Opinion
2016 KA 1594
06-02-2017
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ELIJAH MATHEWS ROBINSON
Joseph L. Waitz, Jr. District Attorney Jason P. Lyons Ellen D. Doskey Assistant District Attorneys Houma, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman Pass Christian, Mississippi Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Elijah Mathews Robinson
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER 650,428, DIVISION D, PARISH OF TERREBONNE
STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE DAVID W. ARCENEAUX, JUDGE Joseph L. Waitz, Jr.
District Attorney
Jason P. Lyons
Ellen D. Doskey
Assistant District Attorneys
Houma, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman
Pass Christian, Mississippi Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
Elijah Mathews Robinson BEFORE: HIGGINBOTHAM, THERIOT, AND CHUTZ, JJ.
Disposition: CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
CHUTZ, J.
Defendant, Elijah Mathews Robinson, was charged by grand jury indictment with first degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30(A)(1). He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. Defendant filed a "Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Notwithstanding Verdict" and a motion for new trial, both of which the trial court denied. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor, with the possibility of parole. Defendant then filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court also denied. Defendant now appeals, alleging a single assignment of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
Also charged in the same instrument was a codefendant, Devonte Smith, who pled guilty and whose conviction and sentence are not at issue in this appeal.
Defendant was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012).
FACTS
On September 23, 2012, Donovan Queen was living with his sister, his niece, and Tyrone Walls, Jr. (the victim) in a trailer located in Mobile Estates in Gray, Louisiana. Sometime in the afternoon or evening, Queen was standing outside of the trailer when a white truck occupied by an old man and young boy pulled up and asked for a type of marijuana known as "Reggie." Queen told the vehicle's occupants that he sold only higher quality marijuana, and they drove away.
Later the same evening, Queen was in the residence with his sister and Walls when there was a knock at the door. Queen looked outside the door and saw a tall (5'10" or 5'11") individual he estimated to be about fifteen or sixteen years old. He also saw a shorter male he estimated to be about twelve or thirteen years old. When Queen opened the door, the shorter male asked to buy seven grams of marijuana. Queen asked to see money, and the males showed him five twenty-dollar bills. At that time, Queen allowed the two individuals into the trailer, and he recognized the shorter male to be the "young boy" he had seen earlier that day in the white truck.
After letting the males inside, Queen walked toward the back bedroom to let Walls know someone wanted to buy marijuana. When he reached the bedroom, Queen noticed the males had followed him and instructed them to go back to the living room. Queen spoke briefly with Walls and his sister, and when he returned to the living room, the males were gone. Noticing that the trailer door was still open, Queen approached it, intending to close it. As Queen neared the door, two armed individuals barged inside. Queen testified at trial that one of the individuals was the fifteen or sixteen year old who had just been inside, and he was armed with a revolver. The other individual, who Queen did not see as well, was armed with a pump-action shotgun. Queen testified that the shotgun-wielding individual was not the same person as the short, twelve- or thirteen-year-old male who had just been inside the trailer.
The assailants instructed Queen to empty his pockets and lie down. Queen complied and lay face down on the floor as the individuals took his watch and phone. As Queen continued to lie on the floor, he heard several gunshots, which he estimated to be between five and seven in total. Queen stated the last gunshots were louder than the first few. After the gunshots ended and the assailants fled, Queen stood up and found Walls as he lay dying on the floor. Queen's sister was unharmed.
Detective Mitchell Legendre of the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff's Office was the lead investigator in Walls' case. During Detective Legendre's investigation, Queen informed him that he saw a picture of one of his assailants on Facebook. Queen ultimately identified the individual with the revolver as Devonte Smith. Detective Legendre also received an anonymous tip identifying defendant as one of the suspects in Walls' murder. Detective Legendre located defendant at school and transported him to the detective bureau for questioning
Defendant ultimately made a statement in which he admitted to being in the residence and possessing the shotgun. Defendant claimed he inadvertently shot Walls once in the shoulder during a scuffle instigated by Walls. Defendant attributed the rest of the gunshots, outside of one or two shotgun blasts that did not hit Walls, to Devonte. Defendant did not testify at trial
An autopsy revealed a total of eight wounds to the victim's body: five gunshot entry wounds (one by shotgun); two gunshot exit wounds; and one grazing powder burn. The state presented testimony from an accomplice, Herbert Smith, who was waiting in a car outside the trailer during the shooting. Herbert stated that defendant had the shotgun when he exited the car and Devonte had a handgun. Herbert noticed that when they returned to the vehicle, Devonte had the shotgun and defendant had something in his pocket that Smith thought was a handgun. During its cross-examination of Devonte (a defense witness), the state played an audio recording of Devonte's police interview in which he stated defendant took the revolver after the shotgun discharged. In his statement, Devonte said he heard three or four more shots after giving defendant the revolver and running from the trailer.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress his statement. He argues his statement was not freely and voluntarily made because the police threatened his mother with arrest to intimidate her into coercing him to confess.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 703(D) provides that on the trial of a motion to suppress, the burden is on the defendant to prove the ground of his motion, except the state shall have the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant. Before a purported confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that the statement was free and voluntary and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. La. R.S. 15:451. The confession of an accused of any age is valid only if it was given knowingly and voluntarily. State v. Fernandez, 96-2719 (La. 4/14/98), 712 So.2d 485, 487.
In Fernandez, the Louisiana Supreme Court overruled State in the Interest of Dino, 359 So.2d 586 (La.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S.Ct. 722, 58 L.Ed.2d 706 (1978), which previously mandated that, in order to introduce a juvenile's confession, the state must affirmatively show the juvenile engaged in a meaningful consultation with an attorney or informed parent, guardian, or other adult interested in his welfare before he waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. The Fernandez court reinstated the totality of the circumstances standard as the basis for determining the admissibility of juvenile confessions. Thus, all of the facts and circumstances must be reviewed to determine whether a juvenile's confession was freely given. Fernandez, 712 So.2d at 489-90.
Among the factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of a juvenile's confession are the juvenile's youth, experience, comprehension, and the presence or absence of an interested adult. The special needs of juveniles are analogous to the special needs of individuals with mental deficiencies and are factors to be considered. The waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights in making a confession or statement does not require a higher level of mental capacity than his level of competency to enter a plea of guilty, to assist counsel at trial, to waive his right to an attorney, or to waive other constitutional rights. State ex rel. J.M., 99-1271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 6/30/99), 743 So.2d 228, 229-30. The testimony of a police officer alone can be sufficient to prove the juvenile's statements were freely and voluntarily given. Id. at 231.
When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial court's discretion, i.e., unless the ruling is not supported by reliable evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 281. However, a trial court's legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751.
In the instant case, the record fully supports the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Detective Legendre testified at the suppression hearing. He testified no questioning of defendant took place between the initial contact at defendant's school and his transport to the detective bureau. At the detective bureau, defendant and his mother, Mary Robinson, were allowed to speak alone in a private room for approximately eight minutes, until Ms. Robinson indicated they were ready to speak to the detectives. At that time, Detective Legendre advised Ms. Robinson he would like to interview her first. Ms. Robinson was moved to a different room and advised of her Miranda rights, at which time she gave an audio-recorded statement in which she indicated defendant had told her about the incident. Thereafter, Ms. Robinson was again allowed to consult with defendant, and they again indicated a willingness to speak with Detective Legendre. Defendant was informed of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver form. At no time did defendant or his mother request a lawyer or indicate that defendant wanted to stop speaking to the police.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). --------
Mary Robinson was called as a defense witness at the suppression hearing. She testified that during an unrecorded portion of her discussion with Detective Legendre, she was advised that she would go to jail if defendant did not give a complete statement or if she failed to talk.
Detective Legendre testified in rebuttal at the suppression hearing. He denied making any of the above threats to Ms. Robinson, and he also noted Ms. Robinson and defendant were given a chance to add to their statements, but chose not to do so. Additionally, at the end of his statement, defendant answered affirmatively when asked if the statement was given of his own free will.
The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the trial court; its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the confession are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. Whether a showing of voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case-by-case basis with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. State v. Guidry, 93-1091, (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/94), 635 So.2d 731, 733-34, writ denied, 94-0960 (La. 7/1/94), 639 So.2d 1163. Once the trial court has determined that the state has met its burden of proof with respect to voluntariness of the confession, its decision is entitled to great weight on review. See State v. Ondek, 584 So.2d 282, 293 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 586 So.2d 539 (La. 1991).
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court stated, "I simply don't think that what Ms. Robinson says happened is what happened." Thus, the trial court made a credibility determination in choosing to believe Detective Legendre's testimony over that of Ms. Robinson. The court noted Ms. Robinson's signing of two different Miranda forms (her own and defendant's), indicating that no coercion, threats, or promises had been made. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court's credibility determinations were an abuse of discretion, so they will not be disturbed on appeal.
Because the trial court did not believe Ms. Robinson was threatened into coercing defendant to making his statement, the evidence indicates the state adequately met its burden of proving the free and voluntary nature of defendant's statement. Defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, allowed to consult with his mother twice, and ultimately agreed he was not forced to make his statement. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress the statement.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.