As noted above, negligent homicide under ยง 13-1102 requires a finding of "criminal negligence," which is defined in A.R.S. ยง 13-105(10)(d) as "fail[ing] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk," which "must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." In support of his argument, Klokeid cites State v. Far West Water & Sewer Inc., 224 Ariz. 173, 228 P.3d 909 (App. 2010), and State v. Salz, 627 A.2d 862 (Conn. 1993). His reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Salz , 226 Conn. 20, 33, 627 A.2d 862 (1993) ; see also State v. Tucker , 181 Conn. 406, 415, 435 A.2d 986 (1980) (although conduct prior to offense did not in and of itself prove intent to murder, it was relevant to establish, in connection with question of intent, pattern of behavior and attitude toward victim that was indicative of defendant's state of mind). Accordingly, it may be inferred from evidence that the defendant engaged in speech that a reasonable person would interpret as a serious threat that the defendant himself was aware that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the speech would be so interpreted.
My research has not revealed extensive discussion in our case law distinguishing characteristics of strict liability, general intent and specific intent crimes. I note, however, that our case law, for example, has characterized the following crimes as general intent: (1) sexual assault in the second degree under General Statutes ยง 53a-71 (a) (1); e.g., State v. Sorabella, 277 Conn. 155, 169, 891 A2d 897, cert. denied, U.S., 127 S. Ct. 131, 166 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2006); (2) risk of injury to a child under General Statutes ยง 5321; e.g., id., 172-73; (3) manslaughter in the second degree under ยง 53a-56; see State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 28 n. 5, 627 A2d 862 (1993) (distinguishing general intent crime of manslaughter in second degree, which requires that defendant act either "recklessly" or "intentionally," from specific intent crime of murder under ยง 53a-54a); (4) sexual assault in the first degree under General Statutes ยง 53a-70. E.g., State v. Smith, 210 Conn. 132, 136, 554 A2d 713 (1989).
However, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that improperly wiring a 120-volt heater to a 240-volt circuit, failing to use a lock nut to connect the heater to the circuit breaker, and using other faulty installation techniques creates a substantial risk of "catastrophic fire" and death. See State v. Salz, 627 A.2d 862, 865, 869-71 (Conn. 1993). Thus, to determine whether the conduct created a substantial risk of death, a court must inquire beyond the general nature of the defendant's conduct and consider the specific conduct in which the defendant engaged.
Experts have been used in several recent cases to determine the causes of fires. See e.g., New London Federal Savings Bank v. Tucciarone, 48 Conn. App. 89 (1998); State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20 (1993); State v. Gray, 221 Conn. 713 (1992). The experts in these cases used a method of eliminating potential causes in order to arrive at an opinion as to the actual cause.
"We have long recognized that a defendant's state of mind can usually be proven only by circumstantial evidence . . . . Recognizing the difficulty in proving by direct evidence that an accused subjectively realized and chose to ignore a substantial risk . . . we have long held that the state of mind amounting to recklessness . . . may be inferred from conduct . . . . It requires little extension of this principle to hold that such relevant conduct may constitute a course of behavior rather than one specific act."Id. at 568-69 (quoting State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 32-33 (1993)) (alterations in original). Applying those principles to the facts of the petitioner's case, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that:
"Although some evidence may be inconsistent with the state's theory of the case, the jury is not bound to credit only that evidence to the exclusion of evidence consistent with the state's theory." State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 29-30, 627 A.2d 862 (1993). We conclude, therefore, that the trial court's instruction provided the jury with a clear understanding of the elements of the crimes charged, and afforded it proper guidance in deciding whether the state had proved the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 32-33, 627 A.2d 862 (1993). Thus, in State v. Bunkley, supra, 202 Conn. 643, this court affirmed a manslaughter conviction under ยง 53a-55 (a) (3) where the defendant, in the course of evading police pursuit, had driven at excessive speeds on the wrong side of the road and had struck the victims' car head on, resulting in the victims' deaths.
"Although some evidence may be inconsistent with the state's theory of the case, the jury is not bound to credit only that evidence to the exclusion of evidence consistent with the state's theory." State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 29-30, 627 A.2d 862 (1993). The defendant's claims in this appeal do not undermine the cumulative weight of the state's case. For example, there was no evidence presented that indicated that the bullet hole in the staircase derived from the same sequence of events that gave rise to the victim's death.
. . ." (Citation omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 180 Conn. 382, 404, 429 A.2d 919 (1980); see also State v. Salz, 226 Conn. 20, 32, 627 A.2d 862 (1993). Thus, motive, like intent, generally is inferred from the circumstances.