State v. Rincon

2 Citing cases

  1. State v. Bernacki

    SC 18674 (Conn. Sep. 26, 2012)

    In the wake of the Supreme Court's divided decision in Dixon, our research reveals that there is a split among the states about the proper Blockburger analysis to apply in determining whether prosecutions for violations of both criminal contempt statutes and statutes criminalizing the underlying conduct violate constitutional double jeopardy protections. For states following Justice Scalia s approach, see Penn v. State, 73 Ark. App. 424, 428, 44 S.W.3d 746 (2001); State v. Johnson, 676 So. 2d 408, 410-11 (Fla. 1996); Tanks v. State, 292 Ga. App. 177, 179, 663 S.E.2d 812 (2008); State v. Rincon, Iowa Court of Appeals, Docket No. 2-132/11-0612, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 303 (April 25, 2012); State v. Gonzales, 123 N.M. 337, 340-41, 940 P.2d 195 (App. 1997); State v. Gilley, 135 N.C. App. 519, 526-27, 522 S.E.2d 111 (1999), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 528, 549 S.E.2d 860 (2001); Commonwealth v. Yerby, 544 Pa. 578, 587-88, 679 A.2d 217 (1996); Ex parte Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d 735, 740-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also People v. Allen, 868 P.2d 379, 384-85 (Colo.) (describing divergent approaches of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia and assuming applicability of Justice Scalia's approach in rejecting double jeopardy claim on ground that trial court order did not incorporate "all elements of criminal trespass), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 842, 115 S. Ct. 129, 130 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1994).

  2. State v. Bernacki

    307 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2012)   Cited 26 times
    Recognizing that a double jeopardy claim presents a question of law

    In the wake of the Supreme Court's divided decision in Dixon, our research reveals that there is a split among the states about the proper Blockburger analysis to apply in determining whether prosecutions for violations of both criminal contempt statutes and statutes criminalizing the underlying conduct violate constitutional double jeopardy protections. For states following Justice Scalia's approach, see Penn v. State, 73 Ark.App. 424, 428, 44 S.W.3d 746 (2001); State v. Johnson, 676 So.2d 408, 410–11 (Fla.1996); Tanks v. State, 292 Ga.App. 177, 179, 663 S.E.2d 812 (2008); State v. Rincon, Iowa Court of Appeals, Docket No. 2–132/11–0612, 2012 WL 1439129, 2012 Iowa App. LEXIS 303 (April 25, 2012);State v. Gonzales, 123 N.M. 337, 340–41, 940 P.2d 185 (App.1997); State v. Gilley, 135 N.C.App. 519, 526–27, 522 S.E.2d 111 (1999), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 528, 549 S.E.2d 860 (2001); Commonwealth v. Yerby, 544 Pa. 578, 587–88, 679 A.2d 217 (1996); Ex parte Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d 735, 740–41 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); see also People v. Allen, 868 P.2d 379, 384–85 (Colo.) (describing divergent approaches of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia and assuming applicability of Justice Scalia's approach in rejecting double jeopardy claim on ground that trial court order did not incorporate “all elements” of criminal trespass), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 842, 115 S.Ct. 129, 130 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). For states preferring the approach of Chief Justice Rehnquist, as more consistent with their jurisdictions' narrower, more technical approaches to the double jeopardy analysis under Blockburger, see University of Cincinnati v. Tuttle, Ohio Court of Appeals, Docket No. C–080357, 2009 WL 2836433, *3, 2009 Ohi