Opinion
No. 3-212 / 02-767.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for LinnCounty, William L. Thomas, Judge.
Carloss Darnell Robinson appeals from his judgment, following jury trial, for murder in the first degree. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Denver D. Dillard, County Attorney, and Jerry Vander Sanden, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Carloss Darnell Robinson appeals his conviction, following jury trial, for murder in the first degree. He contends the court erred in (1) overruling his motion to suppress, (2) permitting the State to present impermissible rebuttal evidence, and (3) finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
The record before us reveals the following facts. On Thursday August 31, 2000 Christine Sanoubane and her two-year-old son moved into the front apartment of a duplex in Cedar Rapids. The defendant Carloss Robinson and Temeca Sanders lived in the rear apartment of the duplex with their four children. While Sanoubane was moving in Sanders volunteered Robinson to help Sanoubane and her friend, Todd Hale, carry some of the heavy furniture from Hale's truck into the apartment. Robinson did so, making four trips from the truck to various rooms in the apartment. Over the course of the next few of days, which happened to be Labor Day weekend, Sanoubane came over to Sanders and Robinson's apartment to use their phone to order pizza and asked Sanders about the laundry facilities in the basement of the duplex.
On Monday September 4, 2000 (Labor Day) Hale returned to Sanoubane's apartment to collect money which he said she had promised him for helping her move. He knocked but got no response. He said he saw Sanoubane's son but was not able to communicate with him and left.
Robinson and Sanders were out of town most of Monday and returned in the early evening. Around 6:30 p.m. Sanders heard a child next door crying and she and Robinson went next door to see what was wrong. They looked in the window of Sanoubane's apartment and could see the child crying but could not communicate with him. About that time Hale arrived at the apartment again to see about getting the money he was promised. Hale also attempted unsuccessfully to communicate with the toddler through the window and called for Sanoubane but got no response.
Robinson apparently heard the telephone ring in their apartment at that point and went to answer it. Hale then pulled the screen and window out and crawled through it into the apartment. He discovered Sanoubane's body in the bathtub. He grabbed the child and ran out of the apartment shouting for someone to call 911 because he thought she was dead. Sanders then yelled for Robinson to call 911 and he did.
Officers from the Cedar Rapids Police Department responded to the call. The first officer at the scene checked Sanoubane for signs of life and found none. Statements were taken from Sanders, Hale and Robinson that night. Robinson told police he had helped Sanoubane move in on Thursday but that he knew nothing about what happened to her.
It was later determined that Sanoubane had been struck on the head and face repeatedly with a blunt object, knocking out two of her teeth. The missing teeth were found on the kitchen floor. She had then been placed in the bathtub and her throat had been cut. The massive amount of blood loss from the cut to her throat was determined to be the cause of death. The drain of the tub had been stopped up with an elastic hair pull and the tub filled. The water had drained out of the tub by the time the body was discovered but the bloody water had left a brownish ring around the tub.
Early the next morning, September 5, Officer Choate of the Cedar Rapids Police Department contacted Sanders and Robinson while they were getting ready to leave for work shortly before 7:00 a.m. He asked if they would come down to the police station to give a more detailed statement. Robinson was reluctant because he needed to get to work but Choate assured him he would be able to contact his employer to explain the situation. Sanders asked Officer Choate a question regarding whether they needed to contact a lawyer, although what specifically she asked is disputed, and Choate told them it was up to them. Sanders and Robinson agreed to the interview and drove themselves to the police station in their own vehicle.
Once at the station Robinson and Sanders were put in separate rooms. In the interview room Robinson sat in the chair nearest the door which at this point was left ajar. The only other person present at the start of the interview was Officer Choate. Choate advised Robinson he was not under arrest and was free to leave at any time and Robinson indicated he understood. Robinson was allowed to call his employer to inform him about the situation.
Robinson initially told Choate the same things he had told the police the previous evening, that he had helped Sanoubane move in on Thursday but knew nothing about her death. Early in the interview Robinson was asked to provide various samples to the police for comparison to any found in Sanoubane's apartment because he had been in the apartment helping her move. Robinson agreed to give the samples and signed a written "Permission to Search Without a Search Warrant" form agreeing to the search of his person. The police took fingerprints, footprints, shoe prints, swabings of his feet, palm prints, and buccal swabs from Robinson. At approximately 9:15 a.m. Officer Choate was informed that Robinson's footprint matched a bloody footprint found inside Sanoubane's apartment.
Choate resumed the interview with Robinson and at that point Robinson was read his Miranda rights aloud. Robinson did not sign the form acknowledging those rights. Officer Choate stated that at that point he thought of Robinson as a potential suspect in the murder rather than just a witness and the door to the interview room remained shut and locked from then on. When Choate confronted Robinson with the information regarding the footprint Robinson at first maintained his original story. However, at around noon he changed his story and told police he had in fact been in Sanoubane's apartment Sunday night while Sanders was out of town visiting her sisters.
Robinson stated that he entered Sanoubane's apartment to see if she was all right because he had heard bumping sounds coming from her apartment. He told Choate that he entered the apartment which was completely dark, knocked, called "Hello," and then looked around and discovered Sanoubane lying on the bathroom floor with her back against the bathtub. He saw some dark substance or foam coming out of her mouth, noticed he was standing in dark liquid, slipped on the liquid and caught himself on the sink or bathtub, and left the apartment. Robinson stated that he panicked, wiped his feet off in the grass and went back to his apartment to smoke a blunt and calm down. He told no one about the discovery. Officer Choate had this second version of events typed up based on notes he had taken and asked Robinson to review the statement at 3:18 p.m. Robinson reviewed the statement but refused to sign it. Shortly thereafter, Choate formally arrested Robinson and charged him with the murder of Sanoubane.
During Robinson's questioning, at approximately 11:30 a.m., the police station received a facsimile "notice" from an attorney in Des Moines which stated he was counsel for Robinson who was being questioned regarding a homicide. The "notice" also requested "reasonable notice of the right of my presence at all line ups, one-on-one show up identification and all other identification procedures including but not limited to the withdrawal of blood, hair, or other bodily specimens from Mr. Robinson." It further stated, "Any questioning of him should cease as requested by this notice." Upon receipt of this "notice" the police did not cease questioning Robinson nor did they inform him of the notice.
At approximately 1:55 p.m. a second attorney, from Iowa City, called the Cedar Rapids Police Department and spoke to Captain Peters. He stated that he had been contacted by Robinson's family to represent him during the interrogation or to represent his interests and would like to speak to Robinson. Peters told the attorney he could not speak with Robinson because they were not through with him yet. The attorney responded they were finished and that their conversation with Robinson needed to end now. The questioning of Robinson did not stop. The attorney then drove to the police station at around 2:30 or 3:00 p.m. Peters told the attorney that Robinson had signed a waiver of counsel. The attorney stated he wanted to discuss those rights with Robinson so he could make an informed waiver. Peters again stated the attorney could not speak with Robinson because they wanted to continue questioning him. During the questioning Robinson did not at any time request counsel, he was not aware an attorney had been contacted by his family, and the police did not inform him of either their receipt of the "notice" or the attempts by the Iowa City attorney to speak with him.
The State filed a trial information charging Robinson with murder in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (1999). Robinson filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to police in the absence of counsel, alleging violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and to counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing the district court entered its written ruling denying the motion.
A jury trial was held. Robinson testified and related yet another, different, third version of the events surrounding Sanoubane's death. He testified that on Sunday night Sanoubane had come to his apartment to see if he had any drugs and he agreed to share his marijuana blunt with her. He further testified that he went over to her apartment, they shared the blunt, and they then engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. He then heard a sound at the door and a man's voice so he hurriedly put on his shorts and went back to his apartment. He told the jury he then stayed at home with his kids for approximately forty-five minutes, went to the corner store, and then came home to call Sanders. While on the phone with Sanders he said he heard bumping noises from Sanoubane's apartment and Sanders told him he should go check it out. He went to Sanoubane's apartment, the door was open and all the lights were off. He then described the events as he had previously to Choate, that he found the body lying on the bathroom floor with her back up against the bathtub, saw a substance coming out of her mouth, noticed he was standing in liquid of some sort, panicked and went home but told no one.
Additional physical evidence against Robinson was introduced by the State at trial. Several bare footprints that matched Robinson's were found in Sanoubane's apartment, some mingled with Sanoubane's blood. A shoe impression matching Robinson's was also found impressed on one of the hamburger buns strewn on the floor of the apartment. A bloody palm print matching Robinson's was found on the bathroom sink. Furthermore, the only prints of any sort found in the apartment belonged to Robinson and Sanoubane. A shirt Robinson admits he was wearing that night was found in his apartment with several small spots of blood on it. DNA testing proved one of the spots to be Robinson's blood and one Sanoubane's. DNA testing of vaginal swabs taken from Sanoubane revealed the presence of sperm matching Robinson's DNA.
The testing indicated DNA from another person as well as Sanoubane and Robinson, most likely as a result of sexual intercourse with another male in the few days prior to Sanoubane's death.
Robinson moved for directed verdict or judgment of acquittal, both at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, alleging there was not sufficient evidence on any of the necessary elements to prove murder in the first degree under sections 707.1 and 707.2. The court denied both motions. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of murder in the first degree. Robinson filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the court following hearing. The court sentenced Robinson to life in prison, the mandatory sentence pursuant to section 902.1.
Robinson appeals his conviction, contending the court erred in (1) overruling his motion to suppress, (2) permitting the State to present impermissible rebuttal evidence, and (3) finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
II. MERITS.
A. Motion to Suppress.
Robinson first argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his right to due process of law and right to counsel as guaranteed by article I, sections 9 and 10 respectively, of the Iowa Constitution.
In its written ruling on Robinson's motion to suppress the court identified and addressed three issues that were being argued in the motion. Only the third issue identified by the court is pursued on appeal and relevant for purposes of this opinion. Robinson's third claim, as identified in the district court's ruling, was that the failure by police to allow an attorney to contact him was in violation of the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution and in violation of Iowa Code section 804.20.
We note as an initial matter that the State argues Robinson was not in custody when he made the statements he sought to have suppressed. However, the district court found that after the police learned the bloody footprint matched one taken from Robinson he was no longer free to leave. The district court's finding is supported by evidence that after the match of footprints was found and the Miranda warnings given the police locked the door to the interview room when they thereafter left Robinson alone in it. Giving deference to the district court's finding, See State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n. 2 (Iowa 2001), we assume for purposes of further discussion that Robinson was in custody after Miranda warnings were given at approximately 9:15 a.m.
The district court determined that because Iowa law generally follows the United States Supreme Court in constitutional matters Robinson's due process claim was controlled by the Supreme Court case of Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). In Burbine the Court held that failure by the police to inform the defendant of a telephone call from an attorney, who had been contacted by a family member for the defendant, before continuing interrogation did not undermine the validity of the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights where the suspect was unaware the attorney had been contacted. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422-27, 106 S.Ct. at 1141-44, 89 L.Ed.2d at 421-25. Thus, the Court found no violation of defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Id.
The Court further held that the asserted misconduct by the police in Burbine, namely the conveying of false information to the defendant's attorney regarding whether Burbine was to be questioned further that evening, was not so offensive as to deprive Burbine of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Id. at 432-34, 106 S.Ct. at 1147, 89 L.Ed.2d at 428-29. Based on, and in accordance with, the holdings in Burbine the district court found Robinson's state due process claim to be without merit.
The district court also determined the police did not violate section 804.20. The court found the legislature did not intend to "create a statutory right for lawyers to intervene in questioning; nor did the legislature intend to create a statutory right for family members to intervene, personally or through counsel of their choosing, in interrogation of adults." The court's ruling on this issue is not challenged on appeal.
We review this constitutional question de novo and make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances shown by the entire record. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001). We give deference to the district court's fact findings but are not bound by them. Id. In reviewing the district court's ruling, we consider both the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and that introduced at trial. Id. The adverse ruling on Robinson's motion to suppress preserved error for our review. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1998).
Where the wording of federal and state constitutional provisions are similar the provisions are generally deemed to be identical in scope, import, and purpose. State v. Beckett, 532 N.W.2d 751, 755 (Iowa 1995); State v. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d 50, 51 (Iowa 1992). Our supreme court has held that article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution provides the same due process protections found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and thus Iowa constitutional due process claims follow federal principles. State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2000); see also Bruns v. State, 503 N.W.2d 607, 611 (Iowa 1999) ("[W]e usually deem the federal and state due process clauses to be identical in scope, import and purpose."); Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 886 (Iowa 1989) (same).
The federal Due Process Clause prohibits states from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Iowa Due Process Clause mandates that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Iowa Const. art. I, § 9.
In Burbine the defendant's sister contacted the public defender's office to obtain legal assistance for her brother (Burbine) on what she believed to be a breaking and entering charge. She was unaware that Burbine was also a suspect in a murder investigation. Id. at 416, 106 S.Ct. at 1138, 89 L.Ed.2d at 418. After the call from the sister, an attorney from the public defender's office contacted the police department where Burbine was being held and informed the police Burbine was represented by an attorney in that office who was not available but that she would act as Burbine's attorney in the event the police intended to place him in a line-up or question him. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 417, 106 S.Ct. at 1138-39, 89 L.Ed.2d at 418. The police told the attorney they would not be questioning Burbine or putting him in a line-up and that they were through with him for the night. Id. at 417, 106 S.Ct. at 1139, 89 L.Ed.2d at 418.
Less than an hour later the police took Burbine to an interrogation room and began the first of a series of interviews concerning the murder. Prior to each interview Burbine was informed of his Miranda rights and three times signed a written form acknowledging he understood his right to an attorney and that he did not want one called or appointed to him. Eventually Burbine signed statements admitting to the murder. Id. at 417-18, 106 S.Ct. at 1139, 89 L.Ed.2d at 418. At all relevant times Burbine was unaware of his sister's efforts to retain counsel for him and of the fact and contents of the telephone call by the attorney. Id. at 417, 475 U.S. at 1139, 89 L.Ed.2d at 418.
As set forth above, the United States Supreme Courtheld that the police conduct in Burbine did not deprive the defendant of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 433-34, 406 S.Ct. at 1147, 89 L.Ed.2d at 428-29. Although the Court stated that on facts more egregious than those presented in Burbine police deception might rise to the level of a due process violation, the conduct here fell "short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States." Id.
In a footnote in Burbine the Court points out that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only if the individual states that he wants an attorney. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 433-34, 106 S.Ct. at 1147, 89 L.Ed.2d at 428-29, n. 4. The Court also notes that Miranda does not require the police to inform a suspect of any and all information that may be useful to a decision on whether to remain silent or speak to police, and that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is a personal right which can only be invoked by the individual whose testimony is being compelled. Id.
We find the police conduct in the case at hand to be far less egregious than the conduct of the police in Burbine. First, in Burbine an attorney from the public defender's office had already been scheduled to meet with the defendant, albeit on an unrelated charge, and thus some semblance of an attorney/client relationship was present. Here, no attorney had been retained by or appointed for Robinson on any charges, he did not request an attorney, and he did not ask that his family contact an attorney on his behalf. Thus, where Burbine involves at least some indicia of an existing attorney/client relationship, in this case no attorney/client relationship existed between Robinson and either of the attorneys that contacted the police.
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, in Burbine the police outright lied to the attorney who contacted them seeking to speak with the suspect. The attorney stated she would represent Burbine if the police were going to question him, the officer stated they were not and they were through with him for the night, but the police then proceeded to repeatedly question him until a confession was obtained. Here, there was no such conduct by the police.
Although the Iowa Supreme Court has consistently claimed its authority to interpret provisions of the Iowa Constitution so as to expand on personal liberties as defined by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of identical or similar provisions in the federal Constitution, it is reluctant to exercise that authority. Quintero, 480 N.W.2d at 51. Iowa courts have seen fit to accord special respect and deference to the United States Supreme Court interpretations of language in the federal Constitution which is similar to language in the Iowa Constitution. State v. Davis, 304 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1981). Good policy and a desired consistency between the two Constitutions dictate similar interpretations of two similar clauses. Des Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 217 Iowa 1319, 1335, 253 N.W. 701, 709 (1934). "Such consistency in interpretation will accomplish consistency in operation." Id.
In determining whether to interpret provisions of the Iowa Constitution differently than identical or similar provisions of the United States Constitution, our supreme court has applied a three-part test. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 285. It (1) reviews the scope and meaning of the Iowa provision, (2) evaluates the rationale of the federal decisions interpreting the comparable federal provision, and (3) determines whether the federal interpretation is consistent with Iowa law. Id. However, as noted above, in Burbine some semblance of an attorney/client relationship was present, and the police lied to the attorney seeking to speak to Burbine. Neither of those facts is present in this case. We thus need not and do not decide whether under similarly egregious facts we would interpret Iowa's Due Process Clause as providing more protection for our citizens' constitutional rights than provided by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause in Burbine, we find the police conduct here was not so offensive as to deprive Robinson of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution. We, like the Supreme Court, recognize that on facts more egregious than those presented here police conduct might rise to the level of a due process violation. We do not condone any police lying to or deception of a suspect during custodial interrogation, or any police lying to or deception of counsel who has been retained or appointed. However, the conduct of the police in this case was much less egregious than the police conduct in Burbine and falls substantially short of conduct so offensive as to deprive Robinson of his due process rights under the Iowa Constitution. Upon our de novo review we conclude the district court was correct in determining Robinson's due process rights under the Iowa Constitution were not violated and denying his motion to suppress.
B. Rebuttal Evidence.
The trial court has considerable discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence. State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Iowa 1995). This includes the discretion to admit evidence which technically could have been offered as part of a party's case-in-chief. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Iowa 1996); Johnson, 539 N.W.2d at 163. The trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 889; State v. Webb, 309 N.W.2d 404, 411 (Iowa 1981). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001); State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 2001).
Robinson argues on appeal that the court erred in permitting the State to present impermissible rebuttal evidence. At trial Robinson objected to the State's first four rebuttal witnesses arguing that the proposed testimony was not proper rebuttal because it did not rebut any evidence presented by him in his case. These four witnesses were called by the State to testify in support of Jacob Crosson's alibi on the night of Sanoubane's death. Robinson asserts this rebuttal testimony was inadmissible and impermissible because (1) the testimony did not serve to contradict, explain, or rebut any evidence presented by him in the case, and (2) the testimony as to Crosson's alibi only supplemented and corroborated earlier testimony.
Crosson was either Sanoubane's current or former boyfriend, the record being conflicting and unclear on this point, who had a history of violence and domestic abuse with Sanoubane.
Rebuttal evidence is any evidence which "explains, repels, controverts or disproves evidence produced by the other side." Webb, 309 N.W.2d at 411. Generally, rebuttal evidence is confined to new matters first introduced by the opposing party. Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 889. "The fact that testimony might have been useful and usable in the case-in-chief does not necessarily preclude its use in rebuttal." Id. However, rebuttal is not intended to give a party an opportunity to tell his story twice. Id. "Thus, rebuttal should not be used as a corroboration, reiteration, or repetition" of evidence, and "evidence which is merely cumulative" or "merely bolsters or supplements that already adduced" is not admissible as rebuttal. Id. Evidence that has no direct tendency to impeach, contradict, explain, or otherwise rebut evidence is inadmissible rebuttal evidence. State v. Nelson, 153 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa 1967); Webb, 309 N.W.2d at 411.
Several defense witnesses testified regarding Crosson's violent temper, history of abuse, and where he allegedly was around the time of Sanoubane's death. First, Norma Hoffpauir, at whose residence Sanoubane had lived off and on prior to moving into the duplex, testified there had been an argument and fight over drugs between her daughter and Crosson in her home the summer before Sanoubane's death. Hoffpauir stated that she had banned Crosson from her home due to that fight and what it was about. Hoffpauir also testified regarding her 911 call on Monday September 4, 2000, the day Sanoubane's body was discovered, in which she stated that her boyfriend, Todd Hale, was going over to Sanoubane's apartment to find Crosson to collect money owed to Hale by Crosson. This line of questioning by Robinson continued with Sergeant Stephen Keiller who took the 911 call from Hoffpauir on September 4, 2000. Keiller testified that Hoffpauir told him Hale told her he had gone to Sanoubane's apartment that day to collect money from Crosson.
Officer Martin Devore also testified regarding Crosson's violent temper. He stated that he had spoken with Hale on September 4 and Hale informed him that Sanoubane had told him Crosson became angry and destructive during arguments and damaged the wall and the door of her apartment, punching a hole in the wall. Finally, Detective William Hanse testified for the defense regarding his conversation with Sanoubane's mother several hours after the discovery of Sanoubane's body. Her mother told Hanse about a long history of repeated abuse of Sanoubane by Crosson. Sanoubane's mother also told Hanse that Sanoubane was surprisingly tolerant of the abuse she received from Crosson.
The State's rebuttal witnesses testified generally that from the afternoon of September 3 to the early morning of September 4, 2000 they were with Crosson. The testimony basically related the following events. Two of Crosson's friends went to his apartment in Cedar Rapids on the afternoon of September 3 and hung out until approximately seven or eight o'clock that night when they all went to Iowa City, picked up some girls, and went to a bar. When the bars closed they all ate at Perkins in Iowa City, went back to Crosson's apartment in Cedar Rapids, and all spent the rest of the night there listening to music until the sun came up at which point Crosson's friends left.
Thus, through the testimony of the defense witnesses described above Robinson attempted to show Crosson as a person with a very violent temperament, a history of repeated abuse of Sanoubane, and that he was at her apartment at or around the time of her murder. The State attempted to rebut this testimony by offering testimony which placed Crosson nowhere near Sanoubane's apartment at or around the time of her death and thus made it impossible for him to have committed the crime.
We conclude the testimony from the State's four rebuttal witnesses was offered to rebut the defendant's implications that Crosson, who had a violent temperament, had the opportunity to kill Sanoubane by being at her apartment at about the time of her murder. Therefore, the rebuttal evidence was not improper and the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to present such evidence.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Our scope of review and many of the standards of review that apply in sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are set forth in State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 333-34 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999) and need not be repeated here. The following additional standards are applicable as well. We give consideration to all of the evidence, not just that supporting the verdict. State v. Schmidt, 588 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 1998). Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury was free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence. State v. Anderson, 517 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 1994). The credibility of witnesses, in particular, is for the jury. A jury is free to believe or disbelieve any testimony as it chooses and to give as much weight to the evidence as, in its judgment, such evidence should receive. State v. Liggins, 557 N.W.2d 263, 269 (Iowa 1996); State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993). The very function of the jury is to sort out the evidence and place credibility where it belongs. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d at 673.
The State correctly acknowledges that the evidence in this case was largely circumstantial. However, it is well established that direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( p); State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 742 (Iowa 1995). Further, inferences from circumstantial evidence are a staple of the adversarial fact-finding system. State v. Schmidt, 588 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Iowa 1998).
Based on the evidence in the record as detailed above, including but not limited to Robinson's numerous footprints, fingerprints, and palm prints, some of which were in the victim's blood, found in Sanoubane's apartment; DNA evidence showing Robinson had recently had sexual intercourse with Sanoubane; DNA evidence showing Sanoubane's blood on Robinson's shirt; Robinson's changing stories which conveniently shifted each time to account for additional evidence against him as it came to light; and the lack of evidence that anyone else was in Sanoubane's apartment at or around the time of the incident; we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found Robinson guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. There is substantial evidence in the record to support Robinson's conviction.
III. CONCLUSION.
We conclude the district court did not err in overruling Robinson's motion to suppress, and did not abuse its discretion in permitting the challenged rebuttal evidence. We further conclude the district court was correct in finding the evidence sufficient to support Robinson's conviction.