Opinion
2012 KA 1040
2013-09-13
Walter P. Reed District Attorney Covington, Louisiana Kathryn W. Landry Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Frank Sloan Mandeville, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Luis Starlyn Rodriguez-Hernandez
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 465867-3, SEC. B, PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY
STATE OF LOUISIANA
HONORABLE AUGUST J. HAND, JUDGE
Walter P. Reed
District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
Kathryn W. Landry
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Frank Sloan
Mandeville, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Luis Starlyn Rodriguez-Hernandez
BEFORE: KUHN, HJGGINBOTHAM, AND THE RIOT, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
KUHN, J.
Defendant, Luis Starlyn Rodriguez-Hernandez, was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He now appeals, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
The State did not pursue the death penalty.
FACTS
On February 28, 2009, Detective Alvin Hotard with the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office reported to a home in Covington belonging to the victim and his wife, Gina Scramuzza, where the victim's body was found in the laundry room. The home had been ransacked, and many items were missing. As police investigated the scene, Gina made statements confirming her involvement in the victim's murder. The subsequent investigation led officers to identify Carlos Rodriguez, Erly Montoya, and defendant (as well as Gina) as all having been involved with the murder.
Carlos Rodriguez, Erly Montoya, and Gina Scramuzza were charged with first degree murder in the same indictment. The State elected to sever the charges against defendant and try him separately.
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Defendant gave two taped statements after he was arrested, and both were played at trial. According to his second statement, Gina drove defendant, Rodriguez, and Montoya to the home where she and the victim lived, and the three men waited for the victim to arrive. Defendant indicated that he and Montoya planned to take the six-foot-two-inch tall, 236-pound victim down to the ground "for [Rodriguez]." When the victim arrived, Montoya pointed a gun at him and told him to get on the ground. According to defendant, he and Montoya grabbed the victim. However, as the victim went to the ground under his own volition, Montoya and defendant fell with him. Defendant stated that Rodriguez then tied up the victim. Defendant further indicated that he seized several items from the house and placed them into a vehicle that was parked in the garage. While loading the vehicle, defendant heard a noise, reentered the house, and saw the victim kicking. Defendant grabbed the victim's legs and moved them away from the item he was kicking. According to defendant's statement, after he moved the victim's legs, he went back into the garage. Minutes later, Rodriguez exited the home and the three men left. Many of the items taken from the home were subsequently located in defendant's apartment.
Dr. Michael Defatta, Chief Deputy Coroner with the St. Tammany Parish Coroner's Office, testified that the victim's cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation and blunt-force trauma. He also testified that abrasions and bruises on the victim's body were consistent with binding of the wrists.
DISCUSSION
In his sole assignment of error, defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the prosecutor's expression of his personal opinion as to defendant's guilt.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly raised by an application for post-conviction relief in the district court, where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted. However, where the record discloses sufficient evidence to decide the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel when raised by assignment of error on appeal, it may be addressed in the interest of judicial economy. State v. Carter, 96-0337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/8/96), 684 So.2d 432, 438.
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution. In assessing a claim of ineffectiveness, a two-pronged test is employed. The defendant must show that (1) his attorney's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced him. The error is prejudicial if it was so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, or "a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that, but for counsel's unprofessional conduct, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; State v. Felder, 2000-2887 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So.2d 360, 369-70, writ denied, 2001-3027 (La. 10/25/02), 827 So.2d 1173. Further, it is unnecessary to address the issues of both counsel's performance and prejudice to the defendant if the defendant makes an inadequate showing on one of the components. State v. Serigny, 610 So.2d 857, 860 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 1263 (La. 1993).
The record reflects that during his closing argument while reviewing the elements of first degree murder with the jury, the prosecutor stated:
And that murder was done during the commission of a robbery or a kidnapping. That's one definition of first degree murder. And you have, in my opinion, both a robbery and a kidnapping.
Kidnapping does not, is not limited to situations where you forcibly hold a person to a location to somewhere else. It also involves imprisoning someone, not letting that person go where they want to go. That is a form of kidnapping. His own words indicate that he participated in that.
So, again, if you believe that this man participated in the killing of [the victim]; had the specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on [the victim]; and it occurred during the commission of a robbery or a kidnapping, he's guilty of first degree murder. (Emphasis added.)
While it is generally considered error for a prosecutor to state an individual belief concerning the accused's guilt when that remark is made in such a way that the jury may conclude that the prosecutor's belief is based on evidence outside the record, the expressing of an opinion based on evidence within the record is permissible. See State v. Motion, 395 So.2d 1337, 1346 (La.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 850, 102 S.Ct. 289, 70 L.Ed.2d 139 (1981). Upon reviewing the record in this case, we find that this challenged comment was based only on matters in the record and, thus, was permissible. The prosecutor's comment regarding his opinion of the defendant's guilt was made after he had reviewed the evidence presented at trial. If the substantive issue an attorney failed to raise has no merit, then the claim the attorney was ineffective for failing to raise the issue also has no merit. See State ex rel Roper v. Cain, 99-2173 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/26/99), 763 So.2d 1, 5 (per curiam), writ denied, 2000-0975 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 733. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
DECREE
For these reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of defendant-appellant, Luis Starlyn Rodriguez-Hernandez.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.