Opinion
NUMBER 2017 KA 0245
09-15-2017
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CARLOS ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ
Warren L. Montgomery Matthew Caplan Covington, LA Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana Lieu Clark Mandeville, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Carlos Alberto Rodriguez
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of St. Tammany State of Louisiana
Docket Number 465867-I
Honorable August J. Hand, Judge Presiding
Warren L. Montgomery
Matthew Caplan
Covington, LA Counsel for Appellee,
State of Louisiana Lieu Clark
Mandeville, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
Carlos Alberto Rodriguez BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McDONALD, AND CHUTZ, JJ. WHIPPLE, C.J.
The defendant, Carlos Alberto Rodriguez, was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30, and pled not guilty. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the denial of the motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
By joint stipulation, the State agreed to withdraw its intent to seek the death penalty and all parties agreed that the instant charge would be tried as a non-capital offense.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about February 27, 2009, Sergeant Brett Ibert and Deputy Shane Bennett of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office (STPSO) were dispatched to 44 Green Hill Drive in Covington, due to an initial 911 call in reference to a missing person, followed by a subsequent complaint by the same caller of a possible burglary. When the police arrived at the residence, the complainant, Gina Scramuzza, stated that her husband, Mario Scramuzza, Jr. (the victim), was missing and the house had been ransacked. The officers entered the residence and observed the bedrooms in disarray with opened drawers and clothes tossed around. As Sergeant Ibert escorted Mrs. Scramuzza out of the residence in preparation to process the scene, Deputy Bennett called him to the laundry room where the victim's body was on the floor face down with a blue and white towel under his head. Although he saw the victim's body in the residence, Sergeant Ibert did not initially inform Mrs. Scramuzza, who was outside when the body was discovered. As he officers placed Mrs. Scramuzza inside of the air conditioned police unit, Mrs. Scramuzza abruptly became distraught and asked, "[O]h, my God, what is it[?]"
By the time of trial, Sergeant Ibert's official title had changed to "Lieutenant." His title at the time of the offense, however, will be referenced herein.
Suspected blood was on the towel located underneath the victim's head and a second towel with suspected blood on it was located under a pile of clothes near the victim's body. The police further collected an approximate forty-four inch red, white, and blue looped cord or rope from the laundry room counter.
Mrs. Scramuzza was subsequently transported to the Major Crimes Office for questioning. After Mrs. Scramuzza was informed of and waived her rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), she was interviewed by STPSO Detective Vance Vitter and Detective Stacey Callendar. Early on, Mrs. Scramuzza expressed her desire to speak with the female officer (Detective Callendar) alone. Thus, Detective Vitter excused himself from the interview room and monitored the interview from the observation room. During the interview, Mrs. Scramuzza confirmed that she was having an extramarital relationship with the defendant, and confessed to plotting the victim's death and to specifically hiring the defendant to commit the murder. She stated that the defendant and two unknown males who sat in the back seat entered her vehicle on Friday afternoon. She specifically indicated that she picked up the defendant and the unknown males, whose faces she did not see as she was instructed not to turn around, from Walmart and dropped them off at her residence, knowing that they would murder the victim. At that point, Detective Callendar drafted arrest warrants for Mrs. Scramuzza and the defendant.
By the time of trial, Detective Vitter's official title had changed to "Lieutenant." His title at the time of the offense will be referenced herein.
By the time of the trial, Detective Callendar's last name and official title had changed. Thus, she is also referenced in the record as Sergeant Stacey Griffin. Her title and last name at the time of the offense will be referenced herein.
On Sunday, March 1, 2009, the police reMirandized and re-interviewed Mrs. Scramuzza to obtain a recap of her confession after learning that the audio of the initial VHS recording was distorted. A digital voice recording of the recap was fully captured.
Keith Plaisance, IT director of United States Environmental Services, the defendant's place of employment at the time of the offense, testified that on February 26, 2009, the defendant sent an e-mail notification that he would not be attending work on February 27, and February 28, due to a "very bad" family matter. Plaisance provided the police with tracking data for the defendant's work vehicle for that time period. Detailed coordinates showed the defendant's "comings and goings" on February 27, 2009. The victim's truck was located in a motel parking lot in Walker, Louisiana.
Before the instant trial, Mrs. Scramuzza pled guilty to first degree murder with the agreement by the State to not seek the death penalty and the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
According to Dr. Michael DeFatta, the St. Tammany Parish Coroner's Office expert in forensic pathology who performed the autopsy on March 1, 2009, the victim suffered trauma to the neck, blanching on the left side of his face, and injuries to his forehead, nose, bottom lip, wrists, hand, ribs, and knee. Dr. DeFatta testified that in his opinion, the victim was face down when he died, and his cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation.
The injuries to the victim's wrists included banding and bruising, consistent with his being bound with zip ties.
The defendant gave a recorded police statement on Sunday, March 1, 2009, after his arrest and upon being advised of his Miranda rights and signing the waiver of rights form. The defendant admitted to knowing Mrs. Scramuzza, but only to having a non-physical relationship with her. He further confirmed that he was aware that Mrs. Scramuzza was married, and that he did not inform her that he was married. According to the defendant, approximately three months after the relationship started, Mrs. Scramuzza began complaining about her husband. The defendant denied any knowledge of the victim's death and stated that he was home at the time of the offense and had not been on the Northshore (the Covington/Mandeville area) any time that Friday or since.
During a subsequent interview conducted the following day, after being re-Mirandized, the defendant was shown surveillance photographs of himself at the Northshore Walmart on Friday, February 27, 2009. At that point, he admitted to being in the area, and to meeting with Mrs. Scramuzza, indicating that she wanted him to pawn or take possession of some of her jewelry. However, as to whether the defendant killed the victim, the defendant "didn't deviate from any information that he had provided previously," in denying he killed the victim.
Items located in the defendant's work truck included two Rolex watches and a bracelet engraved with Mrs. Scramuzza's first name, Gina, and boxes of blue nitrile gloves.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In a combined argument for both assignments of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal as the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The defendant contends that the bulk of the evidence consists of the testimony of three individuals who lacked credibility, namely, Gina Scramuzza, Erly Montoya, and Luis Rodriguez-Hernandez. The defendant contends that the three witnesses have a history of dishonesty and criminal activity and that no rational trier of fact would have believed or relied on their testimony.
The defendant avers that Mrs. Scramuzza made claims of spousal abuse in an attempt to deflect responsibility for her conduct. He further asserts that Mrs. Scramuzza changed her story because she felt betrayed by the defendant, and notes that she admitted to having serious mental health issues. As to Montoya, the defendant contends that Montoya is an illegal alien, who made a deal with the State in exchange for his testimony. The defendant further contends that Montoya lied to the police about details, initially gave the police a fake name, and admitted to receiving money from Mrs. Scramuzza. As to Rodriguez-Hernandez, the defendant claims that Rodriguez-Hernandez testified that he was present, but did not see the defendant kill the victim. He contends that Rodriguez-Hernandez has a lengthy criminal record in Louisiana and Florida. Moreover, the defendant notes that Rodriguez-Hernandez gave conflicting statements to the police and admitted that nearly all of the items taken from the victim's residence were found at his house. Finally, the defendant argues that the circumstantial evidence in this case supports a finding that he was not in the Scramuzza home when the victim was killed.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime charged and defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jones, 596 So. 2d 1360, 1369 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 598 So. 2d 373 (La. 1992). See also LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 821(B); State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 654, 660. The Jackson standard of review, incorporated in Article 821(B), is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, LSA-R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So. 2d 141, 144. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So. 2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So. 2d 126 (La. 1987).
Louisiana Revised Statute 14:30(A)(1)(4) defines first degree murder, in pertinent part, as the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of armed robbery or simple robbery, and/or has been offered or has received anything of value for the killing. Armed robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, while armed with a dangerous weapon. LSA-R.S. 14:64(A). Simple robbery is the taking of anything of value belonging to another from the person of another or that is in the immediate control of another, by use of force or intimidation, but not armed with a dangerous weapon. LSA-R.S. 14:65(A). Armed robbery and simple robbery are crimes of general intent. State v. Davis, 2012-0386 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/2/12), 111 So. 3d 100, 103. In general intent crimes, the criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction is shown by the very doing of the acts which have been declared criminal. State v. Payne, 540 So. 2d 520, 523-24 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 169 (La. 1989).
We note that as another option for the enumerated felony element of the first degree murder offense, the jury instructions also included first degree robbery, which would require the State to prove "that the offender induced a subjective belief in the victim that he was armed with a dangerous weapon and that the victim's belief was objectively reasonable under the circumstances." See LSA-R.S. 14:64.1(A); State v. Caples, 2005-2517 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So. 2d 147, 151, writ denied, 2006-2466 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So. 2d 684.
Specific criminal intent is that "state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." LSA-R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Thus, specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. State v. Buchanon, 95-0625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So. 2d 663, 665, writ denied, 96-1411 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So. 2d 923.
The State bears the burden of proving those elements, along with the burden of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. State v. Draughn, 2005-1825 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So. 2d 583, 593, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S. Ct. 537, 169 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2007). When the key issue is the defendant's identity as the perpetrator, rather than whether the crime was committed, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification. A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Weary, 2003-3067 (La. 4/24/06), 931 So. 2d 297, 311, cert denied, 549 U.S. 1062, 127 S. Ct. 682, 166 L. Ed. 2d 531 (2006), quoting State v. Neal, 2000-0674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So. 2d 649, 658, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S. Ct. 1323, 152 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2002).
All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals. LSA-R.S. 14:24. Mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make one a principal to the crime. Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or execution of a crime are principals to that crime. An individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he personally has the requisite mental state. See State v. Pierre, 93-0893 (La. 2/3/94), 631 So. 2d 427, 428 (per curiam). Accordingly, the mental state of one defendant may not be imputed to another defendant. State v. Bean, 2004-1527 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So. 2d 702, 707, writ denied, 2005-1106 (La. 11/3/06), 940 So. 2d 652.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. State v. Richardson, 459 So. 2d 31, 38 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984). Unless there is internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the physical evidence, the testimony of a single witness, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to support a factual conclusion. State v. Marshall 2004-3139 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 362, 369, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 905, 128 S. Ct. 239, 169 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007). It is the fact finder who weighs the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those determinations. See State v. Hughes, 2005-0992 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So. 2d 1047, 1051.
On Saturday, Detective Vitter initially responded to the Discount Zone on Collins Boulevard to obtain video surveillance, as the police were informed that the night of his death, the victim called his wife, Mrs. Scramuzza, from that location to inform her that his debit card was declined when he attempted to purchase gas. The video surveillance shows that at approximately 7:00 p.m., a sunburst orange Dodge pickup truck entered the Discount Zone parking lot and parked next to a gas pump. The surveillance footage shows a subject, who appears to be the victim, exiting the vehicle and attempting to get gas before appearing to make a phone call, reentering his truck, and proceeding back on Collins Boulevard. After viewing the surveillance footage on Saturday, Detective Vitter responded to the scene and was present when Mrs. Scramuzza was informed that her husband's body was discovered and that he was deceased. Mrs. Scramuzza placed her head in the chest of the victim's father, Mario Scramuzza, Sr., but she did not have any tears as she began questioning an investigator as to whether he was certain that it was her husband who was deceased.
Mrs. Scramuzza began asking about her vehicle, a 2004 silver Nissan Murano, and whether she could leave the scene. As Mrs. Scramuzza's vehicle was located inside the secured crime scene, in the driveway next to the residence, Detective Vitter told her that she was free to leave, but would not be allowed to move her vehicle. She persisted in wanting to leave and ultimately indicated that she needed to retrieve items from the vehicle. Detective Vitter informed Mrs. Scramuzza that he would retrieve the items if she signed a consent form to allow him to enter the vehicle. After initial hesitation, still stating that she wanted to leave in the vehicle, Mrs. Scramuzza signed the form. Mrs. Scramuzza privately informed Detective Callendar that there was a cell phone in the vehicle that she, unbeknownst to her husband (the victim), used to communicate with a friend (the defendant). After speaking to Mrs. Scramuzza and retrieving the cell phone located under the floor mat of the driver's side, Detective Vitter and Detective Callendar asked Mrs. Scramuzza if she was willing to come to the office for further questioning. She was then transported to the Major Crimes Office.
When Detective Callendar questioned Mrs. Scramuzza about her friend, she identified him as "Carlos" and indicated that his full name was on documents in her purse located in her vehicle. As a result, Detective Vitter contacted the lead detective, Detective Keith Cannizzaro, who was at the scene with the vehicle, and the detective located Mrs. Scramuzza's purse and paperwork, which provided the defendant's full name and home address in Kenner, Louisiana. Detective Vitter promptly relayed this information to Detective Callendar, and Mrs. Scramuzza confirmed the defendant's identity as her boyfriend.
As a result of Mrs. Scramuzza's confession, Detective Callendar drafted arrest warrants for the defendant and Mrs. Scramuzza. On Sunday, Detective Cannizzaro located the defendant, and determined that he was married and that his wife was pregnant at the time. Upon being made aware of the facts, Detective Callendar relayed this information to Mrs. Scramuzza during a second interview that day, who reacted with surprise and anger. Mrs. Scramuzza was then increasingly forthcoming and provided additional information. Detective Callendar further confirmed that Mrs. Scramuzza never attempted to exonerate herself.
Mrs. Scramuzza testified that she had known the defendant for about seven years, and that during part of that time period, she and the victim were married, had a son, but were seeing other people. She further described her marriage as mentally, emotionally, and physically abusive, and void. Though he knew about her marriage, the defendant did not tell her he was married at the time, but instead indicated that he had a girlfriend. At some point the defendant offered to help Mrs. Scramuzza "get rid" of her husband, which she interpreted as an offer to kill the victim, and that she did not initially reply. The defendant further told Mrs. Scramuzza that "he had done that before." The defendant made statements to Mrs. Scramuzza indicating that they would be together after the murder of her husband. Approximately two months before the instant murder, she paid the defendant two installments of seventeen hundred dollars which he stated that he would use to hire someone. The day that she called 911 to report the victim missing, she had received a phone call indicating that the victim did not show up for work. Though she did not indicate as such when she called 911, Mrs. Scramuzza assumed that the victim had been murdered. When she arrived home, her house was in disarray, the victim's body was in the laundry room, and the victim's truck was not there. She further testified that she did not attempt to verify the victim's death at that point because she was afraid.
Mrs. Scramuzza stated that the victim was controlling and emotionally and physically abusive toward her for at least ten years. She did not report the abuse to the police, purportedly out of fear.
Mrs. Scramuzza confirmed that the day before she discovered the victim's body, she picked up the defendant and two unknown individuals from Wal-Mart, stopped at the bank to get one thousand dollars to pay the other two individuals five hundred dollars each, dropped them off at her house to kill the victim, and told the defendant that he could use the victim's truck to abscond if necessary. The victim was not home at the time, and their son was staying with his grandfather. Mrs. Scramuzza left after dropping the defendant and the other two men off at the Scramuzza residence. While she was at work, she received the phone call from the victim when his debit card was declined at Discount Zone, located about twenty minutes from their residence. Though she could not recall with certainty, Mrs. Scramuzza testified that she may have called the defendant at that point. She subsequently received a phone call from the defendant wherein he indicated that it was "taken care of." The defendant also informed her that they had left beer cans and bottles in the house and told her to get rid of them. She called 911 again after discovering the victim's body, though she did not report the discovery to the police. She found one beer can, which she rinsed off and put in the bag that they used to collect cans to be recycled, located in the laundry room where the victim's body was laying.
She briefly returned home after the defendant called about the neighbors who may have' seen him and/or the other men at the house She left again and went to work once she felt certain that the neighbors had not suspected any foul play.
Mrs. Scramuzza indicated that she decided to fully confess because she felt betrayed by the defendant after being informed that he was married and that his wife was pregnant. She confirmed that she had a $400,000.00 life insurance policy for the victim at the time of the murder. She further identified photographs of one of the pet rabbits that she had given to her son, her engraved bracelet, and the Rolex watches that belonged to her and the victim, and stated that she did not give those items to the defendant. She further confirmed that the victim regularly wore his watch. Mrs. Scramuzza stated that the night of the offense was not the first time that the defendant had ever been in her home, indicating that he had also been there months before the victim's death. Although she admitted that she remained angry at the defendant, Mrs. Scramuzza repeatedly denied fabricating her story as a means of revenge or out of anger. While confirming that she has a history of depression, bipolar, and other mental illnesses, she denied having symptoms such as delusions, paranoia, or misperception.
Consistent with her trial testimony, during the March 1, 2009 recorded and transcribed interview played for the jury, Mrs. Scramuzza stated that the defendant offered to have her husband killed and that she paid two separate installments of seventeen hundred dollars each for that purpose. She stated that during Christmastime, the defendant told her that the victim's death would look like an accident and that she would not be given specific details as to when and how the murder would occur. He did however instruct her to start leaving items of value, such as her watch and bracelet, at home. During the week leading up to the murder, Mrs. Scramuzza agreed to pay the defendant $50,000.00 from the life insurance money. She further described the day of the offense, detailing her actions of driving the defendant and the other two individuals to her home after retrieving money for payments for the murder from the bank.
In addition to locating the defendant, searching his work vehicle, and locating the victim's truck, Detective Cannizzaro and STPSO Detective Emile Joseph Lobrano (with the assistance of a deputy/translator fluent in Spanish) interviewed Gabriel Rodriguez and Giovanni Rodriguez. Gabriel and Giovanni recognized the individuals and vehicle depicted in the Wal-Mart surveillance footage, and Giovanni identified of one of the individuals in the surveillance footage as Erly Montoya, a work acquaintance. When the police located Montoya, he briefly identified himself as Jorge Salazar before confirming his actual name.
During his police interview. Montoya made statements consistent with those of Mrs. Scramuzza, specifically in regards to being picked up from Wal-Mart and stopping at a bank to get cash before going to the Scramuzza residence. Montoya further confessed to his participation in the robbery and murder of the victim, specifically identifying the defendant, Mrs. Scramuzza, and Luis Rodriguez- Hernandez, and identified surveillance photographs. The police further conducted a search of Montoya's apartment in which they recovered some of the victim's belongings, including his cell phone.
Moreover, Tara Johnson, a Forensic DNA Analyst for the St. Tammany Parish Coroner's Office and expert in molecular biology, who tested the evidence in this case, found that the DNA taken from the rim of one of the beer bottles recovered from the victim's residence was consistent with Montoya's DNA sample.
Based on the information provided by Montoya, the police were able to locate Rodriguez-Hernandez, who also admitted to his involvement in the offense. Rodriguez-Hernandez specifically admitted to holding the victim's legs while the defendant asphyxiated him. The police further conducted a search of Rodriguez-Hernandez's apartment, wherein numerous items from the Scramuzza household were also located, including the pet rabbit and a firearm (with a serial number consistent with a gun box located in the victim's master bedroom).
The police further learned that Rodriguez-Hernandez's girlfriend, Carolina Chavez, pawned items that came from the Scramuzza household, including a disc player, discs, and pieces of jewelry that included a graduation ring engraved with Mrs. Scramuzza's first name and maiden last name, an engraved bracelet, and the victim's wedding band.
Johnson testified that the DNA sample from a beer can in evidence was consistent with the defendant's DNA profile as a minor contributor, and with Rodriguez-Hernandez as the major contributor. She further indicated that Rodriguez-Hernandez could not be excluded from a DNA profile taken from one of the blue gloves in evidence, specifically stating, "[w]hen comparing the two loci that we did obtain results from, they would have been consistent with Luis Rodriguez's profile, therefore, we wouldn't be able to exclude him."
Both Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez testified at trial. Montoya confirmed that he pled guilty in this case to armed robbery and manslaughter, while Rodriguez-Hernandez was convicted of first degree murder pertaining to the instant murder. Rodriguez-Hernandez and Montoya had known each other for over two years before the offense. Rodriguez-Hernandez had known the defendant for almost two weeks and introduced him to Montoya, about two days before the instant offense. Rodriguez-Hernandez informed Montoya of a plan to burglarize the Scramuzza residence when no one was home. Montoya verified that he was told that Mrs. Scramuzza was participating in the plan. Montoya claimed that he was initially unaware of any plan to kill the victim. On the day of the murder, the defendant (the driver) and Rodriguez-Hernandez (the front passenger) picked Montoya up from his apartment in Kenner, travelling in a white truck. They travelled across the Causeway Bridge to Covington, and went to Walmart to wait for Mrs. Scramuzza, who arrived in an SUV. At that point, all three of the men entered the SUV, with the defendant sitting in front next to Mrs. Scramuzza and Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez sitting in the backseat. Mrs. Scramuzza stopped at a bank, gave one thousand dollars to the defendant, and the defendant gave Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez five hundred dollars each before they proceeded to the Scramuzza residence. This was the first and only occasion that Montoya had entered the Scramuzza residence. All three of the males were wearing blue gloves that were provided by the defendant and after they hid in the home, Mrs. Scramuzza left. Montoya was told that they would use the victim's vehicle to leave, however, he claimed he did not realize that they were going to rob the victim until the defendant gave him a revolver from the residence and told him to use it to "hold him [the victim] up." They sat around for hours and he drank a beer while waiting for the victim to come home.
When the victim entered, Montoya pointed the gun at him. The defendant ordered the victim to get on the floor and took his keys and bound his hands and feet with zip ties. After the victim was bound, Montoya pulled the truck into the garage and they began loading it with items from the residence while the defendant stayed with the victim in the laundry room. As he walked through the laundry room to the garage to load items, Montoya saw the defendant placing zip ties and a towel around the victim's neck. According to both Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez, Rodriguez-Hernandez stopped loading the truck to help separate the victim's legs, as the victim was kicking and making noises. About ten minutes after Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez finished loading items from the residence, the defendant came out to the garage with a bag and the cut zip ties. They then left in the victim's truck. They went to Giovanni's residence in Walker to transfer items from the victim's truck to the defendant's truck, before abandoning the victim's truck in a motel parking lot and discarding the gloves and bag in a swamp area.
The victim's vehicle contained cut zip ties, consistent with the information provided by Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez indicating that zip ties were placed around the legs and arms of the victim to restrain him during the murder. The police further verified October and November banking transactions consisting of withdrawals of seventeen hundred dollars from Mrs. Scramuzza's bank account, deposits into the defendant's bank account, and a one thousand dollar withdrawal at 3:44 p.m. on February 27, 2009, the day of the victim's murder. Using GPS coordinates and interview statements of Rodriguez-Hernandez and Montoya, the police located two blue disposable medical gloves, believed to be used in the crime, in the Sunset Park area of Lake Maurepas in the I-55 Manchac area.
Detective Callendar, who was previously trained in cell phone technology and forensic data recovery, obtained and analyzed records for Mrs. Scramuzza's cell phone. Detective Callendar further obtained the records for another cell phone listed in Mrs. Scramuzza's name with the defendant's address, believed to be used by the defendant and Rodriguez-Hernandez. On February 27, 2009, at 3:18 p.m. and 3:25 p.m., there were voice calls between Mrs. Scramuzza and the defendant, followed by a roughly one hour and two minute interval before their next communication. Further, there was a text message from the defendant's phone to Rodriguez-Hernandez's phone that night at 7:15 p.m., stating, "Nothing yet from here." Between 8:42 p.m. and 9:44 p.m., there were at least seven phone calls between the defendant and Rodriguez-Hernandez. The four cell phones moved from south Covington to north Covington within the same time frame. However, after a short period of time, Mrs. Scramuzza's phone moved back south, then went north, and then back south. Detective Callendar noted that the cell phone travel was consistent with Mrs. Scramuzza's indication that she had gone to her residence with the defendant (and Montoya and Rodriguez-Hernandez, whom she did not know by name), dropped them off, proceeded to work, was called back to the house, and then went back to work.
The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So. 2d 929, 932. While the defendant claims otherwise on appeal, Mrs. Scramuzza, Montoya, and Rodriguez-Hernandez provided detailed accounts of the robbery and murder of the victim herein that were consistent with the phone records, DNA evidence, surveillance footage, GPS coordinates, and the items recovered during the execution of search warrants for the vehicles and residences of the involved parties. Based on the overwhelming evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was guilty of first degree murder.
Thus, in reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See Ordodi, 946 So. 2d at 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). A court of appeal impinges on a fact finder's discretion beyond the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law in accepting a hypothesis of innocence that was not unreasonably rejected by the fact finder. See State v. Mire, 2014-2295 (La. 1/27/16), ___ So. 3d ___, ___, 2016 WL 314814 at *4 (per curiam).
After a thorough review of the record, we are convinced that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of first degree murder and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator. Accordingly, the combined assignments of error lack merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.