Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0530-11T4
03-27-2013
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JERMAIN RILES a/k/a GERMAIN RILES, Defendant-Appellant.
Jack Venturi Law, attorneys for appellant (Jack Venturi, on the brief). Bruce J. Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillet, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Marie McGovern, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Grall and Accurso.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 10-03-374.
Jack Venturi Law, attorneys for appellant (Jack Venturi, on the brief).
Bruce J. Kaplan, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillet, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Marie McGovern, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, defendant Jermain Riles pled guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a. He was sentenced to a two-year term of probation conditioned, among other things, on his compliance with such drug treatment as might be recommended following an evaluation for drug dependence. As authorized by Rule 3:5-7(d), defendant appeals contending that the judge erred in denying his motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.
To establish the validity of the search, the State produced a warrant authorizing the search of defendant's person, a wood frame house located at a specified address on Reservoir Road in an unnamed town, and a Lincoln Navigator with a specified New Jersey registration. The warrant indicates that it was issued after reviewing the affidavit of Lt. Paul Schuster of the New Brunswick Police Department. It includes handwritten notations indicating that it was signed in New Brunswick, Middlesex County, New Jersey at 9:56 p.m. on January 20, 2010. It bears a signature that is wholly illegible scrawled over a signature line that states nothing other than "JUDGE OF THE."
The State filed its brief in opposition to the suppression motion late, which led the judge to adjourn the motion and sanction the State $250 to compensate defense counsel for his time. At the second hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss the warrant on the ground that there was no indication that it was signed by a magistrate or judge or, if it was, that the judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant.
Although the State had a witness, Detective Yurkovic, present "in case any questions came up," Detective Yurkovic was not the officer listed as the affiant. At defense counsel's request, the judge asked the detective to wait outside the courtroom while the motion was argued. The State never asked to present his testimony. Instead, the State argued that a search warrant is presumed valid and that defendant had failed to overcome that presumption.
The judge rejected defendant's claim that the absence of any information identifying the judge or magistrate invalidated the warrant. The judge concluded that she was bound to follow Rule 3:5-7(g), which states that "[i]n the absence of bad faith, no search or seizure made with a warrant shall be deemed unlawful because of technical insufficiencies or irregularities in the warrant or in the papers or proceedings to obtain it, or in its execution."
The difficulty in this case is that there was absolutely no evidence indicating that this warrant was signed by a neutral magistrate or judge. Issuance by a neutral magistrate is not simply a technical requirement — it is the heart of the warrant requirement and the foundation for the presumption of validity afforded to a search conducted pursuant to a warrant.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, paragraphSee also State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 106 (1987) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02, 80 S. Ct. 168, 170-71, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134, 137-38 (1959), which discusses the origins of the Fourth Amendment and its purpose of eliminating measures like general warrants and writs of assistance that allowed "police control" to take the "place of judicial control"). In short, "[t]he [Fourth] Amendment sets a firm standard with respect to the essentials of a search warrant. . . . The crucial determination is to be made not by the police officer but by a neutral issuing judge." Novembrino, supra, 105 N.J. at 107 (quoting State v. Macri, 39 N.J. 250, 256-57 (1963)).
7 of the New Jersey Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. A basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is that "searches and seizures . . . without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 651 (1980). That is a fundamental precept of our own constitution. State v. Hutchins, 116 N.J. 457 (1989). The warrant requirement safeguards citizens by placing the determination of probable cause in the hands of a neutral magistrate before an arrest or search is authorized. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 147 (1964).
[State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104, 109-10 (1993).]
Given that the warrant did not identify the person who issued it, the State failed to demonstrate that this search was, in fact, conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge. In light of the fundamental and apparent defect and in the absence of any effort by the State to establish that the error was technical, the judge had no basis for concluding that this defect was technical and not fatal. The State could not rest on the presumed validity of the warrant in this circumstance. Accordingly, the judge erred in denying this motion to suppress. Defendant is entitled to vacate his guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION