State v. Rivera

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Brown

    No. E2019-00223-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Jun. 25, 2020)

    Lack of remorse relates to Defendant's amenability to correction. State v. Kristi Dance Oakes, No. E2006-01795-CA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2792934, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 2007)(citing State v. Edward Arnold Rivera, No. W2001-00857-CCA-R9-CD, 2002 WL 1482655, at *3)(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2002)("Lack of remorse is an appropriate factor for a trial court to consider in deciding whether to grant judicial diversion.")). There is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision, and applying a presumption of reasonableness, we affirm the decision to deny judicial diversion.

  2. State v. Denton

    No. M2009-02546-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Determining that a defendant's lack of remorse or refusal to accept responsibility for his or her actions relates to the amenability to correction and is an appropriate factor to consider in deciding whether to grant or deny judicial diversion

    See State v. Kristi Dance Oakes, No. E2006-01795-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2792934, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Sept. 27, 2007) (citing State v. Edward Arnold Rivera, No. W2001-00857-CCA-R9-CD, 2002 WL 1482655, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Feb. 4, 2002) ("Lack of remorse is an appropriate factor for a trial court to consider in deciding whether to grant judicial diversion.")). These factors are sufficient to support the trial court's denial of judicial diversion.

  3. State v. Kristi Dance Oak

    No. E2006-01795-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. Sep. 27, 2007)   Cited 6 times

    Lack of remorse is an appropriate factor for a trial court to consider in deciding whether to grant judicial diversion. See State v. Edward Arnold Rivera, No. W2001-00857-CCA-R9-CD, 2002 WL 1482655, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Jackson, Feb. 4, 2002). Even though there is some evidence in the record indicating that the Defendant is sorry for what transpired, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving more weight to the evidence of lack of remorse.

  4. State v. Brooks

    228 S.W.3d 640 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that "private individuals [can] be responsible for abusing positions of trust when working with the public at large"

    In support of the Defendant's position, the term "public trust" is often used to refer to government employees or elected officials. See, e.g., State v. Johnny Quent Crudup, No. M2004-01646-CCA-R9-CO, 2005 WL 1378774 (Tenn.Crim.App., Nashville, June 9, 2005) (holding that a city government employee who misused his employee credit card violated the public trust); State v. Donna F. Benson, No. W2001-01926-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31296110 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Oct. 8, 2002) (holding that a county criminal court clerk that accepted bribes violated the public trust); State v. Edward Arnold Rivera, No. W2001-00857-CCA-R9-CD, 2002 WL 1482655 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Feb. 4, 2002) (holding that a sheriff's deputy selling confiscated property for personal profit violated the public trust); State v. Tony Williams, No.W2001-00788-CCA-R9-CD, 2001 WL 1516979 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Nov. 21, 2001) (holding that a pretrial services officer accepting bribes violated the public trust). However, the factor of abuse of a "position of trust" does allow the district attorney to deny pretrial diversion to individuals in the private sector.