State v. Roquette

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Pickar

    453 N.W.2d 783 (N.D. 1990)   Cited 19 times

    We will reverse only if the trial court's decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d at 84; Discoe, supra at 468; State v. Carlson, 318 N.W.2d 308 (N.D.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 456, 74 L.Ed.2d 609 (1982); State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980); State v. Thompson, 256 N.W.2d 706 (N.D. 1977). A confession is voluntary if it is the product of the defendant's free choice, rather than the product of coercion.

  2. State v. Dilger

    338 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 22 times
    In State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d 87, 92 (N.D. 1983), we determined no speedy trial violation occurred, noting the trial court had established bail conditions that the defendant did not meet. "[Defendant] has not demonstrated that the delay caused any evidence or testimony to be lost, or impaired his defense in any other way."

    ' We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether or not a waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d at 195. The standard of review which we employ when considering the totality of the circumstances is `whether or not a determination of voluntariness is manifestly against the weight of the evidence . . .' State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260, 264 (N.D. 1980)." State v. Carlson, 318 N.W.2d 308, 311 (N.D. 1982).

  3. State v. Rovang

    325 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1982)   Cited 2 times

    Whether or not a confession is voluntary must be determined under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980). There is no talismanic definition of "voluntariness" applicable to the different situations where the question has arisen.

  4. State v. Tipler

    316 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 1982)   Cited 7 times

    State v. Jensen, supra. "In determining whether a jury instruction is misleading, the instruction as a whole must be considered." State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260, 265 (N.D. 1980), quoting State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 861 (N.D. 1976). The basic principles of law have not changed since the first intoxication statute was enacted in 1877.

  5. State v. Bauldwin

    283 Neb. 678 (Neb. 2012)   Cited 46 times
    Holding trial court’s error in admitting arrestee’s statements obtained in violation of Miranda principles was harmless because there was overwhelming other evidence on which jury’s conviction likely rested

    That is not the case here. See, e.g., State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D.1980); State v. Shaffer, 96 Wis.2d 531, 292 N.W.2d 370 (Wis.App.1980). 42. Mills v. Com., 996 S.W.2d 473, 483 (Ky.1999), overruled on other grounds,Padgett v. Com., 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky.2010).

  6. State v. Walden

    336 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 7 times
    In Walden, an officer arrested Walden and attempted to read Walden his Miranda rights, but Walden cut him off and said, “I know my rights.

    Whether or not Walden's statement was voluntary is contingent upon two factors: first, whether or not the defendant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent; and, second, whether or not the defendant's statement was voluntarily made. State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260, 264 (N.D. 1980). The standard of review to be utilized when resolving a question of voluntariness is whether or not, considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court's determination that Walden's statement was voluntary is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

  7. State v. Discoe

    334 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 28 times
    Recognizing that a district court is in a superior position to determine the weight to give a witness's testimony

    And the way in which the trial court is to make its determination on the issue of voluntariness is by examining the totality of the circumstances which surround the giving of a confession or consent to a search to see whether it is the product of an essentially free choice or the product of coercion. Schneckloth, supra; State v. Carlson, 318 N.W.2d 308 (N.D. 1982), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 456, 74 L.Ed.2d 609 (1982); State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980); Lange, supra. Under a "totality of the circumstances" standard, although the existence or absence of certain factors concerning (1) the characteristics and condition of the accused at the time he confessed or consented and (2) the details of the setting in which the consent or confession was obtained are significant in deciding voluntariness, no one factor in and of itself is determinative. Schneckloth, supra; State v. Munro, 295 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1980); Barrera v. State, 99 Wis.2d 269, 298 N.W.2d 820 (1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 972, 101 S.Ct. 2051, 68 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981).

  8. State v. Carlson

    318 N.W.2d 308 (N.D. 1982)   Cited 10 times

    The standard of review which we employ when considering the totality of the circumstances is "whether or not a determination of voluntariness is manifestly against the weight of the evidence . . ." State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260, 264 (N.D. 1980). The circumstances which we examine include the reason Carlson returned to the police station on March 5, whether or not Carlson understood the contents of the Miranda warnings, and why Carlson made the second statement.

  9. State v. Klevgaard

    306 N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1981)   Cited 17 times
    Describing the rule’s two purposes: " to deter unlawful police conduct and ... to preserve judicial integrity by not permitting evidence tainted with illegality to be admitted in court"

    In determining whether or not a waiver is made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently," the totality of the circumstances must be considered. State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1980). Klevgaard asserts that the totality of the circumstances were overbearing to his will and caused him to involuntarily make the inculpatory statements.