Opinion
No. 56272-0-I.
May 30, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 05-8-00652-0, Harry J. McCarthy, J., entered June 16, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Nielsen Broman Koch Pllc, Attorney at Law, 1908 E. Madison St, Seattle, WA 98122.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Terence Roger Carlstrom, King Co Prosecutors Ofc, 516 3rd Ave Ste W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2390.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
R.L. contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first degree reckless burning because the State did not introduce evidence that his behavior was a gross deviation from that of a reasonable 12-year-old in the same circumstances. In the alternative, R.L. requests that we remand for additional findings because the trial court did not specifically find that his behavior was a gross deviation from that of a reasonable 12-year-old in the same circumstances. We find that there was sufficient evidence and that the trial court's findings were adequate.
FACTS
On February 13, 2005, R.L.'s mother and stepfather sent him outside to retrieve some candy from the family car. R.L. did not find the candy, but did find a cigarette lighter in the car door. He lit a cardboard air freshener on fire with the lighter, and then blew it out. R.L. had seen his stepfather do the same thing to get rid of a bad smell in the car. R.L. saw that the air freshener was still smoking when he left the car. R.L. told his sister that he had lit an air freshener on fire. His sister told their parents, and R.L.'s stepfather went outside to put out the fire. By the time the firefighters arrived, there was no smoke or fire remaining. The car had burning and charring on the left side of the steering column and the driver's side floorboard.
R.L. had previously gotten into trouble because of a fire. In October 2004, he had lit some balls of paper on fire with a cigarette lighter and had thrown them off his apartment balcony while they were still smoking. The arson investigator had recommended that R.L. participate in a program that would teach him the dangers of fire.
The State charged R.L. with second degree arson for the car fire. The State later amended the information to include the alternative charge of first degree reckless burning. The trial court acquitted R.L. on the arson charge, but did find R.L. guilty of first degree reckless burning. R.L. appeals.
ANALYSIS I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
R.L. contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless burning. He claims that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to show that his conduct grossly deviated from what a reasonable 12-year-old would have done in the same circumstances.
A person is guilty of first degree reckless burning when he or she `recklessly damages . . . any vehicle . . . by knowingly causing a fire or explosion.' RCW 9A.48.040(1). A person acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur, and that disregard is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. RCW 9A.08.010(c). Juveniles are held to the standard of a reasonable juvenile of the same age and circumstances. See State v. Marshall, 39 Wn. App. 180, 183-84, 692 P.2d 855 (1984) (15-year-old defendant convicted of manslaughter held to the standard of a reasonable 15-year-old). The standard of conduct for a reasonable juvenile is within the knowledge of the average fact-finder; no expert testimony is required. Marshall, 39 Wn. App. at 184. In determining whether the evidence is sufficient, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
The evidence here was sufficient. R.L.'s mother testified that she had told him never to `mess' with lighters or matches, as there could be a fire and someone could get hurt. She also testified that she does not allow R.L. to play with lighters or to use them outside her presence. R.L.'s stepfather testified that he had told R.L. that he should not play with fire. R.L. himself told one of the investigators who had responded to the 2004 incident that he had been taught in school that it is wrong to `mess' with fire. R.L. testified that when he lit the air freshener, he was `just playing around.' He also testified that his parents had taught him not to `mess' with fire before the current incident.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that R.L. acted recklessly; i.e., in gross deviation from the behavior of a 12-year-old in similar circumstances. He knew from his parents and his school that it was wrong to play with fire and lighters, and that he was not supposed to use lighters outside his mother's presence. In fact, he had previously gotten in trouble for lighting paper on fire. Yet he still used a lighter to light the air freshener on fire. The State introduced sufficient evidence to show recklessness.
R.L. contends that the record suggests that he acted as any reasonable 12-year-old would have. He points to testimony that he works with fire while cooking, that he has been allowed to light incense in the house, and that he has seen his stepfather light air fresheners in the car and blow them out without damaging the car. However, viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable 12-year-old in R.L.'s circumstances would still have known that using a cigarette lighter to light an air freshener on fire outside the presence of his parents was wrong. R.L.'s claim fails.
II. Required Findings
R.L. argues that the trial court failed to make a finding that his behavior was a gross deviation from what a reasonable 12-year-old would do in the same situation. He asserts that we must remand to the juvenile court to enter the appropriate findings.
JuCR 7.11(d) requires that the juvenile court `enter written findings and conclusions in a case that is appealed. The findings shall state the ultimate facts as to each element of the crime and the evidence upon which the court relied in reaching its decision.' The trial court did just that. The court found that R.L. did not have permission to play with cigarette lighters, or to light any fires in the car. The trial court also found that R.L. knew his parents and school had told him not to play with fire or lighters. The trial court further found that:
[R.L.] knew that lighting air fresheners on fire was wrong and it was dangerous. He knew that harm could be done as a result of the fire and that the fire could damage the car. [R.L.] had past experience using cigarette lighters, and knew that it was dangerous to use the lighters in the way that he did. [R.L.] knew that it was wrong to light fires in the car.
The trial court concluded that the State had proven all of the elements of first degree reckless burning beyond a reasonable doubt, and specifically found all of the elements, including that R.L. had recklessly caused the damage. These factual findings support the court's conclusion that R.L. acted recklessly.
R.L.'s complaint with the court's findings appears to be that the court did not explicitly make a finding that R.L.'s behavior was a gross deviation from that of a reasonable 12-year-old in the same circumstances. But JuCR 7.11(d) does not require that the trial court specifically state that the underlying definitions of the elements of the crime are established. The rule only requires findings as to the ultimate facts as to each element of the crime and the evidence upon which the court relied, sufficient for the appellate court to determine from the record and the findings that the standard was met. R.L. has not cited any case law to the contrary. Thus, the fact that the court concluded that R.L. was reckless and found facts supporting that conclusion is enough the court was not also required to explicitly state that R.L.'s behavior grossly deviated from that of a reasonable 12-year-old in similar circumstances. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
APPELWICK, COLEMAN and AGID, JJ.