{6} On May 26, 2005, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the district court's finding of competency, arguing that the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant is competent to stand trial. Defendant argued that the clear and convincing standard is required by State v. Rotherham, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131 (1996). On August 9, 2005, the State filed an opposition to Defendant's motion and filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

We also hold that, in light of recent United States Supreme Court holdings in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the procedures in the Mental Illness and Competency statute do not violate a defendant's constitutional right to due process. See State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131 (evaluating the procedures of the Mental Illness and Competency statute and holding that the Mental Illness and Competency statute is not violative of a defendant's rights to equal protection under the law, substantive due process, or procedural due process). We reverse and remand to the trial court to conduct a new hearing pursuant to Section 31-9-1.5.

Defendant argues that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding of first degree murder. His argument proceeds along three fronts: (1) the State's evidence was insufficient under a clear and convincing standard to support the district court's finding of a deliberate murder; (2) State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, 122 N.M. 246, 263, 923 P.2d 1131, 1148, precludes the district court from considering any state of mind evidence regarding an incompetent defendant, making it legally impossible to prove the specific intent required for first degree murder; and (3) the victim's provocation lowered the culpability for the killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. We reverse the district court on the sufficiency of the evidence to support first degree murder, but affirm on the remaining issues.

See § 31-9-1.5(D)(2); State v. Rotherham , 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131 ("[A]s long as [incompetent defendants] remain dangerous, the State has an interest in committing them to protect the defendants and the public."). Such legislative intent serves the State's compelling interests "to provide care to its citizens when necessary" and "to provide its citizenry a safe community in which to live."

{9} Although we differentiate a detention ordered pursuant to Section 1.5 from an involuntary civil commitment ordered under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 43-1-1 to -25 (1977, as amended through 2016), by calling it a "criminal commitment," neither order comes from a criminal prosecution.Compare State v. Rotherham , 1996-NMSC-048, ¶¶ 53-56, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131 (observing that a finding under Section 1.5 of clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent defendant committed the crime charged justifies further detention for treatment to attain trial competency and to protect the defendant and society in general and that such detention is not punitive), with State v. Clayton , 1981-NMCA-018, ¶¶ 9, 18, 36, 95 N.M. 644, 625 P.2d 99 (affirming the residential placement of developmentally disabled adults based on the district court’s finding under Section 43-1-13(E) (1978) of clear and convincing evidence that the residential services are in the adults’ "best interests" and are consistent with the "least drastic means"). We note that Section 1.5 does not use the term criminal commitment .

Id.See Nicholas Rosinia, Note, How ‘Reasonable’ Has Become Unreasonable: A Proposal for Rewriting the Lasting Legacy of Jackson v. Indiana , 89 Wash. U.L. Rev. 673, 681–91 (2012) (discussing and categorizing different states’ responses to Jackson ); see also , e.g. , State v. Rotherham , 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131, 1138 (1996) ("After Jackson was decided, New Mexico revised its statutes governing the confinement and treatment of persons found to be incompetent to stand trial.... If the court determines the defendant is still incompetent and is not making progress toward competency such that there is no substantial probability he will attain competency within one year, the court may either release defendant and dismiss the case with prejudice, Section 31–9–1.4(B), dismiss the case with prejudice and refer the defendant to the district attorney for civil commitment under the MHDDC, Section 31–9–1.4(C), or pursue criminal commitment, Section 31–9–1.4(A)."); In re Snyder , 308 Kan. 615, 422 P.3d 1152, 1157 (2018) ("But soon after Jackson , the Legislature revamped the competency statutes in an apparent effort to comply with that decision.

5(D)(1) requires that, if a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that a "dangerous" defendant committed the crime charged, the defendant must be detained in a secure "locked facility." State v. Rotherham, 122 N.M. 246, 253, 923 P.2d 1131, 1138 (1996). Section 31-9-1.

This Court has also recognized that confinement "impinges [on] the right to liberty." State v. Rotherham, 122 N.M. 246, 255, 923 P.2d 1131, 1140 (1996). However, "[t]he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill."

Section 31-9-1.4. The process for criminal commitment under the NMMIC was described in State v. Rotherham , 1996-NMSC-048, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131. "For criminal commitment, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the criminal act charged." Id . "If the State ... prove[s] that the defendant committed the criminal act charged, the court is required to determine whether the defendant is dangerous."

{5} Defense counsel argued that Child will never become competent to assist in his own defense and that Child is too vulnerable to suggestion for the treatment-to-competency program. Defense counsel further contended that under State v. Rotherham, 1996-NMSC-048, 122 N.M. 246, 923 P.2d 1131, the court must dismiss if a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial. {6} The court expressed concern over the prosecution's suggestion that it could order treatment to address the underlying issues of the case.