Voicing their disenchantment with the voluntariness standard, several states have elected in recent years to adopt a per se exclusionary rule in order to combat what many perceive to be an increase in the number of flagrant violations of the prompt production requirement. Webster v. State, 59 Del. 54, 213 A.2d 298, 301 (1965); Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del. 35, 212 A.2d 886, 892 (1965); Larkin v. United States, 144 A.2d 100, 103 (D.C. App. 1958); Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888, 889 (Fla. 1971); ( but see State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262, 264 (Fla. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 285 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973)); State v. Benbo, Mont., 570 P.2d 894, 900 (1977); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 370 A.2d 301, 306-307 (Pa. 1977). See State v. Vollhardt, 157 Conn. 25, 244 A.2d 601, 607 (1968) (construing statutory codification of Mallory rule); and see People v. Williams, 68 Cal.App.3d 36, 137 Cal.Rptr. 70, 75 (1977) (adopting per se rule with respect to line-up identification evidence, but retaining voluntariness standard for confessions).
The prevailing rule throughout the nation at the time was to the same effect. West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968); Mosley v. State, 246 Ark. 358, 438 S.W.2d 311 (1969); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407; State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262 (FLa.App. 1973); American Law Institute, Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure, pp. 361-62 (1975). From these authorities it is abundantly clear that neither the courts nor law enforcement authorities in Louisiana were aware that a juvenile's custodial interrogation could not under any circumstance be conducted without consultation with attorney, parent or adult as set forth in Dino.
The validity of the waiver and voluntariness of the confession are determined from the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311 (1966); Mosley v. State, 246 Ark. 358, 438 S.W.2d 311 (1969); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert. denied 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1968); State v. Roberts, Fla.App., 274 So.2d 262 (1973); West v. United States (5th Cir.) 399 F.2d 467 (1968); American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, pp. 361-362 (1975). In State v. Gullings, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
PER CURIAM. This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 274 So.2d 262 (1973). Our jurisdiction is based upon conflict between this case and In Re A.J.A., 248 So.2d 290 (Fla.App. 1971).
The Florida Supreme Court approved the District Court's decision "[i]n view of the explicit mandatory language" of the statute. Roberts v. State, 285 So.2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1973), quashing this Court's decision in State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262 (Fla.App.1st, 1973). But the 1973 Legislature revised ยง 39.03(3), F.S., and substituted a milder requirement that the child "taken into custody" be delivered to the intake officer "without unreasonable delay."
In my view, the reliance by the dissenting opinion upon the Supreme Court's decision in Jesse Obendale Roberts is unavailing. The Roberts decision explicitly is founded upon the mandate of Section 39.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., relating to juveniles, whereas the Roberts court implicitly approved this court's holding in State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262, wherein we held that an accused waives his Section 901.23 F.S.A. rights if he makes a confession following the giving of the Miranda warnings in accordance with Pettyjohn v. United States, supra, and O'Neal v. United States, supra. For the above reasons, I concur in the reversal.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed on authority of Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1969); State v. Roberts, 274 So.2d 262 (Fla.App. 1973); and Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S. App.D.C. 69, 419 F.2d 651. SPECTOR, C.J., and RAWLS and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.