State v. Rose

15 Citing cases

  1. In re Comfort

    284 Kan. 183 (Kan. 2007)   Cited 41 times
    Finding no record support for the respondent's argument that his letter qualified as political speech and stating that " lawyer's right to free speech is tempered by his or her obligation to both the courts and the bar, an obligation ordinary citizens do not undertake"

    A statute that either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process. State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045-46, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); State v. Lackey, 232 Kan. 478, 479, 657 P.2d 40 (1983); State v. Carpenter, 231 Kan. 235, 237, 642 P.2d 998 (1982); State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 192, 612 P.2d 630 (1980); State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 91-92, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979); Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 663, 562 P.2d 65 (1977). A statute is not invalid for vagueness or uncertainty where it uses words of commonly understood meaning.

  2. City of Wichita v. Lucero

    255 Kan. 437 (Kan. 1994)   Cited 10 times

    " 246 Kan. at 258-59. Additional rules are set forth in State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984), where we stated: "In addition Kansas has long held a statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined or having a settled meaning in law.

  3. State v. Adams

    254 Kan. 436 (Kan. 1994)   Cited 19 times
    Considering the meaning of the term "misconduct" as employed by a statute prohibiting official misconduct

    State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418, 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). Nor are we persuaded by the State's argument that the words "oppression," "partiality," "misconduct," or "abuse of authority" are commonly understood and therefore not vague, citing State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); In re Brooks, 228 Kan. 541, 544, 618 P.2d 814 (1980); and Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 663, 562 P.2d 65 (1977). Those cases are distinguishable from the present case.

  4. Hearn v. City of Overland Park

    244 Kan. 638 (Kan. 1989)   Cited 59 times
    Determining that a local ordinance containing a pit-bull-specific presumption did not violate the plaintiffs' equal protection rights

    A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process. State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045-46, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); State v. Lackey, 232 Kan. 478, 479, 657 P.2d 40 (1983); State v. Carpenter, 231 Kan. 235, 237, 642 P.2d 998 (1982); State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 192, 612 P.2d 630 (1980); State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 91-92, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979); Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 663, 562 P.2d 65 (1977). A statute is not invalid for vagueness or uncertainty where it uses words of commonly understood meaning.

  5. State v. Ward

    716 P.2d 594 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986)

    The constitutionality of a statute is presumed and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984). The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by "common understanding and practice."

  6. U.S. v. Beltran-Palafox

    731 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (D. Kan. 2010)   Cited 7 times
    Finding dog trainer's “expertise is largely based on experience, rather than formal education” and admitting his expert testimony

    The gravamen of the offense is clearly the impairment of visibility into the motor vehicle from the outside.State v. Rose, 677 P.2d 1011, 1049 (Kan. 1984). In 2008, the Kansas Court of Appeals explained that an officer's "reasonable suspicion" that a vehicle's windows violate the window-tint law is limited to the facts available to him or her prior to the traffic stop: "`Neither the concepts of probable cause nor "articulable suspicion" would require that an officer have tint meter readings before making a stop for a window tint violation.'"

  7. State v. Webber

    260 Kan. 263 (Kan. 1996)   Cited 45 times
    In Webber, 260 Kan. 263, this court reiterated its longstanding position on the admission of polygraph test results and concluded that polygraph tests are too unreliable to be admissible and they tend to invade the province of the jury in determining the ultimate question of fact: whether a witness is speaking the truth.

    "[A] statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined or having settled meaning in law." State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984). K.S.A. 21-4625(4) employs commonly used words, easily understood by a jury applying them. It is not unconstitutionally vague.

  8. State Bd. of Nursing v. Ruebke

    259 Kan. 599 (Kan. 1996)   Cited 27 times
    In Ruebke, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying a request by the Kansas State Board of Nursing for a preliminary injunction against the defendant, a lay midwife, from engaging in "healing arts" without a license.

    In re Brooks, 228 Kan. at 544." State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984). The definition of healing arts uses terms that have an ordinary, definite, and ascertainable meaning.

  9. State v. Bryan

    259 Kan. 143 (Kan. 1996)   Cited 34 times
    In Bryan, the fact that "course of conduct" was defined with an objective standard differentiated it from a "following" which was not defined with an objective standard.

    As a final argument, the State argues that stalking under K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-3438 is a specific intent crime and, therefore, should be upheld in the face of a vagueness challenge. In support, the State cites State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984), wherein this court stated "[a] statute is . . . more readily upheld against a charge of vagueness if the offense is one which requires a specific intent." The State argues that because K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-3438 requires an intentional following, it is a specific intent crime.

  10. City of Wichita v. Wallace

    246 Kan. 253 (Kan. 1990)   Cited 32 times
    Defining dance as "rhythmic movement . . . executed by different parts of the body in accordance with temperament, artistic precepts, and purpose"

    The propriety, wisdom, necessity and expediency of legislation are exclusively matters for legislative determination. Courts will not invalidate laws, otherwise constitutional, because the members of the court do not consider the statute to be in the public interest; what the views of the members of the court may be upon the subject [are] wholly immaterial. It is not the province nor the right of courts to determine the wisdom of legislation touching the public interest, as that is a legislative function with which courts cannot interfere. See State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418, 662 P.2d 1286 (1983); and City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 226 Kan. 383, 385-86, 598 P.2d 1051 (1979)." 237 Kan. at 74-75.