Opinion
No. A06-2094.
Filed: April 17, 2007.
Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 06070941.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN 55101-2134; and Martin J. Costello, Katrina E. Joseph, Tori K. Stewart, Hughes Costello, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for appellant)
Amy B. Norberg, James Whelpley Associates, Chartered, Roseville, MN 55113 (for respondent)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The State of Minnesota challenges the district court's stay of adjudication of guilt and imposition of a probationary period following respondent Amir Sahbegovic's guilty plea to misdemeanor violation of an order for protection under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14 (2006). Because the district court ordered the stay of adjudication solely to relieve respondent of the collateral consequences of his conviction, namely, the effect that the conviction would have on his immigration status and on his ability to support his wife and child, we reverse and remand.
DECISION
A district court has the inherent power to stay adjudication of guilt, even over the state's objection, when "special circumstances" exist and a stay of adjudication is "in the furtherance of justice." State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn. 1996) (affirming stay of adjudication on charge of third-degree criminal sexual conduct when conviction would have required 19-year-old offender, who had consensual sexual relations with teenage girlfriend, to register as predatory sex offender). Soon after release of Krotzer, the supreme court further defined "special circumstances" by limiting them to cases where the district court has granted the stay of adjudication "for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor's clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function." State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540, 541 (Minn. 1996) (emphasis deleted). In State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Minn. 2005), the supreme court reaffirmed the holding of Foss and stated that Foss allows a stay of adjudication only when the prosecutor has "clearly" abused the charging function and that Foss may not be read "to permit a stay of adjudication whenever there are either special circumstances or an abuse of the charging function." Notably, this court has specifically rejected as a basis for a stay of adjudication the district court's "desire to relieve an offender of the collateral consequences of [a] conviction." State v. Thoma, 569 N.W.2d 205, 209 (Minn.App. 1997), aff'd by 571 N.W.2d 773 (Minn. 1997).
Here, while an order for protection was in effect, respondent admittedly approached his child on the street, removed her from a vehicle, and began to walk away with her. This act constituted a violation of an order for protection under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b). The district court stated the following reasons for ordering the stay of adjudication to the offense:
Because of the immigration issues, the Court feels that a plea to the charge might endanger that for him and also endanger the wife's means of support, as well as the child's means of support.
A stay of adjudication keeps [respondent] on probation . . . for two years on the condition that he remain law abiding, so the Court believes that the interests of all the parties are fully protected by the disposition in this case.
While the district court's bases for staying adjudication are pragmatic and laudable for humanitarian reasons, because the record shows no abuse of the state's charging function, we must reverse and remand.
Reversed and remanded.