Opinion
No. 92 TRD 00569.
Decided March 19, 1992.
John J. Lohn, City Prosecutor, for plaintiff.
Daniel J. Marco, for defendant.
This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss a charge of violating R.C. 4511.12. The defense argues: (1) the statute is being used to enforce a resolution of the Medina County Board of Commissioners that is unconstitutional in that it denies defendant George E. Rivers equal protection of the law and unfairly discriminates against the trucking industry; and (2) the resolution is in excess of the statutory authority of the board of commissioners.
The state of Ohio did not oppose the motion on the ground that the resolution is in excess of statutory authority. The prosecutor indicated at the hearing that he had sought an opinion from the Medina County Prosecuting Attorney regarding the action of the board of commissioners, but had received no response as of the date of the hearing.
Because both parties agree with regard to the lack of statutory authority of the board of commissioners to enact the resolution in question, the court makes no decision concerning the constitutional issues raised, although it notes that municipal ordinances have withstood a similar challenge. Brook Park v. Short (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 519, 573 N.E.2d 168.
Although the parties themselves agree that the resolution in question exceeds the authority of the board of commissioners, when a party seeks dismissal of a case on this basis, the court will independently examine the issues presented.
On May 20, 1991, the Medina County Board of Commissioners adopted Resolution 91-396 to prohibit through truck traffic on a section of Lake Road between U.S. Route 224 and Wedgewood Road (State Route 162). This resolution provides "that through truck traffic involving any truck in excess of four tons be prohibited" on a designated section of Lake Road. The resolution specifies that its authority is derived from R.C. 4511.07(I), which provides that local authorities may adopt regulations "[r]egulating the use of certain streets by vehicles, streetcars, or trackless trolleys."
There is a specific statute (R.C. 5577.08) that authorizes a board of commissioners to enact resolutions classifying roads with reference to maximum weights. This statute provides that "[t]he classifications made by the board under this section shall not apply to vehicles of a weight of five tons or less for vehicle and load."
The first issue is the authority of the board of commissioners pursuant to R.C. 4511.07(I) to enact a weight limitation as a local traffic regulation.
There is no dispute that the board of commissioners is a "local authority" as defined by R.C. 4511.01(AA) ("local authorities" means "every county * * * having authority to adopt police regulations under the constitution and laws of this state") and has authority to enact resolutions pursuant to R.C. 4511.07.
R.C. 4511.07 is a general statute allowing a board of commissioners or other local authorities to enact local traffic regulations. It allows such local authorities to enact and enforce local regulations such as are covered by R.C. Chapter 4511 (traffic laws — operation of motor vehicles) and by R.C. Chapter 4513 (traffic laws — equipment; loads). Although R.C. 4513.33 deals with the weight limits, this section establishes only the methodology for weighing vehicles and for amending weight limits and state routes within a local area. It is not relevant to the actions of the board of commissioners in this case.
R.C. 5577.08 is a special statutory provision establishing the authority of a board of commissioners to specify the maximum load allowable on county and township roads. Such classifications may not apply to vehicles of five tons or less. As a special provision, R.C. 5577.08 prevails over R.C. 4511.07. See R.C. Section 1.51 (special or local provision prevails over general). The authority of a board of commissioners to enact minimum load limits is therefore governed by R.C. 5577.08 and not by R.C. 4511.07.
Generally, a resolution adopted by another branch of government is presumed to be valid. However, a weight limit classification system must be enacted according to statute before any presumption of validity would apply. State v. Copen (Apr. 14, 1989), Geauga App. No. 1444, unreported, 1989 WL 36292.
The resolution of the Medina County Board of Commissioners attempts to regulate weight limits below five tons. This directly violates the statute authorizing a resolution of this nature.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is appropriate in that the board of county commissioners did not have statutory authority to create this regulation in its present form and, therefore, this court cannot enforce it in its present form.
The motion to dismiss is granted and costs in this matter are assessed to the state of Ohio.
So ordered.