Section 321.463, under which defendant was charged, is unquestionably a penal statute. See State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Iowa 1968); State v. Balsley, 242 Iowa 845, 852, 48 N.W.2d 287, 291 (1951). Therefore, unless § 321.453 so governs as to take the case beyond the purview of § 321.463, a prosecution under the latter section would be proper.
As we have traditionally and repeatedly stated, “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.” State v. Brustkern, 170 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Iowa 1969) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Iowa 1968); State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 339–40, 132 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1965); accord State v. Jennie Coulter Day Nursery, 218 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974); Kruck v. Needles, 259 Iowa 470, 477, 144 N.W.2d 296, 301 (1966); Lever Bros. Co. v. Erbe, 249 Iowa 454, 469, 87 N.W.2d 469, 479 (1958); In re Guardianship of Wiley, 239 Iowa 1225, 1232, 34 N.W.2d 593, 596 (1948); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L.Rev. 417, 419 (1899). Policy arguments to amend statutes must be directed to the legislature.
[O]ne claiming an exception has the burden to show he comes fairly within the exception." Schnabel v. Alcester School Dist. No. 61-1, 295 N.W.2d 340, 342 (S.D. 1980) (citing Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 426, 92 N.W.2d 922, 924 (1958); State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Iowa 1968)). Therefore, the whole-blood cousins, as the party claiming the exception, had the burden of demonstrating that the inheritance came to the Decedent by descent, devise, or gift of some one of his ancestors not of the blood of the half-blood cousins.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that an exception in a statute, contrary to its general enacting clause, should be strictly construed and all doubts and implications should be resolved in favor of the general provision or rule rather than the exception. State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Iowa 1968); Wood Brothers Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 562, 1 N.W.2d 655, 661 (1942); Eddington v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 201 Iowa 67, 72, 202 N.W. 374, 377 (1925). If we apply this rule of statutory construction in this case, then the exemption for municipal liability in section 613A.4(4) should be strictly construed. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of the legislature's general provision for governmental liability in chapter 613A. For these reasons, we do not believe that section 364.16 can be construed to constitute an exception to municipal tort liability.
It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that exceptions to legislative enactments must be strictly construed. Schlemmer v. Buffalo R. P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1 (1907); Canadian Pac. Ry. v. United States, 73 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1934); State v. Christensen, 18 Wn.2d 7, 137 P.2d 512 (1943); City of Winfield v. Board of County Commissioners, 205 Kan. 333, 469 P.2d 424 (1970); Emporia Township v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860, 89 P.2d 919 (1939); State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499 (Iowa 1968); see also Insurance Co. of North America Cos. v. Sullivan, 56 Wn.2d 251, 352 P.2d 193 (1960). One who claims the benefit of such an exception has the burden of bringing himself clearly within it. Rheem Manufacturing Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961); Walling v. Reid, 139 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1943); Barlow v. Story, 120 Ga. App. 48, 169 S.E.2d 660 (1969); State v. Ricke, supra; 2 F. Horack, Jr., Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4936 (3d ed. supp. 1972).
"'" (Citation omitted.) Or as the Iowa Supreme Court said in State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Iowa 1968), "one claiming an exception has the burden to show `he comes fairly within the exception.'" In making its determination that the staff needed to be reduced, and in ultimately deciding that it should let appellee go and retain Anderson, it was essential that "the school board's decision be based upon competent, credible evidence."
[2] It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that exceptions to legislative enactments must be strictly construed. Schlemmer v. Buffalo R. P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 51 L.Ed. 681, 27 S.Ct. 407 (1907); Canadian Pac. Ry. v. United States, 73 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1934); State v. Christensen, 18 Wn.2d 7, 137 P.2d 512, 146 A.L.R. 1302 (1943); Winfield v. Board of County Comm'rs, 205 Kan. 333, 469 P.2d 424 (1970); Emporia v. Williams, 149 Kan. 860, 89 P.2d 919 (1939); State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499 (Iowa 1968); see also Insurance Co. of N. America Cos. v. Sullivan, 56 Wn.2d 251, 352 P.2d 193 (1960). One who claims the benefit of such an exception has the burden of bringing himself clearly within it. Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Rheem, 295 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1961); Walling v. Reid, 139 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1943); Barlow v. Story, 120 Ga. App. 48, 169 S.E.2d 660 (1969); State v. Ricke, supra; 2 F. Horack, Jr., Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4936 (3d ed. Supp. 1972).
The purpose and nature of Code §§ 321.463 and 321.453, with some applicable rules of statutory construction, having been by us heretofore set forth at length, need not be now repeated. See State v. Ricke, 160 N.W.2d 499 (Iowa); State v. Balsley, 242 Iowa 845, 850, 48 N.W.2d 287. See also Code § 4.1(2); Durant-Wilton Motors, Inc. v. Tiffin Fire Ass'n, 164 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa).
In construing statutes, courts may properly consider the evil sought to be remedied and the objects or purposes the legislative enactment seeks to obtain. State v. Ricke, Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 499, 501, and Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 718, 113 N.W.2d 755. The objectives of criminal sexual psychopath statutes are to, (1) protect society by sequestering the deviate so long as he remains a menace to others, and (2) subject him to treatment to the end he may recover from his existing psychopathic condition and be rehabilitated.