State v. Roe

3 Citing cases

  1. Lockett v. State

    720 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    With the caveat from Judge Armstrong of the Oregon Court of Appeals that "the circumstances of individual cases make fact matching a fool's errand," the following is a synopsis of the relevant cases.State v. Roe, 961 P.2d 228, 231 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (Armstrong, J., dissenting). In Oregon v. Pope, 946 P.2d 1157 (Or. Ct. App. 1997), review denied (1998), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that an officer's expansion of a traffic stop to ask the defendant if he was carrying a weapon was justified by officer safety concerns.

  2. State v. Smith

    277 Or. App. 298 (Or. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that officer safety doctrine was inapplicable where "there was no evidence that the target shooters were violent and heavily armed, and there was no other context to suggest that the presence of one weapon foretold another"

    In sum, as established on this record, there were three salient circumstances known to Scott at the time of the encounter. First, Scott was alone in a remote forested area and his backup was one-and-a-half to two hours away. Safety concerns increase when an officer is alone, without backup, or in an isolated area. SeeState v. Roe, 154 Or App 71, 75, 961 P2d 228 (1998) (officer by himself in an isolated area); State v. Austin, 145 Or App 217, 224, 929 P2d 1022 (1996), rev den, 325 Or 368 (1997) (officer alone without backup). Second, Scott approached a group of five unknown individuals with firearms in their possession.

  3. Tumblin v. State

    736 N.E.2d 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that the State did not challenge the defendant's standing at the suppression hearing and trial and had waived the argument and noting that where the prosecution has failed to make any trial court challenge to standing, the government may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal and that, in resolving a claim of unlawful search and seizure, an appellate court should not invoke a lack of standing sua sponte

    Other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have analyzed under two different approaches: (1) officer safety rationale or (2) question reasonably related to the reason for the stop. See Oregon v. Pope, 150 Or. App. 457, 946 P.2d 1157 (1997), review denied (1998) (weapons inquiry justified by reasonable suspicion that motorcyclist posed a danger to officer); State v. Roe, 154 Or. App. 71, 74-75, 961 P.2d 228, 230 (1998) (weapons inquiry justified by reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that there existed an immediate safety threat); State v. Strawn, 154 Or. App. 460, 463-64, 963 P.2d 34, 36 (1998) (weapons inquiry reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, suspicion of automobile burglary); People v. Ross, 289 Ill. App.3d 1013, 224 Ill.Dec. 526, 682 N.E.2d 87, 90 (1997) (weapons inquiry based on reasonable suspicion of the presence of a gun when motorist produced a firearm owner identification card); State v. Taylor, 126 N.M. 569, 575, 973 P.2d 246, 252 (1998), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 534, 972 P.2d 353 (1999) (routine weapons inquiry — not related to purpose of the initial stop and not premised upon reasonable belief motorist was armed and dangerous — exceeded the permissible scope of a traffic stop). Accordingly, Officer Trimble was justified in the weapons inquiry, which led to the vehicle search and ultimately the patdown search, only if he reasonably believed that his