Opinion
No. 61329-4-I.
January 20, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-1-01984-3, Michael Hayden, J., entered February 4, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Following a jury trial in King County Superior Court, Patrick Sanchez was convicted of one count of assault in the second degree, domestic violence, and one count of intimidating a witness. Sanchez appeals, contending that the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he intimidated a witness. We disagree and affirm.
I
As Margaret Berry exited a bus in downtown Seattle, she saw Sanchez hit Stephanie Brakes twice with his fist until Brakes fell to the ground. At trial, Berry testified that Sanchez then kicked Brakes as she lay on the sidewalk. Berry attempted to intervene, but a crowd of seven or eight people at the scene held her back. People in the crowd told Berry that Brakes deserved it. Sanchez then picked Brakes up off the ground and rammed her head into a brick wall.
Berry testified that she screamed at Sanchez to stop the assault, to which he responded by telling her to mind her own business and by saying "that's what's wrong with black folks . . . [they] don't stick together." Sanchez then tried to tell Berry his side of the story, but she responded that he should stop and call the police if he had a problem with Brakes.
At this point, Berry ran to her workplace to have her colleagues call 911. She then rushed back to the scene and told everyone present that the police had been summoned. According to Berry's testimony, Sanchez then told her that his sister worked nearby, that she would come down to "take care" of Berry, and that his family members would be watching Berry. Berry interpreted these statements as a threat to get her to stop interfering and leave. Berry testified that she took Sanchez's threats seriously and quit her job downtown due to her fear of retaliation.
Testimony was undisputed that Sanchez's statements to Berry were made after Berry informed Sanchez that the police were on their way, but before the police arrived at the scene of the assault.
The State charged Sanchez with assault in the second degree, domestic violence (count I), intimidating a witness (count II), tampering with a witness (count III), and misdemeanor violation of a court order (count IV). The State alleged that Brakes was the victim in count I and that Berry was the victim in count II. Counts III and IV were eventually dismissed. A jury found Sanchez guilty of both count I and count II.
Sanchez appeals his conviction on count II, intimidating a witness.
II
Sanchez contends on appeal that the State introduced insufficient evidence at trial by which the jury could have concluded that he committed the offense of intimidating a witness. According to Sanchez, this is so because the State failed to prove that he threatened Berry, or if he did, that he was attempting to induce her not to report or give truthful or complete information relevant to a criminal investigation. A threat combined with such attempted inducement comprise the essential substantive elements of the offense. The State responds that, based on the evidence presented at trial, a jury could reasonably find that both elements were established beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing it and any inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
The State charged Sanchez with intimidating a witness pursuant to RCW 9A.72.110, which provides in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of intimidating a witness if a person, by use of a threat[] against a current or prospective witness, attempts to . . . Induce that person not to . . . give truthful or complete information relevant to a criminal investigation.
RCW 9A.72.110(3)(a) defines the term "threat" as "[t]hreat as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(25)." This is a drafting error; for purposes of this opinion, threat is actually defined by former RCW 9A.04.110(26) (2006), which states:
"Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:
(a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or
(b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or
(c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; or
(d) To accuse any person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against any person; or
(e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or (f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; or
(g) To testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(h) To take wrongful action as an official against anyone or anything, or wrongfully withhold official action, or cause such action or withholding; or
(i) To bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other similar collective action to obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group which the actor purports to represent; or
(j) To do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another with respect to his health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationships.
See Reviser's Note to RCW 9A.72.110.
RCW 9A.72.110(3)(b) defines the phrase "current or prospective witness":
"Current or prospective witness" means:
(i) A person endorsed as a witness in an official proceeding;
(ii) A person whom the actor believes may be called as a witness in any official proceeding; or
(iii) A person whom the actor has reason to believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation or the abuse or neglect of a minor child.
Sanchez bases his appeal on his assertion that his statements were not threats, or at least were not made in an attempt to induce Berry not to report or give truthful or complete information relevant to a criminal investigation.
At trial, the State presented evidence in the form of Berry's testimony. Berry testified that it was only after she informed Sanchez that the police were on their way that he proceeded to say that his sister would come "take care" of her and his family would be watching her. A rational trier of fact could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that Berry's announcement that she had called the police caused Sanchez to become concerned with the possibility that she would provide the police with information that would lead to his arrest, and that he intended to dissuade her from doing so by implying that if she did, his family members would harm her in some way. "`A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence' and all reasonable inferences." State v. Brown, 162 Wn.2d 422, 428, 173 P.3d 245 (2007) (quoting State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992)).
The only authority that Sanchez offers for the contention that the jury could not reasonably have reached this conclusion is State v. Savaria, 82 Wn. App. 832, 919 P.3d 1263 (1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 80 P.2d 594 (2003). In Savaria, we held that the State's proof that the defendant, while at the courthouse, had been "menacingly glaring" at a witness, Karelson (combined with "flipping her off") was "not sufficient to prove an intent to influence" Karelson's testimony at trial. Savaria, 82 Wn. App. at 841. We opined that this was so because "Savaria's actions at the courthouse certainly evidenced his unhappiness that Karelson was at the courthouse apparently willing to testify against him, but they did not provide a basis for the jury to conclude that Savaria was thereby attempting to influence the content of Karelson's testimony." Savaria, 82 Wn. App. at 841.
That is very different from the situation here. Sanchez did not simply behave offensively toward Berry after she had already committed to cooperate with the police. Instead, he threatened her before the police had arrived and, presumably, with sufficient time for Berry to absent herself before they did arrive. From this, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Sanchez's statements were made for the purpose of inducing Berry to leave before police arrived and, thus, that the statements were intended to prevent Berry from giving the police complete information about what she had seen.
Affirmed.