The right to notice is set forth in both the United States and Texas constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601; State v. Rodgers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd).
However, we note that the de novo standard of review has been applied primarily in cases involving motions to quash that complain about the sufficiency of the charging instrument. See Smith, 309 S.W.3d at 13-14; Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 250-52; Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 600-01; State v. Rodgers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd). In State v. Moff, the court of criminal appeals held that the sufficiency of an indictment is a question of law that should be reviewed de novo because the trial court was not in a better position than the appellate court to make that determination. Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601 (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89).
The right to notice is set forth in both the United States and Texas Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10; Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601; State v. Rodgers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd).
The right to notice is set forth in both the United States and Texas Constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601; State v. Rodgers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd).
The sufficiency of an information or indictment is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Smith v. State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); State v. Rodgers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
sically harmed. The sufficiency of an indictment or information is a question of law. State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). A charging instrument must be specific enough to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense. Id. "Whenever recklessness . . . enters into or is a part or element of any offense, or it is charged that the accused acted recklessly . . . in the commission of an offense, [the information] in order to be sufficient in any such case must allege, with reasonable certainty, the act or acts relied upon to constitute recklessness . . ., and in no event shall it be sufficient to allege merely that the accused, in committing the offense, acted recklessly or with criminal negligence." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.15 (Vernon 1989). We conclude the information here sufficiently alleged the act relied upon to constitute recklessness: that defendant struck the complainant with his hand. See State v. Rogers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd) (information sufficiently alleged acts State relied upon to constitute recklessness, including "pushing the body of [complainant] with [his] hand"); Arroyo v. State, 64 S.W.3d 81, 83-84 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001) (information sufficiently alleged act State relied upon to constitute recklessness: "striking the said complainant with the head of [defendant]"), judgment vacated and remanded on other grounds, 117 S.W.3d 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash the information. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant "failed to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct throughout trial was reasonable." C. Subpoena IA file
However, the information is sufficient if it "alleges the act relied upon to constitute recklessness with reasonable certainty so it informs the accused of the nature of the reckless act of which he or she is accused." State v. Emanuel, 873 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.) (concluding indictment alleging violation of section 22.01(a)(1) of the penal code was sufficient because it "did not merely track the statutory language and allege that [the defendant] recklessly caused bodily injury, as prohibited by article 21.15" but, rather, "specified [the defendant's] reckless act as hitting the complainant with a belt"); see State v. Rodgers, 214 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, pet. ref'd) (concluding information alleging violation of section 22.01(a)(1) of the penal code was sufficient because it alleged reckless acts of "pushing," "kicking," "striking," "choking," and "squeezing"). Here, the information did not merely allege appellant caused bodily injury to the complainant, who was his wife.