Accordingly, the two-part Dixon test addresses (1) whether the movement or confinement of the victim was beyond that necessary to consummate the accompanying crime; and (2) whether the additional movement or confinement prevented the victim from summoning help, lessened the defendant's risk of detection, or created a significant danger or increased the victim's risk of harm. State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 442–43 (Tenn.2008). Under the first prong of the Dixon test, the distance of the victim's movement and the duration or place of the victim's confinement were identified as factors to be considered when determining if the movement or confinement was beyond that necessary to consummate the accompanying crime.
817 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tenn. 1991), abrogated by State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), as recognized in State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008). Later, in place of Anthony's "essentially incidental" analysis, the supreme court formulated a two-prong analysis to determine whether the evidence supported a separate conviction for kidnapping.
817 S.W.2d 299, 306 (Tenn. 1991), abrogated by State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), as recognized by State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008). In place of Anthony's "essentially incidental" analysis, the supreme court formulated a two-prong analysis to determine whether the evidence supported a separate conviction for kidnapping.
In State v. Richardson, the Tennessee Supreme Court clarified that this two-prong test "fully replace[d] the Anthony 'essentially incidental' analysis," and that "[t]he Dixon test should be used exclusively in all future inquiries." 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008). This was short-lived.
Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dixon test in State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008), not long before the petitioner's conviction. The petitioner's Claim 27, as originally articulated, is premised on trial counsel's failure to request a Dixon due-process analysis in the trial (or appellate) court.
1997). The supreme court stated that although it adheres to the due process principles articulated in Anthony, the two-part test announced in Dixon replaced Anthony's "essentially incidental" analysis.State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 442-43 443 n. 5 (Tenn. 2008). "The Dixon test `provides the structure necessary for applying the principles announced in Anthony.'"
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstated the convictions. State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008). II. Trial
The supreme court stated that although it adheres to the due process principles articulated in Anthony, the two-part test announced inDixon replaced Anthony's "essentially incidental" analysis. State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 442-43 443 n. 5 (Tenn. 2008). "The Dixon test `provides the structure necessary for applying the principles announced in Anthony.'"
957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn.1997). Under Dixon, the inquiry became (1) whether the movement or confinement of the victim was beyond that necessary to consummate the accompanying crime; and (2) whether the additional movement or confinement prevented the victim from summoning help, lessened the defendant's risk of detection, or created a significant danger or increased the victim's risk of harm.Id.; see also State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 442–43 (Tenn.2008) (recognizing that the Dixon test replaced the Anthony “essentially incidental” analysis). Under this framework, the jury's role was limited to determining whether the State had proven the elements of kidnapping and the accompanying felony beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Dixon test should be used exclusively in all future inquiries.State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 442-43 (Tenn. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Applying the Dixon test to the instant case, we must first determine whether the victim's movement or confinement was beyond that necessary to consummate the especially aggravated robbery. Especially aggravated robbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from a person, accomplished with a deadly weapon where the victim suffers serious bodily injury. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-401, -403.