1981); State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983), writ denied, 439 So.2d 1076 (La. 1983). Thus, in that the requested charge did not conform to the provisions of LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 807, no error arises from its exclusion.
A conviction will not be reversed on the grounds of erroneous instructions, unless a disputed portion, when viewed in light of the entire charge, is erroneous and prejudicial. State v. West, 419 So.2d 868 (La. 1982); State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 439 So.2d 1076 (La. 1983). Our review of the entire jury instruction reveals that it adequately defined the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence and that the examples given by the trial court were neither erroneous nor prejudicial.
LRS 15:445 in part. State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983). Specific intent may be inferred where witnesses testify that a defendant voluntarily pointed and fired a gun at his victims.
The charge on self defense and retreat given in the instant case is virtually identical to that given in the cases of State v. Tolbert, 390 So.2d 510 (La. 1980) and Statev. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983), which was quoted with approval by the courts. A jury charge must be considered as a whole, and the conviction will not be reversed even on the ground of erroneous instruction unless the disputed portion, when viewed in light of the entire charge, is erroneous and prejudicial.
Defendant's final two arguments were waived by lack of contemporaneous objection. State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983) and State v. Quimby, 419 So.2d 951 (La. 1982). Furthermore, the record establishes that the statement was freely and voluntarily given.
His failure to take any of these actions constituted a waiver of this objection. Cf. State v. Quimby, 419 So.2d 951 (La. 1982); State v. Bellows, 442 So.2d 889 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1983), writ denied, 446 So.2d 1222 (La. 1984); State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1983), writ denied, 439 So.2d 1076 (La. 1983). Further, the evidence presented clearly shows that 1417 Annunciation Street, Apartment H, is the correct address in question (rather than 1412 Annunciation Street, Apartment H). The failure of HANO to produce the requested records did not affect Howard's ability to establish this fact.
Because specific intent is a state of mind, it need not be proven directly as a fact but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant. La.R.S. 15:445; State v. Sanders, 431 So.2d 833 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1983). Consequently, it is necessary that a determination be made as to whether the circumstances presented support the jury's finding that the defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on Lynch when the defendant fired a shot in Lynch's direction.