See Middleton v. State, 214 Miss. 697, 59 So.2d 320 (1952). In State v. Ruggiere, 180 Neb. 869, 146 N.W.2d 373 (1966), this court held that amendment of a questioned complaint by substitution of "revocation" for "suspension" was permissible, and noted at 872, 146 N.W.2d at 375: "Distinctions between suspension and revocation in other contexts are often crucial." (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why this change should not have been allowed. State v. Ruggiere, 180 Neb. 869, 146 N.W.2d 373 (1966); State v. Coffield, Del.Super., 3 Storey 406, 171 A.2d 62 (1961). II
There was also ample evidence to establish that the defendant verbally and physically abused the arresting officer, kicked him, and scratched his face. The defendant, however, now contends for the first time, that the complaint as to Count II was fatally defective because it failed to specifically allege that the offense charged was committed within the limits of the City of Grand Island. It must be noted also that the count involves a statutory misdemeanor and that if the complaint is found insufficient or defective at any stage of the proceedings on appeal in the district court, the court shall order a new complaint to be filed. See, 29-613, R.R.S. 1943; State v. Ruggiere, 180 Neb. 869, 146 N.W.2d 373. Even in the case of a felony where an alleged defect in the information was not called to the attention of the trial court in the motion for new trial, this court has held that an information first questioned on appeal must be held sufficient unless it is so defective that by no construction can it be said to charge the offense for which the accused was convicted. Anderson v. State, 150 Neb. 116, 33 N.W.2d 362.
1 of the 1962 Code of Laws of South Carolinabeing clearly unconstitutional: 248 S.C. 386, 149 S.E.2d 913; 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782; 141 S.C. 207, 139 S.E. 386; 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 389; 378 U.S. 347, L.Ed.2d 894, 84 S.Ct. 1697; 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332; 347 U.S. 612, 617, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S. Ct. 808; 306 U.S. 451, 83 L.Ed. 888, 59 S.Ct. 618; 378 U.S. 353; 5 Wheat 76, 5 L.Ed. 37; 378 U.S. 355, 12 L.Ed.2d 901. As to scope in dealing with a penal statuteinvolving severe penalties, and the Courts will not extendthe scope of prohibition by liberal construction of thewords used: 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782. Messrs. T. Kenneth Summerford, Solicitor, and DavidW. Keller, Jr., of Florence, for Respondent, cite: As to theoffense of Appellant coming with a reasonable constructionof the statute involved: 242 S.C. 9, 129 S.E.2d 736; 7 Am. Jur.2d 668; 86 S.E.2d 466, 125 A.L. R. 1455; 249 S.C. 399, 154 S.E.2d 674; 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737; 278 F. Supp. 725; 146 N.W.2d 373; 202 N.E.2d 120. Nov. 6, 1969.