The class of vehicles is broader than the class of motor vehicles. See State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 741, 832 P.2d 801, 802 (Ct.App. 1992) (reasoning that "a `motor vehicle' is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category `vehicle'"). For example, a horse-drawn wagon would be a vehicle, but not a motor vehicle.
19(B) (2005) (defining "vehicle" as "every device in, upon[,] or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, . . . except devices moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks"); cf. NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.11(H) (2007) (defining "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails"); State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 741-42, 832 P.2d 801, 802-03 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a farm tractor is both a motor vehicle and a vehicle and, thus, an intoxicated person operating a farm tractor could be charged with violating Section 66-8-102(A)). Defendant's driving on a county road would qualify as driving "within this state" for purposes of Section 66-8-102(A).
{9} The Respondents ask us to go one step further in the interpretation of these statutes and request that this Court find a public/private distinction based on the type of activity that constitutes "driv[ing]" under Section 66-8-102. It is well settled that a defendant can be charged with DWI under this section if: (1) the defendant is intoxicated and driving a moving vehicle on a public highway, see, e.g., State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 120 N.M. 619, 632, 904 P.2d 1044, 1057 (1995); (2) the defendant is intoxicated and driving a moving vehicle on a private street or private property, see State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 741, 832 P.2d 801, 802 (Ct.App. 1992); or (3) the defendant is intoxicated and is in actual physical control of a non-moving vehicle on a public highway, see Boone, 105 N.M. at 226, 731 P.2d at 369; see also State v. Tafoya, 1997-NMCA-083, ¶ 5, 123 N.M. 665, 944 P.2d 894; Harrison, 115 N.M. 73, 846 P.2d 1082. These consolidated cases trigger the last remaining possible prong of the offense of DWI — whether a defendant can be charged with a violation of the DWI statute if he or she is intoxicated and in actual physical control of a non-moving vehicle on private property.
Our primary focus is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. See State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 690, 831 P.2d 989 (1992). In doing so, we examine the language used in the relevant statute.
{17} Interpreting "good working order" to mean that equipment on a vehicle is functioning for its intended use supports the public safety interests that are among the stated purposes of and are prevalent throughout the Motor Vehicle Code. See State v. Saiz , 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 6, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365 (quoting the statutory requirement that mopeds " ‘comply with those motor vehicle safety standards deemed necessary and prescribed by the director of motor vehicles’ " under NMSA 1978, § 66-3-1101 (1981) ); State v. Richardson , 1992-NMCA-041, ¶ 9, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (noting provisions in the Motor Vehicle Code governing safety that relate to tractors); see also Wright v. Moore , 931 A.2d 405, 408 (Del. 2007) ("The motor vehicle statutes, without doubt, are enacted for the safety of the traveling public."); Commonwealth v. Church , 513 Pa. 534, 522 A.2d 30, 35 (1987) ("[T]he primary purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code and its amendment is to protect the public safety ...."). The Legislature's intent to prioritize safety is apparent in the plain language throughout Article 3 of the Motor Vehicle Code and informs our interpretation of its provisions.
See NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.11(H) (2007, amended 2015) (defining "motor vehicle" as "every vehicle that is self-propelled and every vehicle that is propelled by electric power obtained from batteries or from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails"); State v. Richardson, 1992-NMCA-041, ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (reasoning "that a 'motor vehicle' is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category 'vehicle' "). We therefore reject Defendant's argument.
11(H) (2007). State v. Richardson, 1992–NMCA–041, ¶ 5, 113 N.M. 740, 832 P.2d 801 (“[A] ‘motor vehicle’ is but a subset or subgroup of the larger category ‘vehicle’[.]”); cf. State v. Natoni, 2012–NMCA–062, ¶ 14, 282 P.3d 769 (holding that an ATV qualifies as a “vehicle” for purposes of Section 66–1–4.19(B) and the Motor Vehicle Code's DWI statute, NMSA 1978, § 66–8–102(A) (2010) ).
SeeNMSA 1978, § 66–1–4.19(B) (2005) (defining “vehicle” as “every device in, upon[,] or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, ... except devices moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks”); Saiz, 2001–NMCA–035, ¶ 1, 130 N.M. 333, 24 P.3d 365 (holding that a moped is a vehicle for purposes of DWI) cf. State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 741–42, 832 P.2d 801, 802–03 (Ct.App.1992) (holding that a farm tractor is both a motor vehicle and a vehicle, and thus an intoxicated person operating a farm tractor on an unpaved roadway maintained by the county could be charged with violating Section 66–8–102(A)). In addition, there is no dispute that Defendant was driving on a public road, and therefore would qualify as driving “within this state” for purposes of applying Section 66–8–102(A).
See NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.19(B) (2005) (defining "vehicle" as "every device in, upon[,] or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, . . . except devices moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks"); Saiz, 2001-NMCA-035, ¶ 1 (holding that a moped is a vehicle for purposes of DWI) cf. State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 741-42, 832 P.2d 801, 802-03 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a farm tractor is both a motor vehicle and a vehicle, and thus an intoxicated person operating a farm tractor on an unpaved roadway maintained by the county could be charged with violating Section 66-8-102(A)). In addition, there is no dispute that Defendant was driving on a public road, and therefore would qualify as driving "within this state" for purposes of applying Section 66-8-102(A).
In an intoxicated state, that person could conceivably veer into the range of pedestrian traffic or into oncoming traffic on a highway and create a great danger to other travelers. See State v. Richardson, 113 N.M. 740, 742, 832 P.2d 801 (1992) ("Surely, no one would argue that a farm tractor suddenly veering into oncoming traffic on a highway would be any less dangerous than an automobile operated in the same manner."); see also Covert v. Fisher, 151 S.W.3d 70 (Mo. App. 2004) (upholding suspension of driving privileges where petitioner was driving golf cart while intoxicated on streets of public subdivision). Based on the above reasoning, we determine that a mini-truck fits within the definition of vehicle under K.S.A. 2006 Supp. 8-1485 and that the Kansas Department of Revenue properly suspended Shirley's driving privileges under the Kansas implied consent law.