(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado , 92 Conn.App. 823, 827, 887 A.2d 917 (2006). In ascertaining that intent, we employ an objective standard and look to what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement on the basis of their words and conduct, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement and the purposes they sought to accomplish.

"A Garvin agreement is a conditional plea agreement that has two possible binding outcomes, one that results from the defendant’s compliance with the conditions of the plea agreement and one that is triggered by the defendant’s violation of a condition of the agreement." State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 825 n.3, 887 A.2d 917 (2006); State v. Stevens, 85 Conn.App. 473, 474 n.2, 857 A.2d 972, cert. granted on other grounds, 272 Conn . 902, 863 A.2d 695 (2004). The source of the plea name is State v. Garvin, 242 Conn. 296, 699 A.2d 921 (1997).

Our interpretation is also consistent with the decisions of other courts that have considered similar issues. See Innes v. Dalsheim, 864 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir.1988) (refusing to read ambiguous plea agreement as requiring defendant to waive his right to jury trial in event of breach), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 809, 110 S.Ct. 50, 107 L.Ed.2d 19 (1989); United States v. Podde, supra, 105 F.3d at 821 (refusing to read ambiguous plea agreement as requiring defendant to waive statute of limitations defense as to original charges upon withdrawal of guilty plea); State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 827–29, 887 A.2d 917 (2006) (refusing to read ambiguous plea agreement as providing that violation of rules and regulations of alternative incarceration center would constitute breach of plea agreement); State v. Nelson, 23 Conn.App. 215, 219, 579 A.2d 1104 (1990) (refusing to read ambiguous plea agreement as reserving right for state to reprosecute in event of victim's death), cert. denied, 216 Conn. 826, 582 A.2d 205 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 111 S.Ct. 1315, 113 L.Ed.2d 248 (1991).This court has previously reaffirmed the principle that pretrial negotiations play a “critical role” in the criminal justice system.

Likewise, the state may not claim retroactively that a particular act or omission of a defendant constituted a breach of an agreement when the language of the agreement does not prohibit such an act or omission. See Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, supra, 219 F.3d 168-69 (concluding that state failed to prove that defendant had breached plea agreement by getting arrested for act he did not commit when what constituted breach was left ambiguous by sentencing court, and defendant's interpretation of agreement as prohibiting only actual misconduct was reasonable); State v. Rosado, 92 Conn. App. 823, 828-29, 887 A.2d 917 (2005) (concluding that trial court failed to articulate clearly that defendant's conduct would constitute breach of plea agreement, reasoning that, "if the court sought to convey to the defendant that violating any of the rules and regulations of the [alternative incarceration] center would also constitute a breach of the plea agreement, the court could have clearly communicated that to him"). Finally, it is undisputed that the defendant testified truthfully at the probable cause hearing, that the state was able to use that testimony at Estrella's trial and that the defendant's testimony substantially contributed to Estrella's conviction.

Being functionally indistinguishable from a plea agreement, the rules governing the construction of plea agreements should be applied to the agreement at issue here. See, United States v. Feigenbaum, 962 F.2d 230, 234 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir.1992); Craig v. People, 986 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999); State v. Wills. 244 Kan. 62, 765 P.2d 1114, 1120 (1988); Slate v. Bethel, 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 854 N.E.2d 150, 167 (2006); State v. Mares, 119 N.M. 48, 888 P.2d 930, 934 (1994) (allowing ambiguities to be resolved in favor of the defendant but limiting doctrine); State v. Bisson 156 Wash.2d 507, 130 P.3d 820, 827 (2006); People v. Toscano, 124 Cal.App.4th 340, 345, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 923 (Cal.App. 2004); State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 887 A.2d 917, 919 (2006); State v. Shorter, No. C4-94-2442, 1995 WL 147064, at *5 (Minn.Ct.App. Apr. 4, 1995). 979 F.2d at 399 (internal quotations omitted).

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 826–27, 887 A.2d 917 (2006). The terms of the plea agreement were stated by the court.

In setting forth the terms of a Garvin agreement, “the trial court judge bears an affirmative, nondelegable duty to clarify the terms....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 827, 887 A.2d 917 (2006). Thus, we look to whether the terms of the Garvin agreement were “clear and unambiguous so as to put the defendant on notice that failing to” abide by the Evolve program's rules and regulations would violate the agreement.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 92 Conn. App. 823, 827, 887 A.2d 917 (2006). In other words, "[w]hen a guilty plea is induced by promises arising out of a plea bargaining agreement, fairness requires that such promises be fulfilled by the state. . . . The same concept of fairness ordinarily impels the court, in its discretion, either to accord specific performance of the agreement or to permit the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea."

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 92 Conn. App. 823, 826-27, 887 A.2d 917 (2006). "Our Supreme Court has held that a plea agreement is akin to a contract and that the well established principles of contract law can provide guidance in the interpretation of a plea agreement. . . . Whether a contractual provision is ambiguous presents a question of law and therefore is subject to de novo review. . . .

"`[B]ecause a defendant pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement waives a number of fundamental constitutional rights . . . the circumstances surrounding the plea agreement must comport with due process to ensure [the] defendant's understanding of its consequences . . . The notion of fundamental fairness embodied in due process implies that whatever promises the government makes in the course of a plea agreement to induce a guilty plea must be fulfilled.' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rosado, 92 Conn.App. 823, 826-27, 887 A.2d 917 (2006). "Our Supreme Court has held that a plea agreement is akin to a contract and that the well established principles of contract law can provide guidance in the interpretation of a plea agreement . . . Whether a contractual provision is ambiguous presents a question of law and therefore is subject to de novo review . . ."