Opinion
ED77941
Handdown Date: June 12, 2001
APPEAL FROM: CIRCUIT COURT OF CLARK COUNTY, HON. GARY DIAL
AFFIRMED.
Emmett D. Queener and Craig A. Johnston for Appellant.
John M. Morris, II, Evan J. Buchheim and Hugh S. Summers for Respondent.
Russell, J., and Teitelman, J., concur.
John Rowe (Defendant) appeals from the judgment of the trial court following a jury trial. Defendant was convicted of driving while his license was suspended or revoked in violation of Section 302.321, RSMo 2000, and was sentenced to three years of imprisonment and fined one thousand dollars. We affirm.
On October 2, 1999, several police officers were operating a checkpoint in Clark County at the intersection of Highways 61 and 136. Clark County Deputy Sheriff Rick Davis saw Defendant pull his vehicle off the road and onto the shoulder near the checkpoint. Defendant then exited the driver's side of the car and moved to the passenger side. His wife moved from the passenger side to the driver's seat. Several officers pulled in behind Defendant's car and approached the occupants. Defendant admitted he did not have a driver's license and that he switched positions in the car because of it. The officers arrested Defendant for driving without a valid license.
The State charged Defendant with the class D felony of driving while his license was suspended or revoked in violation of Section 302.321, RSMo 2000. Defendant was a resident of Iowa. His Iowa driving record, admitted at trial, showed Defendant was barred from having an Iowa driver's license because he was a habitual offender, and his license had been indefinitely suspended and revoked. The jury found Defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to three years of imprisonment and a fine of one thousand dollars. Defendant appeals.
In his sole point on appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing judgment and sentence against him because the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was operating a vehicle "when his license or driving privilege had been canceled, suspended or revoked under the laws of this state" in violation of Section 302.321, RSMo 2000.
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo.banc 1998).
Section 302.321, RSMo 2000, provides in pertinent part:
A person commits the crime of driving while revoked if he operates a motor vehicle on a highway when his license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended or revoked under the laws of this state and acts with criminal negligence with respect to knowledge of the fact that his driving privilege has been canceled, suspended or revoked.
Defendant concedes that he had no privilege to drive on Missouri roads because he did not have a valid driver's license and that he committed the offense of driving without a valid license in violation of Section 302.020, RSMo 2000. Nevertheless, Defendant asserts that his conviction rests on his Iowa residency and the revocation of his Iowa license by the State of Iowa and that cannot support a conviction under Section 302.321, RSMo 2000. Specifically, Defendant argues that he could not be guilty of violating Section 302.321, RSMo 2000, because his driver's license and driving privilege were revoked under the laws of Iowa, not under the laws of the state of Missouri. Defendant reasons that Section 302.321, RSMo 2000, does not apply to him because he had no privilege to drive in Missouri, and therefore, there was nothing that the laws of this state could revoke. We disagree.
Section 302.080(2), RSMo 2000, allows a nonresident, who is at least sixteen years of age and who has in his immediate possession a valid license issued to him in his home state or country, to drive upon Missouri's highways without a Missouri driver's license. Accordingly, Defendant was exempt from obtaining a Missouri driver's license and had a privilege to drive under the laws of this state when he had a valid Iowa driver's license. Section 302.080, RSMo 2000; See State v. Bray, 774 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Mo.App.W.D. 1989). Once Iowa revoked its driver's license, Defendant no longer had a privilege to drive in Missouri under Section 302.080, RSMo 2000. As a result, Defendant's driving privilege in Missouri was equally revoked or canceled when his Iowa driver's license was revoked by that state. Therefore, Defendant's driving privilege was canceled, suspended or revoked "under the laws of this state."
Further, this conclusion is reinforced by Missouri's participation in the "Driver License Compact," which was enacted in Missouri in 1985. See Section 302.600, RSMo 2000. The compact specifically provides that it is the policy of the participating states to:
(2) Make the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.
Section 302.600, RSMo 2000, art. I (b)(2). The compact exhibits the reciprocal nature among the states of the privilege to drive. Accordingly, when Defendant's license was revoked by Iowa, Missouri was obligated to recognize this revocation. Section 302.600, RSMo 2000, art. V (1) and (2).
In addition, the practical effect of Defendant's proposed construction of Section 302.321, RSMo 2000, would be to limit the statute to Missouri residents. In other words, nonresidents who had knowledge their driver's license had been suspended or revoked in their home states, could drive in Missouri without fear of prosecution. Defendant's absurd reading of the law could not have been intended by the legislature. Therefore, sufficient evidence existed to support Defendant's conviction for driving while license suspended or revoked. Point denied.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.