d its decision on the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; see id., at 751, 218 A.3d 696 ; which requires that the sentencing court "[c]onsider" how the scientific and psychological evidence showing the differences between a child's brain development and an adult's brain development counsels against the imposition of a lengthy sentence under which it is likely that the child will die while incarcerated. General Statutes § 54-91g (a) (1) and (2) ; see also State v. Riley , 190 Conn. App. 1, 26–28, 209 A.3d 646 (rejecting, on basis of plain language of § 54-91g, defendant's argument that language and legislative history of P.A. 15-84 created "a presumption against the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile defendant, and such exceedingly rare sentences can only be imposed after a specific finding that the juvenile being sentenced is permanently incorrigible, irreparably corrupt, or irretrievably depraved" (footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 333 Conn. 923, 217 A.3d 993 (2019). This certified appeal followed.

The defendant's claim that § 51-183c required recusal under the circumstances of this case presents a question of statutory interpretation, thereby invoking our plenary review. See State v. Riley , 190 Conn. App. 1, 8, 209 A.3d 646, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 923, 217 A.3d 993 (2019). "The principles that govern statutory construction are well established.