The person's consent may be revoked, however, and section 322.261 prohibits the taking of a blood sample from a person who expressly objects to the chemical test. State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The issue, then, is whether appellant's consent to the breathalyzer test was freely and voluntarily given.

ADKINS, Justice. This is a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of a decision by the Third District Court of Appeal, reported at 355 So.2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), which conflicts with the decisions in State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), and Lytwyn v. State, 353 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). We have jurisdiction.

The implied consent laws of several jurisdictions expressly state that they apply to persons arrested for "any offense" arising out of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, and their courts have applied the statute to negligent homicide cases. See State v. Riggins (Fla.App. 1977), 348 So.2d 1209. However among the jurisdictions which have interpreted implied consent laws with operative language similar to Montana's, there has been a split of opinion. Some jurisdictions hold that their statutes do apply to negligent homicide prosecutions.

The rationale supporting the well-established rule that results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible, is equally applicable to the results of a sodium butathol test. See Sullivan v. State, 303 So.2d 632 (Fla. 1974); State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Crawford v. State, 321 So.2d 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), approved in State v. Crawford, 339 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1976). Also the trial judge properly excluded the testimony of the psychiatrist, Dr. Zimmer.

None of these cases, however, dealt with a situation in which a statute plainly indicates that a blood sample shall not be taken if the subject refuses to consent. See State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977), cert. dismissed, 362 So.2d 1056 (1978). The State's assertion that the legislature could not have intended to give up the right to obtain chemical tests under the rule laid down in Schmerber or pursuant to a proper warrant is unpersuasive.

After examining the reasoning in the case law of other jurisdictions which have addressed the issue, we arrive at the same conclusion as reached by the majority of those courts — that the language quoted from section 321B.7 prohibits the taking of a blood sample after the driver has refused police requests to submit to testing. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 366 So.2d 296, 322 n. 4 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978) ("The person cannot be compelled to submit to a test against his will. . . .") (dictum); Anchorage v. Geber, 592 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Alaska 1979); Campbell v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 549, 479 P.2d 685, 692 (1971) (driver has "physical power" to refuse to submit to the test); State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.App. 1977); Longino v. Cofer, 148 Ga. App. 341, 343, 251 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1978); Rossell v. City County of Honolulu, 59 Haw. 173, 182, 579 P.2d 663, 669 (1978) ("[I]t is essential that the police refrain from imposing the chemical tests when the arrested driver refuses to submit to such tests."); People v. Todd, 59 Ill.2d 534, 543, 322 N.E.2d 447, 454 (1975); State v. Bellino, 390 A.2d 1014, 1023 (Maine 1978); State v. Wilson, 92 N.M. 54, 56, 582 P.2d 826, 828 (1978); People v. Stratton, 286 App. Div. 323, 326, 143 N.Y.S.2d 362, 365 (1955), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 664, 133 N.E.2d 516, 150 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1956); Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316, 318 (Okla. Cr.App. 1971); State v. Annen, 12 Or. App. 203, 206, 504 P.2d 1400, 1401 (1973) ("[I]t is apparent that in some instances drivers have a statutory right under the Implied Consent Law to refuse to submit to any and all chemical sobriety tests."); Commonwealth v. Wolpert, 224 Pa. Super. 361, 370, 308 A.2d 120, 125 (1973).

.2d 375 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (blood sample taken from a defendant who was lawfully arrested for DUI not involving a traffic accident after he was injured in the county jail following his arrest held unauthorized by Sections 316.1932(1)(c), 316.1933(1), and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); State v. Prues, 478 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (blood sample taken from a defendant arrested for DUI involved in one-car traffic accident in which only the defendant was seriously injured held unauthorized under then-existing Section 316.1933(1) and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); McDonald v. State, 364 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (blood sample taken from defendant arrested for DUI where defendant objected to the taking of such sample held unauthorized under predecessor implied consent statutes and thus results of scientific test performed on such sample were inadmissible in evidence); State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (same), cert. dismissed, 362 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1978). B

That statute has been interpreted as barring the results of chemical tests as evidence unless the motorist first gives his consent to submit to the tests. State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Lytwyn v. State, 353 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); McDonald v. State, 364 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Smith v. State, 378 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1979); Sambrine v. State, 386 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1980). And, if the driver refuses consent, he must suffer the sanction of having his license suspended for the statutory period.

Affirmed. See State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), cert. dismissed, 362 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1978); Smith v. State, 378 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1979). DOWNEY, C.J., and ANSTEAD and MOORE, JJ., concur.

They received limited permission and anything obtained beyond the permissible test was properly the subject of a motion to suppress. See: Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Compare State v. Riggins, 348 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), certiorari dismissed 362 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1978). The order under review be and the same is hereby affirmed.