State v. Rubert

10 Citing cases

  1. State v. Saunders

    103 Or. App. 488 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 4 times
    Finding that a statute that authorized the director of the Fish and Game Commission to "enter and inspect" specified places and things necessarily authorized warrantless entries, but a statute that authorized the commission to "search and examine" areas that it believed to contain evidence of commercial fishing law violations did not authorize warrantless entries

    "`Exigent circumstances involve an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent . . . the destruction of evidence.' [State] v. Roberts, 75 Or. App. 292 [, 295, 706 P.2d 564] (1985). "Once Officer Pert had seized the package, it was incumbent upon the State to show why it could not get a warrant (as was done in [State] v. Kosta, 75 Or. App. 713 [, 708 P.2d 365] (1985)), within a reasonable period of time. [State] v. Roberts, supra; [State] v. Robert [sic], 46 Or. App. 843[, 612 P.2d 771] (1980). "The state failed to carry its burden to prove exigency and the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted."

  2. State v. Roberts

    75 Or. App. 292 (Or. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 20 times
    Concluding that the state failed to carry its burden to prove exigency because the officers did not seek a warrant and "offered no credible evidence of the length of time necessary to obtain a warrant"

    In order to justify a warrantless entry of a residence to effectuate an arrest, the state must demonstrate both probable cause to arrest and exigent circumstances justifying the entry. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S Ct 1371, 63 L Ed 2d 639 (1980); State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980). The officers had probable cause to believe that defendant was driving his car while under the influence of intoxicants and probable cause to believe that defendant was in the apartment.

  3. State v. McMurphy

    48 Or. App. 327 (Or. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 4 times

    Assuming without deciding that there was probable cause to arrest in this case, we find that the state did not carry its burden of demonstrating that exigent circumstances required the entry. In State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980), a case arising out of the same incident as that before us, we found that the state had demonstrated neither probable cause to arrest nor exigent circumstances justifying entry. The facts before us are more complete than those provided in Rubert.

  4. Commonwealth v. Pietrass

    392 Mass. 892 (Mass. 1984)   Cited 62 times
    Dwelling window viewable from a walkway and porch

    This was a slender thread on which to hang a belief that the suspect was inside. See State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 845-847 (1980) (description of a house "on the west side of 113th Street, about halfway between Holgate and Powell . . . [with] a small sports car in the driveway" was too "loose" for police to have probable cause to search the house). We do not undertake to distinguish "clear probable cause" from any other kind of probable cause.

  5. Weddle v. State

    621 P.2d 231 (Wyo. 1980)   Cited 38 times
    In Weddle v. State, 621 P.2d 231, 238-39 (Wyo. 1980), we indicated that failure to follow the procedure required by the rape-shield statute was of significance, even at the preliminary hearing stage, and could be fatal to the introduction of such evidence.

    Generally, if there is a reasonable possibility of injury or death if the entry not be made, or if there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if the entry not be made, "exigent circumstances" exist. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Dorman v. United States, D.C. Cir., 435 F.2d 385 (1970); State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980); State v. Fauver, Hawaii App., 612 P.2d 119 (1980); State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 55, 579 P.2d 559 (1978); Howard v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 599 S.W.2d 280 (1980); People v. Baca, Colo., 600 P.2d 770 (1979); People v. Sakalas, 85 Ill. App.3d 59, 40 Ill. Dec. 29, 405 N.E.2d 1121 (1980). In answer to the question "Why did you not obtain a warrant prior to making the arrest?"

  6. State v. Sullivan

    265 Or. App. 62 (Or. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 7 times
    In Sullivan, the defendant was charged with DUII. At the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress evidence derived from a warrantless entry into the defendant's home, the officer testified that he could not obtain a warrant by telephone because telephonic warrants do not exist in Washington County and no evidence was presented as to whether a warrant could have been obtained by traditional in-person methods.

    Without any evidence of that time or any evidence concerning the time required to secure the evidence, we will not assume that the officers could not have obtained a warrant within a reasonable time. [State v. Rubert, 46 Or.App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980) ].”Roberts, 75 Or.App. at 297, 706 P.2d 564.

  7. Washington v. Com

    29 Va. App. 5 (Va. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 35 times

    Because neither the informant's reliability nor the basis for the informant's knowledge was established, the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that Ford was in the residence at 2347 Bethel Street. See McGhee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 203, 487 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1997) (en banc).See also State v. Rubert, 612 P.2d 771 (Or. App. 1980). In fact, the failure of the officers to take reasonable steps to corroborate the information supplied by the bondsman demonstrates the fallacy of the majority's position. Had the officers first determined who resided at 2347 Bethel Street, obtained a description of Ford, determined the purpose for which the capias had been issued — all perfectly reasonable steps to take — the incident may never have occurred.

  8. Washington v. Com

    26 Va. App. 657 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    See McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 203, 487 S.E.2d 259, 264 (1997) (en banc). See also State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980). Officer Samuels lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that Washington was Ford.

  9. State v. Chapman

    107 Or. App. 325 (Or. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 10 times
    Concluding that a working methamphetamine lab provided exigent circumstances for warrantless search

    They were involved in securing the neighborhood, in obtaining assistance and in questioning defendants. Defendants rely on State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980), and State v. Roberts, 75 Or. App. 292, 706 P.2d 564 (1985), for the proposition that the state must prove that a warrant could not be obtained. However, those cases did not involve findings that exigent circumstances existed.

  10. State v. Collicott

    56 Or. App. 605 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 6 times
    In State v. Collicott, 56 Or. App. 605, 610-11, 642 P.2d 1187, rev den 293 Or. 190 (1982), Gillette, P.J., concurring, noted that, although unnecessary to say in the context of Collicott, if probable cause existed, a magistrate's denial of a warrant would not invalidate a subsequent search.

    In either event, the officers had time to obtain a warrant before the planned meeting. See State v. Rubert, 46 Or. App. 843, 612 P.2d 771 (1980). The exigency that the evidence would be destroyed was brought about by the police and, as such, cannot support the warrantless entry into defendant's house.