We find an abuse of discretion only when the party claiming such shows that the discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). . . . We review constitutional issues de novo.
However, unlike some federal courts, this court has required a showing of prejudice to establish a due process violation. See State v. Ivy, 300 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Iowa 1981); State v. Erving, 346 N.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Iowa 1984); State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). In determining whether prejudice has resulted from a prosecutor's intimidating tactics, trial courts are vested with broad discretion.
Based on the exchange quoted above, the district court had no reason to believe that Krogmann wanted anything further done with respect to the prosecutor's improper question. Furthermore, to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show both the misconduct and resulting prejudice. State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). We consider:
We find an abuse of discretion only when the party claiming such shows that the discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). Vanover raises a constitutional issue.
Trial courts are vested with broad authority to determine whether prejudice actually results from misconduct. State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). Appellate courts will overturn a trial court's ruling only upon finding an abuse of discretion.
To prevail on this assignment defendant must show both the misconduct and that he was prejudiced by it. State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). It is also a discretionary ruling. Id.
To prevail on an accusation of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must prove both misconduct and resulting prejudice. State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). On direct exam, the prosecutor did not ask the stepdaughter questions about specific dates or specific recollections to which she had referred in her earlier deposition.
We uniformly condemn such tactics. See State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Iowa 1985); State v. Epps, 316 N.W.2d 691, 695 (Iowa 1982); State v. Ivy, 300 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Iowa 1981). However, evidence an agreement to testify was motivated in part from fear of prosecution does not mandate exclusion of the testimony as inherently suspect or require reversal of a conviction.
"An abuse of discretion appears only when it was 'exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.'" State v. Anderson, 448 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa 1989) (quoting State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985)). This court grants the district court "broad discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial" in "recognition of the trial court's better position to appraise the situation in the context of the full trial."
"To prevail on a matter of prosecutorial misconduct, [Sempek] must show both the misconduct and that he was prejudiced by it." State v. Ruble, 372 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Iowa 1985). A prosecutor's misconduct does not warrant relief unless the conduct was so "prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial."