Opinion
NUMBER 2016 KA 0303
09-19-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. JOSEPH WENDELL RINEY
Joe Waitz, D.A. Herbert W. Barnes, Jr., A.D.A. Ellen D. Doskey Houma, LA Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman Louisiana Appellate Project Covington, LA Attorney for Appellant Defendant - Joseph Wendell Riney
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the 32nd Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Terrebonne, Louisiana
Trial Court Number 676,311 Honorable George J. Larke, Jr., Judge Joe Waitz, D.A.
Herbert W. Barnes, Jr., A.D.A.
Ellen D. Doskey
Houma, LA Attorneys for Appellee
State of Louisiana Bertha M. Hillman
Louisiana Appellate Project
Covington, LA Attorney for Appellant
Defendant - Joseph Wendell Riney BEFORE: WELCH, CRAIN, AND HOLDRIDGE, JJ. WELCH, J.
The defendant, Joseph Wendell Riney, was charged by grand jury indictment with aggravated rape (of victim under the age of thirteen), a violation of La. R.S. 14:42 (prior to its amendment by 2015 La. Acts, No. 184, which redesignated aggravated rape as first degree rape). The defendant pled not guilty. The defendant filed a motion to suppress (styled by defense counsel as a motion in limine) any unrecorded inculpatory statements. A hearing was held on the matter and the motion to suppress was denied. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals, designating the trial court's failure to grant his motion to suppress as his sole assignment of error. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
From 2011 to 2013, C.N. lived with her mother and two younger brothers in a house on Cherry Street in Houma. At some point in 2011, the defendant briefly dated C.N.'s mother. During this period, the defendant began sleeping over at the family home. After the relationship ended, the defendant and C.N.'s mother remained friends, and the defendant continued to sleep at her house a few times a week. During this time, the defendant repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse with C.N. In 2013, ten-year-old C.N. became pregnant, and gave birth to a child in June of 2014, when she was eleven years old. In January of 2014, C.N. informed her mother of the defendant's actions and the police were notified. DNA tests later established the defendant as the biological father of C.N.'s child.
Victims of sex offenses are referred to by their initials. See La. R.S. 46:1844(W).
Following C.N.'s disclosure to her mother of the defendant's actions in January of 2014, the defendant was brought to the police station for questioning. Sergeant Travis Theriot and Detective Keith Craft, both with the Houma Police Department, conducted the videotaped interview of the defendant together. Following the interview, the recording equipment was turned off, and Detective Craft left the interview room. Sergeant Theriot remained in the interview room with the defendant. During this period, the defendant made potentially incriminating comments. Sergeant Theriot turned the video camera back on and conducted, alone, a second interview of the defendant. Sergeant Theriot subsequently testified at trial as to the content of defendant's unrecorded statements.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the motion to suppress his unrecorded statements made to Sergeant Theriot should have been granted. According to the defendant, the State failed to establish that it was clear to him that the unrecorded statement he made to Sergeant Theriot could be used against him; as such, the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress his unrecorded, inculpatory statements, which were presented to the jury through Sergeant Theriot's testimony.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Since the general admissibility of a confession (or inculpatory statement) is a question for the trial court, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony are accorded great weight and will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. See State v. Patterson, 572 So.2d 1144, 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So.2d 11 (La. 1991); State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. In determining whether the ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress was correct, we are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion. We may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case. State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1223 n.2 (La. 1979).
It is well-settled the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) protects an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege during incommunicado interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere. In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, the Supreme Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Thus, before a confession or inculpatory statement made during a custodial interrogation may be introduced into evidence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was first advised of his Miranda rights, that he voluntarily and intelligently waived those rights, and that the statement was made freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D); La. R.S. 15:451; Hunt, 25 So.3d at 754; see also State v. Patterson, 572 So.2d at 1150.
Whether or not a showing of voluntariness has been made is analyzed on a case-by-case basis with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. State v. Williams, 2001-0944 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 932, 944, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 135. Testimony of the interviewing police officer alone may be sufficient to prove a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Maten, 2004-1718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 721, writ denied, 2005-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544.
We note initially that the defendant never confessed to raping C.N. During his first recorded statement, the defendant stated that he knew C.N. and her mother, and that he still slept at her house because it was close to his job. The defendant told the officers that he slept at his ex-girlfriend's [C.N.'s mother's] house "last night." The defendant also stated that he did not get along with C.N., nor did he pay much attention to her. The defendant denied that he ever touched C.N. Sergeant Theriot then informed the defendant of C.N.'s pregnancy, noting "not only is she pregnant, but she's pregnant for you." At this point, the defendant became quiet and stopped answering questions. When asked if C.N. got pregnant because she "came on" to him or because he raped her, the defendant responded, "neither one." When pressed for an answer, the defendant informed the officers he had nothing to say.
At the conclusion of the first recorded statement, Detective Craft left the interview room to attend to paperwork required for booking purposes. Sergeant Theriot testified at the motion to suppress hearing and at trial that he stayed in the interview room and spoke to the defendant, even though the defendant was not being recorded at this point. Sergeant Theriot asked the defendant if he wanted him to explain exactly what he was being charged with. After informing the defendant of the specific charges, the defendant began "making some admissions" to the sergeant.
According to Sergeant Theriot, the defendant told him that he had a sex addiction, and that he had not known what he had done until the next day because he had taken some pills (Percocet and Soma). Sergeant Theriot, at this point, told the defendant, that he was going to "put the recorder back on." The video camera was turned on and the defendant was recorded a second time, this time speaking only with Sergeant Theriot. The defendant said very little during this interview. Sergeant Theriot noted the defendant had told him "off tape" that he had taken Percocet and Soma. When asked what he would want to say to C.N., the defendant said "I'm sorry." Sergeant Theriot asked the defendant three questions, in quick succession: Did he force C.N.?; did he threaten C.N.?; and did C.N. say stop? The defendant responded "nope" to each question. At the motion to suppress hearing and trial, Sergeant Theriot testified that it was only minutes between the two recordings.
While not a confession to the crime of aggravated rape, the admission by the defendant, via the trial testimony of Sergeant Theriot, that he was a sex addict and had taken pills is arguably inculpatory, and Miranda warnings were required. The record demonstrates that the required Miranda warnings were given to the defendant herein.
In the first recorded interview of the defendant, conducted by both Detective Craft and Sergeant Theriot, Detective Craft Mirandized the defendant before any questioning about the crime began. The detective verbally informed the defendant of each of his rights. Specifically, the defendant was told he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him in court; that he had the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before questioning began and to have the lawyer present during questioning; if he could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for him before any questioning if he wished; he also had the right to stop answering questions at any time. When asked if he understood his rights the defendant indicated that he did by nodding his head. Detective Craft then read aloud the paragraph directly below the Miranda warnings, which stated:
I have read or have had read to me this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
The defendant, Detective Craft, and Sergeant Theriot all signed and dated the warning as to rights form. Sergeant Theriot testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he never threatened the defendant in any way, and never put him under duress before or during the time that he talked to him.
The State clearly showed the defendant was advised his Miranda rights prior to making any inculpatory statements. The videotaped interviews also clearly established that the defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given without influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menace, or promises. See La. R.S. 15:451; State v. King, 563 So.2d 449, 453 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 610 (La. 1990). Nothing in the record indicates in the brief time between recorded interviews that Sergeant Theriot did anything improper.
The defendant suggests in his brief that he was not aware his unrecorded statements could be used against him; but nothing in the record indicates why the defendant would have been under this misapprehension. The defendant was clearly informed by Detective Craft that anything he said could be used against him in court, not anything he said only while being recorded. In proving an intelligent waiver of the rights to silence, self-incrimination, and counsel, the State need not show that a defendant was aware of the full evidentiary significance of his statements. See State v. Warren, 536 So.2d 529, 533 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
When a suspect has been informed of and has validly waived his Miranda rights during his initial questioning by police, those rights need not be repeated before each subsequent interrogation unless the evidence shows either a significant break in the interrogation process, such as a specific request for assistance of counsel, or police coercion. See State v. Harvill, 403 So.2d 706, 709 (La. 1981). The defendant had been informed of his Miranda rights less than an hour prior to speaking to Sergeant Theriot while not being videotaped. While speaking with Sergeant Theriot at this time, the defendant never invoked his right to remain silent or his right to have an attorney present. In speaking to Sergeant Theriot, the defendant continued to waive his Miranda rights, including and especially the right against self-incrimination. Accord State v. Leger, 2005-0011 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108, 129-31, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1221, 127 S.Ct. 1279, 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007).
In State v. Leger, the defendant's unrecorded incriminating statement, following two videotaped statements, was found to be admissible at trial via the testimony of a police officer, even where the unrecorded statement was obtained almost eighteen hours after the conclusion of the defendant's interrogation on the previous day by police, and where the defendant was not Mirandized again before giving the unrecorded statement. --------
Moreover, even if we did find the trial court's admission of the unrecorded inculpatory statement into evidence erroneous, such an admission would have been harmless error. The admission of a confession (or inculpatory statement) is a trial error, similar in both degree and kind to the erroneous admission of other types of evidence which must be reviewed to determine whether the error was harmless. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); State v. Montejo, 2006-1807 (La. 5/11/10), 40 So.3d 952, 975, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1082, 131 S.Ct. 656, 178 L.Ed.2d 513 (2010). An error is harmless if it is unimportant in relation to the whole and the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Koon, 96-1208 (La. 5/20/97), 704 So.2d 756, 763, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1001, 118 S.Ct. 570, 139 L.Ed.2d 410 (1997).
C.N. gave birth to a child when she was eleven years old. DNA evidence, introduced at trial through the testimony of an expert, proved that the defendant was the biological father of C.N.'s child. The defendant had sexual intercourse with C.N. when she was under the age of thirteen years and, as such, committed the crime of aggravated rape (now, first degree rape). Considering the foregoing, we are convinced that even if the defendant's inculpatory statement had been erroneously introduced into evidence, the guilty verdict actually rendered was unattributable to the error. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); La. C.Cr.P. art. 921.
The assignment of error is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.