Furthermore, contrary to Vance's contentions on appeal, no New Mexico state published appellate decision has held that a driver who fails to first ascertain the safety of a lane change has not violated § 66-7-317(A) unless that movement puts another vehicle in danger. Vance cites four published state opinions: Aragon v. Speelman , 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1971) ; Archibeque v. Homrich , 88 N.M. 527, 543 P.2d 820 (1975) ; State v. Siqueiros-Valenzuela , 404 P.3d 782 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017) ; and State v. Salas , 321 P.3d 965 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014). This court has closely examined each of these cases and concludes they are so far removed from the facts and circumstances of this case as to provide no real guidance to an officer in Rael's position. Aragon , a wrongful death case involving a collision between a vehicle and a bicycle, deals with the propriety of an instruction on negligence per se.
We note that the officer's observations would also support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant had executed an improper turn, and/or was driving carelessly. See NMSA 1978, § 66-8-114(B) (1978) (defining careless driving to include the operation of a vehicle in an imprudent manner, without due regard for corners and all other attendant circumstances); NMSA 1978, § 66-7-322 (1978) (describing the required position and method of turning at intersections); cf. State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 2, 14-15, 321 P.3d 965 (holding that an officer's observation of the defendant's "erratic driving," including his sudden left turn into a driveway from the far right lane, thereby crossing over multiple lanes of traffic, gave rise to "legitimate and reasonable suspicion that lane and illegal turn-related traffic offenses occurred" such that the traffic stop was justified). Insofar as any or all of these considerations would supply a valid basis for the stop, the untimely motion to suppress was without merit.
See Archibeque, 1975-NMSC-066, ¶¶ 3, 16 (holding that the district court properly refused to give a negligence per se instruction because "[t]he harm sought to be prevented by [Section 66-7-317(A)] apparently is head-on collisions or sideswiping the opposite moving traffic[, and i]t is doubtful that the statute could have been intended by the [L]egislature to apply to a situation such as this[,]" where the defendant crossed out of his lane and killed himself and his passenger in a single-vehicle accident without any eyewitnesses); Aragon, 1971-NMCA-161, ¶¶ 6-10 (holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a negligence per se instruction based on a failure to maintain lane violation because "there [was] no evidence that the defendants' vehicle moved from one lane to another at anywhere close to where the accident occurred"). {14} In 2014, we decided State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, 321 P.3d 965, the first published case analyzing Section 66-7-317(A) in the criminal context. In that case, two officers were following the defendant when they observed his vehicle cross out of his lane one time and then make a sudden left turn from the far right lane without using his turn signal.
ess, contending that the traffic stop which led to his arrest and convictions was not supported by reasonable suspicion. [MIO 1-7] However, the officer's observation of defendant's repeated weaving beyond the lane lines supplied an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Defendant was violating numerous traffic laws. See NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-317(A) (2015) (requiring that vehicles be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane, and prohibiting movement beyond such lane until the driver has first ascertained that movement can be made with safety); NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(A) (2016) (prohibiting driving under the influence); NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-114(A)-(B) (1978) (prohibiting careless driving); and see, e.g., State v. Ruiz, 1995-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 3, 24, 120 N.M. 534, 903 P.2d 845 (holding that an officer's observation of weaving was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to initiate a DWI traffic stop); cf. State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 2, 12-16, 321 P.3d 965 (concluding that observation of swerving and crossing lines without signaling would have been sufficient to support a conviction for failure to maintain lane, where nothing in the record indicated that the defendant ascertained that his movements could be made with safety or that he was conscious of or focused on safety or risk). As a result, the traffic stop was permissible.
Although Defendant contends that his driving was not "so erratic" as to give rise to reasonable suspicion of impaired driving, [MIO 22] in light of the prolonged, wide-ranging, and repeated nature of the weaving that was observed, we conclude otherwise. See id. (indicating that weaving observed over the course of approximately four blocks was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated); see also State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 2, 15, 321 P.3d 965 (characterizing the defendant's driving as "erratic" based on a single instance of failure to maintain lane and an illegal turn, and holding that these observations gave rise to a "legitimate and reasonable suspicion of impairment," such that the ensuing traffic stop "advanced the public interest well over the minimal intrusion into Defendant's liberty interest"); cf. Apodaca, 1994-NMCA-120, ¶¶ 2, 6, (observing that continuous "weaving from the right side of his traffic lane to the left side" constituted "peculiar driving behavior" which was "not normal"). {6} In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the traffic stop was valid.
However, the officer testified that he was driving fifteen to thirty yards behind Defendant's vehicle [RP 79], and under similar circumstances this Court has held that this satisfies the requirement that other traffic must not be affected. See State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 13-14, 321 P.3d 965 (observing that an officer driving behind a defendant who crossed the lane lines was affected by the movements of the defendant's vehicle, such that Section 66-7-317(A) applied). In addition, the officer testified that the traffic was moderate to heavy.
Even if Officer Torrez was mistaken as to whether Defendant's vehicle was a "truck" of a particular width, such a mistake of fact would not negate reasonable suspicion. See State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶ 16, 321 P.3d 965 (recognizing that "[m]istakes of fact . . . do not negate reasonable suspicion"). We, therefore, affirm the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis of lacking reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
[DS 3; RP 94] Although Defendant believes this Court places too much emphasis on her "blank stare and slack jaw" [MIO 3], as well as on her chosen course that she drove through the parking lot [MIO 3], we disagree, because when viewed together, they provide reasonable suspicion that Defendant was driving while impaired. [RP 93] See State v. Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 569, 136 P.3d 570 ("Questions of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo by looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detention was justified."); see also State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶ 15, 321 P.3d 965 (holding that, under the totality of circumstances, the defendant's erratic driving provided reasonable suspicion that he was driving while impaired); State v. Chapman, 1999-NMCA-106, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 (recognizing that a motorist's behavior and appearance may be considered when addressing the reasonableness of a detention). {5} Also, and as discussed in our notice, apart from Defendant's odd driving behavior and concerning facial demeanor, Defendant's detention was further justified by Sergeant McCoy's observation that Defendant was driving a vehicle with a flat tire, in violation of Section 66-3-901 (prohibiting the driving of a vehicle on a highway without required equipment or in an unsafe condition).
Therefore, a reasonable officer could also believe Defendant's actions violated Section 66-7-317. See, e.g., State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 13-14, 321 P.3d 965 (observing that an officer driving behind a defendant who crossed the lane lines was affected by the movements of the defendant's vehicle, such that Section 66-7-317(A) applied); see also State v. Gonzales, No. 34,329, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. June 30, 2015) (non-precedential) (citing Salas for same proposition, that an officer's vehicle traveling behind the defendant can be traffic impacted by the defendant's unsafe movements out of his lane). {8} In sum, we decline to accept Defendant's argument that we must reject the district court's version of the facts as well as that court's credibility determination. We therefore affirm the district court's decision for the reasons stated here and in our notice of proposed disposition.
{3} By his first issue Defendant renews his challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress, contending that the officer who initiated the traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion. [MIO 11-15] However, the officer's observation of swerving and crossing lane lines without signaling, as well as Defendant's near-collision with a curb, supported the stop. [MIO 2] See, e.g., State v. Salas, 2014-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 2, 12-16, 321 P.3d 965 (concluding that similar observations supported legitimate and reasonable suspicion that lane and turn-related traffic offenses had occurred, thereby justifying the stop). Although we understand Defendant to suggest that we should limit or depart from Salas in this case, we decline the invitation.