A statute that either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process. State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045-46, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); State v. Lackey, 232 Kan. 478, 479, 657 P.2d 40 (1983); State v. Carpenter, 231 Kan. 235, 237, 642 P.2d 998 (1982); State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 192, 612 P.2d 630 (1980); State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 91-92, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979); Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 663, 562 P.2d 65 (1977). A statute is not invalid for vagueness or uncertainty where it uses words of commonly understood meaning.

" 246 Kan. at 258-59. Additional rules are set forth in State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984), where we stated: "In addition Kansas has long held a statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined or having a settled meaning in law.

State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418, 662 P.2d 1286 (1983). Nor are we persuaded by the State's argument that the words "oppression," "partiality," "misconduct," or "abuse of authority" are commonly understood and therefore not vague, citing State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); In re Brooks, 228 Kan. 541, 544, 618 P.2d 814 (1980); and Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 663, 562 P.2d 65 (1977). Those cases are distinguishable from the present case.

A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process. State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045-46, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); State v. Lackey, 232 Kan. 478, 479, 657 P.2d 40 (1983); State v. Carpenter, 231 Kan. 235, 237, 642 P.2d 998 (1982); State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 192, 612 P.2d 630 (1980); State v. Norris, 226 Kan. 90, 91-92, 595 P.2d 1110 (1979); Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658, 663, 562 P.2d 65 (1977). A statute is not invalid for vagueness or uncertainty where it uses words of commonly understood meaning.

The constitutionality of a statute is presumed and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984). The test to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague is whether its language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when measured by "common understanding and practice."

The gravamen of the offense is clearly the impairment of visibility into the motor vehicle from the outside.State v. Rose, 677 P.2d 1011, 1049 (Kan. 1984). In 2008, the Kansas Court of Appeals explained that an officer's "reasonable suspicion" that a vehicle's windows violate the window-tint law is limited to the facts available to him or her prior to the traffic stop: "`Neither the concepts of probable cause nor "articulable suspicion" would require that an officer have tint meter readings before making a stop for a window tint violation.'"

"[A] statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined or having settled meaning in law." State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984). K.S.A. 21-4625(4) employs commonly used words, easily understood by a jury applying them. It is not unconstitutionally vague.

In re Brooks, 228 Kan. at 544." State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984). The definition of healing arts uses terms that have an ordinary, definite, and ascertainable meaning.

As a final argument, the State argues that stalking under K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-3438 is a specific intent crime and, therefore, should be upheld in the face of a vagueness challenge. In support, the State cites State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1046, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984), wherein this court stated "[a] statute is . . . more readily upheld against a charge of vagueness if the offense is one which requires a specific intent." The State argues that because K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-3438 requires an intentional following, it is a specific intent crime.

The propriety, wisdom, necessity and expediency of legislation are exclusively matters for legislative determination. Courts will not invalidate laws, otherwise constitutional, because the members of the court do not consider the statute to be in the public interest; what the views of the members of the court may be upon the subject [are] wholly immaterial. It is not the province nor the right of courts to determine the wisdom of legislation touching the public interest, as that is a legislative function with which courts cannot interfere. See State v. Rose, 234 Kan. 1044, 1045, 677 P.2d 1011 (1984); State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418, 662 P.2d 1286 (1983); and City of Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 226 Kan. 383, 385-86, 598 P.2d 1051 (1979)." 237 Kan. at 74-75.