The correct rule of law stated above in State, ex rel. Stine, v. McCaw, supra ( 136 Ohio St. 41), and State, ex rel., v. Hahn, supra ( 50 Ohio St. 44), is the rule of law which this court stated in State, ex rel. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., v. Industrial Commission, supra ( 162 Ohio St. 302). Likewise, this rule supports and requires the result which was reached in State, ex rel. Adams, v. Rockwell et al., Bd. of Edn. (1957), 167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665, and State, ex rel. Roger J. Au and Son, Inc., v. Studebaker et al., Commrs. (1963), 175 Ohio St. 222, 193 N.E.2d 84.
In cases decided prior to 1967, this court had denied a writ of mandamus because the relator had an adequate remedy by way of mandatory injunction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cent. Serv. Station v. Masheter (1966), 7 Ohio St.2d 1, 36 O.O.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 177; State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell (1957), 167 Ohio St. 15, 3 O.O.2d 433, 145 N.E.2d 665. Likewise, this court affirmed or reversed judgments of courts of appeals because the lower courts had or should have denied a writ of mandamus when the relator had an adequate remedy by way of mandatory injunction. State ex rel. Danford v. Karl (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 79, 38 O.O.2d 203, 223 N.E.2d 602; State ex rel. Durek v. Masheter (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 76, 38 O.O.2d 202, 223 N.E.2d 601.
At least one case from another state court suggests that closed meetings in violation of an open meeting law can be enjoined without an enabling provision in the statute. State ex rel. Adams v. Rockwell, 167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665 (1957). We hold that injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy in this case but have misgivings about the extent of the relief and some of the exceptions.
134 Ohio St. 348; State, ex rel. Gladman, v. Indus. Comm., 136 Ohio St. 90; State, ex rel. McCamey, v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, 141 Ohio St. 610; State, ex rel. Horvitz Co., v. Sours, Dir., 142 Ohio St. 591; Gannon v. Gallagher, Dir., 145 Ohio St. 170; State, ex rel. Stanley, v. Cook, Supt. of Banks, 146 Ohio St. 348, paragraph three of the syllabus; Freon v. Carriage Co., 42 Ohio St. 30; State, ex rel., v. Carpenter, 51 Ohio St. 83; State, ex rel. White, v. City of Cleveland, 132 Ohio St. 111, paragraph one of the syllabus; State, ex rel. First National Bank, v. Village of Botkins, 141 Ohio St. 437, paragraph one of the syllabus; State, ex rel. Shively, v. Nicholas, Judge, 151 Ohio St. 179, 181; State, ex rel. City of Cincinnati, v. Miller et al., Public Utilities Comm., 149 Ohio St. 45; State, ex rel. Welker, v. Indus. Comm., 150 Ohio St. 464; State, ex rel. Hepperla, v. Glander, Tax Commr., 160 Ohio St. 59; State, ex rel. Adams, v. Rockwell et al., Board of Edn., 167 Ohio St. 15; State, ex rel. Schafer, v. Citizens National Bank of Ironton, 168 Ohio St. 535; State, ex rel. Lotz, v. Hover, Pros. Atty., 174 Ohio St. 68, 72; State, ex rel. Emmich, dba. Modern Launderers Dry Cleaners, v. Indus.Comm., 148 Ohio St. 658; Shelby v. Hoffman, 7 Ohio St. 451, 455, 456; and State, ex rel. Lorain County Savings Trust Co., v. Board of County Commrs., 171 Ohio St. 306. Nevertheless, in spite of the array of authorities to the contrary, the following cases approve the exercise of discretion by the appellate court to issue or deny the writ.
However, they have an adequate ordinary remedy by way of injunction. State, ex rel. Adams, v. Rockwell et al., Board of Education of Minford Local School District, 167 Ohio St. 15. Relators contend that the principles announced in the Libbey-Owens-Ford case, supra, are not applicable to the Court of Appeals or to the exercise of discretion by that court in mandamus actions originating therein.
(Emphasis added.) See, also, State, ex rel. Adams, v. Rockwell, 167 Ohio St. 15, which is to the same effect. Nowhere in the record in either of the cases now before us is there any showing on behalf of the relator, or otherwise, that there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
"The school year shall begin on the first day of July of each calendar year and close on the thirtieth day of June of the succeeding calendar year. A school week shall consist of five days, and a school month of four school weeks." I also cite State, ex rel. Adams, v. Rockwell, 167 Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665: " Per Curiam.